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Daniel Scott

Illinois State University, dpscott@ilstu.edu

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AN OLD SOLDIER'S VIEW OF THE EARLY COLD WAR,
1949-1953

Daniel P. Scott

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This Master's Thesis examines General Douglas MacArthur's strategic assessments which led to his pursuit of the expansion of the Korean War beyond the Yalu River. By examining General MacArthur's actions during the Korean War, I clarify the reason behind his desire to expand the war into Manchuria and China. This evaluation also provides insight into MacArthur's overall early Cold War strategy – 1949-1953. This Master's Thesis challenges the notion that General MacArthur's desire to use atomic weaponry in the expansion of the Korean War as being indicative of a flawed personality or a lack of understanding of the geopolitical situation. Some viewed General MacArthur as a warmonger, who purposefully sought to antagonize the Soviet Union into a general war. In contrast, I postulate that MacArthur's Korean War strategy demonstrated his intricate evaluation of the geopolitical situation of the early Cold War period.

AN OLD SOLDIER'S VIEW OF THE EARLY COLD WAR,
1949-1953

DANIEL P. SCOTT

A Thesis Submitted in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

Department of History

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AN OLD SOLDIER'S VIEW OF THE EARLY COLD WAR,
1949-1953

DANIEL P. SCOTT

COMMITTEE MEMBERS:

Ross Kennedy, Chair

Richard Hughes

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DS.

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INTRODUCTION

The events of 1949 altered the Cold War strategy of the United States. The year began with a key strategic victory by Chinese Communist Forces over Chinese Nationalist Forces, resulting in the decimation of the Kuomintang (KMT) army, its forced retreat south, and its eventual withdrawal to Formosa in October. This victory led to the eventual declaration of the formation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) that same year. In March 1949, the Soviet Union successfully detonated their first atomic bomb, effectively ending the U.S. atomic monopoly. The latter half of 1949 consisted of secret meetings between Soviet and PRC leadership, which resulted in the solidification of the expansion of the Communist bloc in the Far East with the signing of the Sino-Soviet 'Mutual Assistance' treaty, in February 1950.¹ Following this alliance, North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950.

President Harry Truman and his administration perceived these events as very threatening not only to Western Europe, but also to United States preponderance worldwide. Leading officials, notably the writers of NSC-68, viewed the Soviet Union as expansionists, extremely aggressive and intent on spreading communism throughout Western Europe and in Asia, even at the risk of open war with the United States. Confirmation of this perception presented itself in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) attack on South Korea and later by Soviet support of Chinese intervention in the war.²

Until the Soviet Union's detonation of an atomic bomb in 1949, the Truman Administration believed it could deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe with its atomic monopoly. Up until 1949, U.S. strategy assumed that if the Soviet Union did attack the west, the Soviets would probably occupy most of Europe in the early stages of the war. The United States would probably ultimately prevail in the conflict, however, because it could mobilize superior economic resources against the Soviet Union and use its atomic bombs to destroy the Soviets' military and economic assets. As Soviet capabilities became degraded, the United States would re-invade the continent and win the war. The Soviet Union's new atomic capability, however, made it unlikely this plan would work, since the Soviet Union could now attack the United States economy and bomb any invading force in Europe.³

Faced with this new Soviet development the Truman Administration shifted its strategic containment policy to 'forward defense.'⁴ The reason being that if war came against the Soviet Union, the United States had to be prepared to deliver punishing and decisive blow at the start of the war, to destroy Soviet atomic and conventional forces, or face the reality of the devastation and possible defeat of the United States at the hands of the Soviet Union. In April 1950 the National Security Council drew up NSC-68, which outlined this new strategy. It called for a massive military buildup, which would take several years to complete. Upon completion of this military build-up, U.S. officials believed the United States would have the forces to prevail in a war with the Soviet Union and, armed with that confidence, they envisioned at that point implementing an assertive diplomatic strategy "to check and to roll back the Kremlin's drive for world domination."⁵

Meanwhile, as the Truman Administration sought to aggressively challenge the Soviet Union's expansion in Europe, their position on Asia was held with less fervor. There, the Truman Administration identified Japan as being of the utmost importance to U.S. security. U.S. officials determined that the 'loss' of China, although damaging to the position of the United States, was not fatal. While they recognized China as being important to the reconstruction of Japan, the Administration maintained that the resources of Southeast Asia would provide Japan all it required. Far Eastern affairs did not chiefly concern the Administration until the DPRK invaded South Korea, on June 25, 1950, thereby damaging the credibility of containment.⁶

To bolster the credibility of containment as it pursued its military build-up, the Truman Administration intervened in the Korean War to defend South Korea and repositioned the U.S. Seventh Fleet to protect the KMT on Formosa. The Administration strategically managed U.S. intervention in the Korean War to prevent expansion of the conflict into global warfare against the Soviet Union and the PRC. This limited warfare mindset reflected the Administration's belief that it was unwise for the United States to take aggressive actions that risked general war until it completed its military buildup, as outlined in NSC-68. Following the successful landing at Inchon and counter attack against the DPRK, the Administration fully supported pursuing the DPRK until its destruction, but only because U.S. leaders did not believe the PRC would intervene in the conflict. When the PRC did intervene, the Truman Administration became risk averse, choosing instead to wage a limited war confined to the Korean peninsula.⁷

These views, however, were not shared by the Commander and Chief of the Far East and Commander of all United Nations Forces General Douglas MacArthur. The General persistently called for taking an aggressive approach to combat Chinese Communist Forces fighting in Korea. These disagreements eventually led to the dismissal of General MacArthur from command, on April 11, 1951, by Truman. Why did MacArthur want to risk an expanded war with China in 1950? How did this willingness to risk an expanded war relate to his overall strategic views in 1950? How did his strategic views differ from the Truman Administration's?

When embarking on an attempt to understand MacArthur's complicated strategic world view in the years 1949-1953, one must first understand his career and the political nature of the man. MacArthur was born in 1880 to Captain Arthur MacArthur, Jr. (who was a Medal of Honor recipient during the American Civil War) and his wife Mary Pinkney Hardy MacArthur. In 1903, MacArthur graduated from West Point at the top of his class. As a newly commissioned officer, his first duty station assignment came as a member of the 3rd Engineer Battalion – which shortly after his arrival deployed to the Philippines. Two years later he received orders to report to a new assignment in Tokyo. When World War I broke out MacArthur was promoted to Major where he served as the head of the Bureau of Information for the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker. Upon the United States entrance into the war, MacArthur received new orders assigning him as Chief of Staff of the 42nd Division, deploying him to France. In 1919, MacArthur became Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Three years later MacArthur received orders to return to the Philippines. Following his promotion to Major General in 1925, MacArthur received orders which stationed him stateside for the next 4 years until

reassignment sent him back to the Philippines in 1929. The following year, MacArthur was sworn in as Chief of Staff of the United States Army with the rank of General. In 1935, MacArthur drew a new assignment sending him back to the Philippines charged with the task of supervising the creation of the Philippine Army. There he would retire from the Army at the end of 1937, remaining as a civilian adviser to the Philippine government. The eruption of World War II in 1941 resulted in the federalization of the Philippine Army and MacArthur being recalled to active duty, named Commander of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, and promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General. The surrender of Japan brought a new assignment for MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the Far East. During his reign as Commander in Chief of the Far East, he considered running for the presidency of the United States of America. This can be seen in the fact that although he openly expressed to Eisenhower that he had no such desire, he still allowed his name to be put on the ballot for the 1948 Republican Primary. Even after his controversial “retirement” he toured the United States giving public speeches, putting himself out there politically for the 1952 Republican Primary. This basic fact of MacArthur’s political ambition makes the understanding of his outlook on the early Cold War all the more significant to historians of this period.⁸

Literature that addresses Douglas MacArthur falls into two polar opposite camps when discussing his legacy and the makeup of the man. The first group consists of a very small minority comprised mostly of men who served underneath his military command for numerous years. Their aim is not to understand MacArthur’s strategic mindset but simply rehabilitate and reinforce the heroic image of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, who was a West Point honor graduate and a Medal of Honor recipient and

who – as a ‘masterful’ strategist – helped lead the rollback of Japanese conquest of the Pacific in World War II. They do not make an attempt analyze MacArthur’s strategic views. They instead emphasize his leadership as being integral to shaping the emergence of a peaceful Japan as “an engine of world economic growth and stability.”⁹ One ardent defender of the General was his former aide Major General Courtney Whitney. In 1955, he wrote a biography of General MacArthur entitled, *MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History*. In the final paragraph of the book, Whitney claims that a clever conspiracy, rooted in communist influence throughout Washington, led to the rejection of General MacArthur’s strategic plan of the global war on communism.¹⁰

The other camp of scholars, such as historian Burton Kaufman, also pay little attention to MacArthur’s strategic views. Instead scholarship here criticizes General MacArthur’s judgment ascribing his views or decisions to a severe flaw in his personality. To them, General MacArthur was an egotistical and self-centered man who was continuously working toward his own glory and political goals.¹¹ Burton Kaufman, explains this theory of him “as a military leader obsessed with his own sense of destiny and by a reckless disregard for higher authority.”¹² These scholars echo the thoughts Truman wrote in his diary in which he describes MacArthur as “Mr. Prima Donna” who told God what to do.¹³

Rosemary Foot and Peter Lowe provide good examples of this critical scholarship of General MacArthur. Foot’s work, *The Wrong War*, does not attempt to provide a direct analysis of MacArthur’s strategic motivations. Instead she portrays him as a grand manipulator and coercive force within the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Truman Administration whom Truman and his Eurocentric cohorts combated daily. She portrays him as an overzealous United States General who believed his military to be the world's most superior.¹⁴ Foot further expounds upon this idea by explaining that General MacArthur possessed a “cavalier attitude” toward the potential bombing of China.¹⁵ To emphasize her point she provides an excerpt from General Matthew Ridgway's memoir, *The Korean War*, where he revisits a meeting he had in August of 1950 in which General MacArthur expressed the opinion that Chinese intervention was unlikely, but he added, “I pray nightly that they will – would get down on my knees in order to have an opportunity to fight the Chinese Communists.”¹⁶

Peter Lowe's interpretation of General MacArthur is similar to Foot's. He not only emphasizes General MacArthur's selfish motivations he also explained, through an examination of General MacArthur's Senate Hearing testimony, how the General viewed American forces as far superior to that of Communist China and Russia. Lowe writes, “He was to a large extent an independent operator because of the extraordinary nature of his long career, because of his personality, and because of his remaining [political] ambitions. He diverged from the Truman Administration chiefly in the extent of his obsession with ‘Red’ China; he was not particularly interested in the Soviet Union and was far more moderate towards Moscow than might have been expected.”¹⁷

What is lacking in the works by Peter Lowe and Foot is an exact analysis of why General MacArthur held such a strategic opinion of North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union. They simply dismiss MacArthur's assessments as “imaginative”.¹⁸ The

scholarship of these authors does not explain MacArthur's strategic outlook, they focus much more on blanket characterizations of his actions as flaws in personality – i.e. obsession with 'Red China', a megalomaniac, and 'imaginative'.

In contrast to the Truman Administration, General MacArthur wanted to pursue an aggressive "rollback" strategy in fighting the Cold War in 1950. In his view, the Korean War provided western powers the opportunity to regain control of Asia by re-unifying Korea. The intervention of the People's Republic of China in conflict, likewise, provided the United States the opportunity to decisively alter the Chinese Civil War through U.S. military action and through the "unleashing" the Kuomintang in both mainland China and Korea. MacArthur believed that the PRC's control over China was a temporary one, which could easily be toppled with U.S. military support. Soviet intervention in a United States – PRC war was of no real risk in either Asia or in Europe, according to MacArthur, because of what he viewed as Soviet military weaknesses and the Soviet leadership's risk-averse nature. The opportunity was now, before the Soviet Union developed its atomic arsenal and delivery capabilities. Seizing the opportunity in Asia would amount to a decisive victory in the Cold War for the United States and its Western Allies.

CHAPTER I

THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF ASIA

The strategic epicenter of Cold War foreign policy differed between the Truman Administration and General MacArthur. The Administration believed Western Europe to be the key to the balance of Cold War power.¹⁹ To MacArthur, the idea that the Cold War would be won or lost in Europe was an incorrect assessment of the current geopolitical situation. He contended that United States needed to actively participate in the rebuilding and restructuring of nations throughout the Far East. Although they differed upon which Cold War theater held more significance, both the Truman Administration and General MacArthur ardently believed in the containment strategy – seeking to “check the expansion of Soviet influence” in the Far East.²⁰ They both regarded Japan as the most significant territory in the Far East, not only to the interest of the United States but the world’s security.²¹ Furthermore, MacArthur also shared in the belief that if the Soviet Union was permitted to co-opt the resources and raw materials either in Western Europe (as the Germans did), or in the Far East (as the Japanese did), then they would have the opportunity to significantly increase the size and strength of their military – making them a most formidable foe.²²

MacArthur perceived the Soviet Union’s aggressive expansion in the Far East as motivated by their desire to achieve two basic goals, 1) valuable raw materials and 2) fresh water access. MacArthur insisted that these goals had been historically well

documented. He explained in his memoir that his father, Arthur MacArthur, experienced firsthand the Soviet Union's attempt during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), to expand its territory and achieve these goals.²³

These goals were first scripted in a 1947 memo when MacArthur sent a message to the Secretary of State, George Marshall, in which he outlined the strategy of the Soviet Union in North Korea. In this message he explained that the Soviet Union had not altered its goal of retaining North Korea as a loyal satellite state "to insure Soviet use of Wonsan and Chinnampo [as] Soviet ports."²⁴ MacArthur argued that the Soviet Union's strategic goal in the Far East, the reason that they got involved in the Pacific Theater in the final months of World War II, resided in its habitual desire for warm water access. General MacArthur further explicated upon the historical nature of this desire during his congressional testimony. He stated that the Russian desire for coastal access existed because they had "always believed that [they] could not take [their] rightful place in the international sphere of commerce and industry unless [they] shared the commerce of the seas. For centuries [Russia] has been seeking warm waters."²⁵ Such access in the warm waters of the Pacific and Indian Oceans would allow "her a chance to develop transportation [and] her water transportation facilities."²⁶ The access these oceans would provide for the Soviet Union would result in an outflanking of the Mediterranean, "but it would place her fair and flush upon the continent of Africa, which for the next hundred years, with its enormous industrial potential is something that attracts all commerce and all industry, whatever its nationality might be."²⁷

As mentioned earlier, the two most important locations, as designated by the Truman Administration and endorsed by MacArthur, were Germany and Japan. These two nations were proclaimed to be the powerful epicenters that were the keys of their respective geographical locations. Under this assessment, U.S. leaders believed that if either of these two nations were co-opted into the Soviet sphere, the Soviet Union would have access to invaluable resources of men and material. This meant that the Soviet Union would be able to mobilize the available labor force of either nation, which would undoubtedly provide the Soviet Union the capability to drastically enhance their military manufacturing output as well as their gathering of resources. The result of this would provide the Soviet Union the ability to drastically build up its military force and enhance its military capabilities. The Truman Administration and General MacArthur believed that this co-option should be prevented at all costs or the United States, along with the rest of the world, would find itself at the mercy of the Soviet Union's expansion.

Japan's significance to the security of the United States, thus the world, can be found in a report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 9, 1949. The sentiment found in this report was fully supported by MacArthur and the Truman Administration. The JCS report expanded upon the geopolitical implication of Japan, explaining that if the Soviet Union absorbed Japan into its orbit; "Japan, also because of her geographic location, could under [U.S.S.R.] control be used as a base for aggressive action directly against United States bases in the Western Pacific, in anticipation of step-by-step advances eastward and to the Southeast Asia region. ... Japan's strategic importance is increased by her manpower and her industrial potentials. ... Despite the logistic demand that would need

to be met in making her support useful... these... potentials could... have great influence either for or against the interests of the United States in event of global war.”²⁸

While these basic goals were the motivating factors behind the Soviet Union’s intervention in World War II, their larger goal sought to secure a voice in the rebuilding of Japan so that they might expand their periphery in the Far East with the eventual solidification of their Eastern Front.²⁹ MacArthur explained, “What the Soviets sought were the economic frontiers of the world, Asia to the north, Africa to the south – frontiers which possessed a mighty reservoir of the world’s potential wealth in raw resources. The center represented little in the economic advance, the flanks everything.”³⁰ Achievement of either flank would result in the eventual solidification of the other; MacArthur argued that if the Soviet Union achieved its current expansion eastward, solidifying their desired Eastern Front, then soon they would be able to expand their Western Front all the more aggressively.³¹

The successful co-option of Japan and solidification of the Soviet Union’s Eastern Flank resided in their successful influence in China. This understanding led MacArthur to believe, more so than the Truman Administration, that China was a key power center in Asia and its loss to communism was a major threat to the security of the United States and the world. If the Soviet Union was allowed to solidify its position in the Far East there was no telling the opportunities or the capabilities that would be offered for the nation.

General MacArthur’s overall opinion on the significance of China and its role in determining the allegiances of the Asiatic region cannot be found in any direct quote or

statement. Instead, it can be gleaned from the multiple recommendations and memos directed at the Truman Administration, Republican Senators, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW). Most of these recommendations centered upon the strategic importance of the United States solidifying its geopolitical preponderance of power throughout the entire Pacific Basin. MacArthur speculated that if communists were allowed to remain in power in China that it would drastically damage the preponderance of the United States in that region, while providing the Soviet Union the opportunity to solidify and expand its influence.

Prior to 1949, when it came to assessing the potential outcome of a World War between the Soviet Union and Western powers, General MacArthur believed – as did the Truman Administration – that the Soviet Union would be defeated. However, unlike the Truman Administration, MacArthur based his notion less upon the American atomic monopoly and more upon his assessment that the capabilities of the Soviet Union were severely hindered by its two front vulnerability, so long as China remained tied to the west. The “loss” of China to the Communists and the signing of the Sino-Soviet Alliance in 1950 was thus a major setback for the United States in MacArthur’s view.

General MacArthur elaborated on this idea in his speech to Congress on April 19, 1951 in Washington D.C. “The issues are global and so interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector, oblivious to those of another, is but to court disaster for the whole,” the General asserted. “While Asia is commonly referred to as the gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other.”³² The United States and her allies

could not afford to allow the Soviet Union the opportunity to expand in either front. For this reason he argued that “if a potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it is for us to counter his effort.”³³ Here MacArthur stressed the significance of the United States to maintain a balanced military in both Europe and Asia in hopes to deter the Soviet Union from continuing its expansion eastward. General MacArthur addressed this issue in a meeting with William J. Sebald (acting U.S. Political Adviser for Japan) and Max W. Bishop. The General expressed concern, to Bishop and Sebald, that the Administration was granting the security of the Far East and the Pacific “far too little consideration” by transferring naval power to the Atlantic, along with the reducing the U.S. airpower in the Pacific.³⁴ MacArthur believed the situation in the Far East to be unstable and that the removal of vital assets necessary to the security of the Far East was detrimental not only to the present situation but also to Global Security. “The Communist threat is a global one,” he stressed. “Its successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every sector. You cannot appease or otherwise surrender to Communism in Asia without simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt its advance in Europe.”³⁵

More specifically, the first reason the ‘loss’ of China was detrimental was because a China within the Soviet Union’s orbit provided it with a strategically key bulwark capable of defending its Far Eastern shores from any aggressive military campaign emanating from Japan, Okinawa or any other part of the Far East by the hand of western powers. This would allow the Soviet Union to eliminate a key strategic flaw in its natural location, namely its vulnerability on its western front in Europe and its eastern front in Asia. This expanded front would also enhance the Soviet Union’s overall military and industrial capabilities. In agreement with Admiral Cooke, MacArthur insisted that if,

“Soviet eastern Asia becomes self-sufficient ..., Soviet Asia can then become an element of strength in the over-all Soviet power structure.... If it is extended to include Korea and broadened to include Manchuria and possibly Hopei and Shantung, it appears probable that the ... balance of power has been moved from the side of the democratic powers to that of Soviet Russia and her satellites.”³⁶

That was precisely what MacArthur contended a ‘friendly’ China afforded the Soviet Union. No longer would the Soviet Union be forced to divide its forces for the security of its borders in both Western Europe and East Asia. The Sino-Soviet Alliance now provided the Soviets military flexibility by strengthening their Far Eastern position without utilizing their own military power. De Facto political control of China provided the Soviet Union with a newly expanded front in the Far East; stretching from the eastern edge of Siberia on the Sea of Japan, along the 38th Parallel in North Korea, down to the South China Sea, just north of Vietnam. The Soviet Union had now multiplied its reach without stretching the limits of its military force – the only major military presence in these newly allied countries was in the form of military advisers to assist in military planning and training of national military forces.

To MacArthur, the method by which this regional acquisition was achieved was almost as significant as the military flexibility afforded by this new bulwark. The acquisition, made without military force, saved the Soviet Union from expending its limited military resources or its natural resources. MacArthur noted that the, “Russian policy is not to sacrifice its own troops, but to use those of its friends. The enormous expansion of Soviet influence since the end of the World War II has been brought about

without the Russian soldier firing a shot in battle.”³⁷ This allowed the Soviets to maintain a strategic balance necessary to maintain their strength in the global community without risking open war and continuing to meet their desired reconstruction and expansion goals.

The gains made through the Sino-Soviet Alliance provided the Soviet Union with access to invaluable strategic resources that it had long desired in the Far East. China provided them the expanded opportunity for warm water access, which MacArthur argued, had been an ultimate goal of the Soviet Union since the late 1800s, as seen in the Russo-Japanese War and Soviet involvement in Korea following World War II. MacArthur wrote in his memoir that this new strategic affordability provided the Soviet Union with an atmosphere conducive to exploitation of natural resources throughout not only of Asia, but the possibility of expansion into Africa.³⁸ These acquisitions, through an alliance with China, provided the Soviet Union with invaluable resources necessary for expediting its reconstruction, thereby its expansion.

Secondly, the ‘loss’ of China, and the method by which it was lost, created to MacArthur an environment which might lead to a domino effect throughout Asia. He argued that the nations of Asia would drift one by one from western influence to that of the Soviet Union. MacArthur founded this theory upon the belief that the alliance of Far Eastern nations with the West was tenuous. MacArthur explained that if Asian allies did not receive actual help from the United States, or the United Nations, that “they very probably will make the best bargain they can with the other side so that they can escape the depredations and destructiveness of being overrun.”³⁹ This is not the only example of MacArthur explaining the psychology of the ‘oriental mind’. In a composed

memorandum in June 1950 he implored that the Truman Administration maintain a sense of urgency when dealing with other nations throughout Asia in the wake of the ‘loss of China’: “This is our most impelling need of the moment in this quarter of the globe – the regaining of our lost initiative over the events which are stirring all of the Asian peoples. For, it is in the pattern of Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute and dynamic leadership but quickly turn from a leadership characterized by timidity or vacillation.”⁴⁰ Thus, these rebuilding nations sought alliances only with the most powerful nations. This meant that the successful expansion of the Soviet Union’s preponderance in the Far East was directly tied to the decrease of that of the United States. The Soviet Union’s successful gains in China might lead Japan and other states to shift to the Soviet Union’s side, which might allow the Soviets to co-opt Far Eastern resources, perhaps through bilateral trade agreements as they had done in Eastern Europe. The result would be a major shift in the balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union.

Solidification of the Soviet Union’s Eastern Front along with the co-option of resources available would have a paramount influence upon the Soviet Union’s effort, desire, and method of expansion into Western Europe. MacArthur fervently believed that the security of Western Europe was tied directly to the allegiances and security of the Far East. He stated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 23, 1950, the importance of the Inchon landing and the moment that was at hand, “It is plainly apparent that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest.... We here fight Europe’s war with arms, while there it is still confined to words. If we lose the war to Communism in Asia, the fate of Europe will be gravely jeopardized. Win it and Europe will probably be saved from war and stay free.”⁴¹

MacArthur reaffirmed this message to the JCS writing on December 30, 1950. “I understand thoroughly the demand for European security and fully concur in doing everything possible in that sector, but not to the point of accepting defeat anywhere else and acceptance which I am sure could not fail to ensure later defeat in Europe itself.”⁴² Again this belief can be found in a letter from MacArthur to Republican Congressman Joe Martin, dated March 20th 1951, “... if we lose the war to Communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable; win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. ... There is no substitute for victory.”⁴³ Here we see that MacArthur believed the security of Europe was tied to the security of Asia, and the linchpin in Asia was China.

Thirdly, and most often noted, General MacArthur emphasized the security risk that a Communist China posed to not only the geopolitical preponderance of the United States’ power in Europe and Asia, but also to the defensive perimeter of the mainland of the United States. MacArthur identified Formosa as one of the most significant strategic parcels of land – outside of Japan – that held the key to the preponderance of United States power in the Far East and the Pacific. The General believed that the Chinese Communist victory in mainland China meant that Formosa would soon too fall to the Chinese Communists. In early 1949, for example, he contended that the ‘next logical ‘domino’ to fall to the Communists would be Formosa, which would be detrimental to the United States security and position in the Far East. “If Formosa went to the Chinese Communists,” he argued to Administration officials William Sebald and Max Bishop, “our whole defensive position in the Far East was definitely lost; that it could only result eventually in putting our defensive line back to the west coast of the continental United

States.”⁴⁴ MacArthur added “that there could be no question but that if Formosa were in the hands of the Chinese Communists it would be available to the [U.S.S.R.] as a base at any time the latter desired.”⁴⁵

MacArthur had been concerned about East Asia and the United States defensive perimeter for some time. Following the surrender of Japan in 1945, the Truman Administration and MacArthur both saw the need to expand the defensive perimeter of the United States in the Pacific. In 1948, in the wake of the military success of Chinese Communists against Chinese Nationalists forces, the strategic significance and security of Japan came to the forefront of political discussion. This resulted in further strategic discussions between MacArthur and State Department officials in Japan on March 1, 1948, to be followed by the JCS’s construction of a memorandum evaluating Japan mid-1949. Out of these discussions came the defensive perimeter made up of island chains, which Japan was a part of.

On March 1, in Japan during a luncheon with George Kennan, MacArthur explained to those present the strategic significance of Japan to the U.S. defense perimeter. The “strategic boundaries of the United States were no longer along the western shores of the North and South America,” he stated; “they lay along the eastern shores of the Asiatic continent.” He continued, “Our fundamental strategic task was to make sure that no serious amphibious force could ever be assembled and dispatched from an Asiatic port. ... The center of our defense problem [has] now sifted to the north, since it was now only toward the north that a threat of the development of amphibious power could mature.”⁴⁶ Based on the current power dynamic in the Far East, MacArthur

outlined his defensive perimeter that was designed to solidify United States interests throughout the Pacific and in the Far East. MacArthur explained that this defensive perimeter, “was a U-shaped area embracing the Aleutian [Islands], Midway, the Former Japanese mandated islands ...the Philippines, and above all Okinawa.”⁴⁷

To General MacArthur, the defensive perimeter, along the islands falling within its scope, provided the United States and the United Nations an optimal position to not only defend itself but to stage a devastating strike force against their enemies.⁴⁸ Okinawa, for its strategic potential, was designated as the most significant island within this point for two reasons. First, its location, size, and established air strips which provided the United States a location to maintain her interests in the region. This meant that with the United States Air Force the United States could control the “Asiatic coast from Vladivostok to Singapore,” to include “the ports of northern Asia from which an amphibious operation could conceivably be launched.”⁴⁹ Beyond preventing amphibious assaults from the north, Okinawa also provided the United States the ability to retain complete control over “the Ryukyu [island] chain south of Latitude 29.”⁵⁰

One year later in March 1949, in a press interview, MacArthur publicly stated for the first time America’s Pacific defensive perimeter: “Now the Pacific has become an Anglo-Saxon lake and our line of defense runs through the chain of islands fringing the coast of Asia. It starts from the Philippines and continues through the Ryukyu Archipelago which includes its broad main bastion, Okinawa. Then it bends back through Japan and the Aleutian Island chain to Alaska.”⁵¹ It is important to note here the absence of Formosa, even though General MacArthur emphasized the importance of Formosa in

that meeting with Bishop and Sebald less than one month earlier on February 3, 1949. The General's reasoning for this omission can be based upon the understanding that the Kuomintang (KMT) had only lost a major battle and control of northern China. However, they still maintained control of southern China, and the Chinese Communists had yet to even cross the Yangtze River. Furthermore, the KMT continued to receive military supplies from the United States. Their complete defeat and subsequent evacuation to Formosa was not yet solidified.

Once the Chinese Communists forced the retreat of the KMT to Formosa, on December 10, 1949, MacArthur clarified his position to include Formosa within the defensive perimeter. The "threat of the development of amphibious power" had now returned in both the north and south of Asia.⁵² The United States' security in the Pacific was now severely threatened. In the mind of MacArthur the 'loss' of Formosa was all but guaranteed and this fact severely threatened the longevity of the United States ability to control this "bastion", thus their preponderance of power in the Pacific would crumble and the mainland of the United States would be threatened.⁵³

On June 14, 1950 – eleven days before the start of the Korean War – MacArthur detailed for Washington an eleven point memorandum in which he explained in great detail the strategic value of Formosa, not only in the Far East, but also to United States national security.⁵⁴ He contended that "it is obvious that the time must come in the foreseeable future when a line must be drawn beyond which Communist expansion will be stopped. As a means of regaining a proper United States posture in the Orient it is apparent to me that the United States should initiate measures to prevent the domination

of Formosa by a Communist power. I am equally certain that it would be a fundamental error with regard to any part of the orient to fail to take appropriate measures in those areas still open to our influence.” He continued, “Formosa is an integral part of [our defensive perimeter] which in the event of hostilities can exercise a decisive degree of control of military operations along the periphery of Eastern Asia. ... The United States striking forces based on this line would have the capability to interdict the limited means of communication available to the Communists and deny or materially reduce the ability of the [U.S.S.R.] to exploit the natural resources of East and Southeast Asia.”⁵⁵

MacArthur concluded his point by exclaiming that these capabilities hinged upon the United States “dependence upon the retention of Formosa by a friendly or a neutral power.”⁵⁶ Therefore, “the domination of Formosa by an unfriendly power would be a disaster of utmost importance to the United States, and I am convinced that time is of the essence. I strongly believe that the Commander-in-Chief Far East should be authorized and directed to initiate without delay a survey of the military, economic and political requirements to prevent the domination of Formosa by a Communist power and that the results of such a survey be analyzed and acted upon as a basis for United States national policy with respect to Formosa.”⁵⁷

General MacArthur further emphasized the strategic significance of Formosa in his letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) of Chicago, dated August 27, 1950 (This letter was written following his personal inspection of Formosa on August 1, 1950). In it he emphasized that Formosa, positioned at the very center of the United States’ position in Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines would provide a foothold in the United States defensive perimeter if it got in the hands of a powerful unfriendly nation to the

United States. He explained, “At the present time there is on Formosa a concentration of operational air and naval bases which is potentially greater than any similar concentration on the Asiatic mainland between the Yellow Sea and the Strait of Malacca.”⁵⁸

Furthermore, MacArthur described the ease at which the development of additional military facilities could be achieved through the exploitation of present World War II Japanese facilities already located on the island.⁵⁹ At that present moment MacArthur assessed that Formosa itself had the capacity to stage “ten to twenty air groups of types ranging from jet fighters to B-29-type bombers, as well as to provide forward operating facilities for submarines.”⁶⁰

The capability of the enemy’s staged military assets on Formosa was of paramount danger to the United States because they were “100 miles closer to Okinawa than any point on the Chinese mainland and are 150 miles closer to Clark Field and Manila [both located in the Philippines] than any other area which could be acquired by Communist military forces.”⁶¹ This would allow enemy forces to increase their air effort 100 percent against United States airfields, located in such areas as Okinawa. Western shipping lanes would also become the predatorial waters of enemy submarines. MacArthur emphasized that the geographical make-up of Formosa would provide enemy forces not only an ideal location to stage offensive operations but also provide them with the capability to “checkmate” defensive or counter-offensive operations by American and allied forces.⁶² General MacArthur emphasized that any hostile nation that controlled Formosa would be afforded the position to “either counterbalance or overshadow the strategic importance of the central and southern flank of the United States front line position.”⁶³ He continued to expound, “Formosa in the hands of the Communists can be

compared to an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender ideally located to accomplish Soviet offensive strategy and at the same time checkmate counteroffensive operations by United States Forces based on Okinawa and the Philippines.”⁶⁴

The term ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ was one that MacArthur often used to describe Formosa. One reason for his constant usage of that term would have been to emphasize and remind Washington officials of his prior assessment of the weakness of the Soviet Union, one key being their lack of navy. The significance of this Soviet deficiency resided in the assessment that under current conditions any attempt by an Asian power to attack the United States or its allies must be amphibious, and thus it would be doomed to failure without control of the sea or air.⁶⁵ However, MacArthur explained, Communist control of Formosa would provide the Soviet Union the opportunity to utilize this unsinkable aircraft carrier to supplement their lacking navy. Therefore, the Soviet Union would now be provided the capability to advance its position in the Pacific Ocean without maintaining a naval force other than her submarines. The island would inherently enhance the Soviet navy providing it with the ability to act as a forward operating base for her naval and air strengths. Staged out of Formosa the Soviet Union would be capable of causing serious damage to United States shipping lanes and interests. Furthermore, MacArthur assessed, that Communist seizure of Formosa would mean that “Russia will have acquired an additional “fleet” which will have been obtained and can be maintained at an incomparably lower cost to the Soviets than could its equivalent of ten or twenty aircraft carriers with their supporting forces.”⁶⁶

To supplement his emphasis on their strategic vulnerability MacArthur focused upon the historical use of Formosa as a springboard for military aggression against its southern neighbors. He emphasized that the Japanese used the island as a staging area and a supporting base of their Pacific operations in 1941. Formosa was the vital linchpin in the transportation and communication from Japan throughout the South Pacific. As Allied Forces pushed back the Japanese it became even more vital to their defensive perimeter. Permitting enemy forces to acquire such strategically geographical pertinent lands, such as Korea or Formosa, could alter regional strength and history could repeat itself. "Its military potential would again be fully exploited as the means to breach and neutralize our Western Pacific defense system and mount a war of conquest against the free nations of the Pacific Basin."⁶⁷ MacArthur expounded upon this in his testimony to Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper, "If the enemy secured Formosa and secured thereby the Pacific Ocean that would immeasurably increase the dangers of that ocean being used as an avenue of advance by any potential enemy. And Alaska is on that ocean; it would unquestionably increase the dangers to Alaska as well as it would be to the State of California, the State of Washington, and Oregon, Central and South America."⁶⁸

The strategic threat went beyond the offensive and defensive posture that Formosa offered. Following the 'loss' of China, General MacArthur believed that the resources necessary for rebuilding Japan were of the upmost importance, and in Formosa he noted the available agriculture as being significant to the Japanese. Since 1910 Formosa has been able to consistently exporting its food surplus. Prior to the beginning of World War II in Asia, Formosa had been exporting on an annual basis rice and wheat to the approximation of 600,000 metric tons. The implications of these exported goods to

Japan only enhanced her wartime capabilities. MacArthur contended that such numbers could be replicated in a short time and would play a vital role in the rebuilding of Japan. He explained, “the availability of food surplus, may be of considerable importance in reestablishing the economies of those Oriental nations now largely dependent upon United States assistance.” However, if they allowed Formosa to be swallowed by Communists then these surpluses would not only aid the Communist war effort – if a war began – but also assist in the expansion of communism. The latter would be the case due to the fact that much of the Far East had been utterly destroyed by the Japanese and famine had become prevalent throughout the East and Southeast Asia. Thus, these starving nations would be persuaded by the supplies in which the Soviet Union could now offer them, expanding the Soviet orbit.⁶⁹

To General MacArthur the repercussions of the ‘loss’ of China were not to be simply dismissed, for the effects would resonate globally. MacArthur believed that strategic resources necessary to the rebuilding of Japan were severely damaged by this ‘loss’. Furthermore, the PRC’s alliance with the Soviet Union provided them a fortified eastern flank that encouraged an economic and military relationship with the Soviet Union instead of the Imperialist West.⁷⁰ This domino effect would result in strategically threatening the United States’ position in the Pacific. The Communist seizure of China would eventually have an irreversible effect upon the control of Formosa and eventually Japan, thus the United States would face being expelled from the entire Pacific Basin. If Formosa was allowed to fall under the control of the PRC, it would eventually result in the shattering of the free peoples of the Pacific Basin: “In view of the moral implications, as well as the geographic proximity of this area to other endangered peoples on and near

the periphery of China, the future status of Formosa can well be an important factor in determining the political alignment of those national groups who have or must soon make a choice between Communism and the West.”⁷¹ Nothing could be more disastrous than if the United States were to let that happen – if Asia was lost then Europe would soon follow. General MacArthur summarized his feelings on the significance of the ‘loss’ of China to Senator Alexander Wiley before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate. MacArthur said, “It is my own personal opinion that the greatest political mistake we made in a hundred years in the Pacific was in allowing the Communists to grown in power in China.”⁷²

All of these views about the strategic implications of China and Formosa stood in contrast to those of Truman and his top advisors. To the Truman Administration the ‘loss’ of China was categorized as unfortunate, but not one of the upmost importance because their lodestar of the region remained Japan and the rebuilding of Japan was their top priority in the Far East. While a natural counter point to the Administrations reaction was to emphasize the effect that the ‘loss’ of Chinese resources necessary for the rebuilding and future of Japan, it was determined by the Administration that these lost resources would not be the determining factor to the success or failure of Japan’s reconstruction. The Administration fervently believed that other nations of Southeast Asia could supplement the lost resources from China with no overriding effect on Japan.⁷³

When it came to assessing the significance of Formosa, the Truman Administration shared some of the same concerns as General MacArthur did. In 1949,

members of the Truman Administration agreed with the strategic importance outlined by the JCS. So too did they recognize the agricultural and material benefit Formosa offered Japan during peacetime. In time of war, they also agreed that possession of Formosa offered any enemy of the United States great strategic potential. However, what differed was the final assessment of how to handle the situation. In the opinion of the JCS, the island of Formosa did not hold enough significance to “warrant the use of military force.” Instead “the JCS urged the State Department to use diplomatic finesse and economic aid to avert a CCP takeover.”⁷⁴

CHAPTER II

SOVIET STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES

When it came to assessing the strategic capabilities of the Soviet Union, the Truman Administration and General MacArthur differed. In the wake of the events of 1949, culminating in the beginning of the Korean War, President Truman signed NSC-68. As noted earlier, this policy paper stressed that the Soviet Union's acquisition of the atomic bomb threatened America's war-winning capability and required a massive American military expansion in response – an expansion that would take several years to complete. However, unlike the NSC-68 view of the Soviet Union's capabilities, MacArthur thought the Soviet Union and its communist allies in Asia were comparatively inferior to the United States. He argued that the Soviet Union's atomic manufacturing was in its infancy, that logistical problems weakened its military, and that its control over its ally China was tenuous at best.

Contrary to NSC-68, MacArthur did not equate the Soviet Union's nuclear capability with a power shift. He stressed that the Soviet Union had only just developed its own nuclear weapon in 1950; as he explained in his memoir, "at this time, while we had the atomic bomb, she [the Soviet Union] had not yet developed its manufacture."⁷⁵ MacArthur believed that the Soviet Union, only having just developed the atomic bomb, could not achieve a reasonable stockpile any time soon. MacArthur's point was corroborated by a CIA report, published in November 1950, which assessed the Soviet

Union's nuclear capabilities, outlining an estimated numerical difference of atomic bombs between the Soviets and the United States. "The Soviets had fewer than 25 atomic bombs," noted the report, while the United States had a stock pile of "over 500 atomic bombs and at least 264 nuclear-capable aircraft."⁷⁶ When MacArthur analyzed the capabilities of the Soviet Union's atomic weaponry, then, he saw a small stockpile and a balance of power heavily favoring the United States.

MacArthur also perceived that the Soviet Air Force lacked bombers and had logistical problems. During his congressional testimony he elucidated upon the current makeup of the Soviet Union's air strength in the Far East as being comprised of mainly fighters, and "of those fighters, the majority are jets, and are excellent."⁷⁷ Only a small number of Soviet bombers in the Far East existed that were capable of conducting standard bombing attacks against allied positions, let alone executing bombing runs outfitted with atomic bombs.⁷⁸ MacArthur's assessment of the Soviet bombing force aligned with the CIA report, which stated that "the Soviets had ... no effective means of delivering" atomic bombs.⁷⁹

Whatever the balance of atomic forces, MacArthur did not believe atomic weaponry to be the ultimate weapon that could be substituted for an imbalanced or outdated military. He viewed atomic weaponry as a complimentary weapon; it enhanced a modern military, it did not create one. This notion served as the basis for MacArthur's overall assessment of the Soviet Union's capabilities.

Military tactics had evolved over two World Wars. MacArthur saw the method by which the United States defeated Japan as evidence that victory in war no longer revolved

around armor and infantry. Instead success resided in the capability of a nation to control the air and water, supplemented by a strong ground force. While a modern military required diversity, which consisted of strength in equal sectors (air force, navy, and army), a victorious modern military demanded it. Evidence of this sentiment can be found in response to the question asked by Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) inquiring on the capabilities of the Soviet Navy. General MacArthur testified that a balanced modern military resulted in success on the battlefield. However, he explained that the Soviet Union had been unable to develop that necessary part of its military since the time of the czars. He described the historical success that Britain had in frustrating Russian attempts to access the warm waters of the Mediterranean, by way of the battlefield or “in [sic] the utilization of the principle of the balance of power, or in combinations and leagues of various nations to prevent that tremendous expansion.” British success prohibited Russia the “chance to develop her transportation, [and] water transportation facilities.” Without such development, MacArthur exclaimed, “Russia could not dominate and control the world.”⁸⁰

Furthermore, MacArthur speculated that the failure of prior czars to establish any warm water ports in the Mediterranean influenced the Soviet Union deviated from prior czarist goals in the west, to the east, in order to achieve modernization. However, MacArthur pointed out that modernization would take time and that once the Soviets secured access to warm water in the east they would enter “a different phase” of development. In this phase he believed that the Soviet Union would be troubled by the historic nature of its men, that the impedance to this modernization remained that “the Russian has never been a seagoing man. It has been his enormous weakness. His great

strength has always been on the ground.” Stressing that point, MacArthur explained that for these reasons it would take them “decades, [or] some of us believe it centuries, to develop a merchant marine and combat vessels to protect them. The Russians have never shown that capacity in the slightest degree.” Such was the case with the Soviet Union’s navy in the Far East.⁸¹

Currently, in 1951, MacArthur testified that the Soviet Navy was still in its infancy. He explained that those fleets which were located in the Far East, were the Fifth and the Seventh Soviet fleets which were comprised of “light elements, cruiser, [and] destroyer.” According to MacArthur, the main purpose of the submarines stationed there was for defensive measures and their training only meant to deter any attempted amphibious landing. In an open conflict, he assessed, the Soviet Union’s navy as a whole “would not be a match either in quantity and certainly not in quality with our own forces.” Compounding this weakness, according to MacArthur, was the perception that the Soviet Union would not be capable of challenging the naval ability of the United States for at least another decade.⁸²

Other than Soviet ground troops, MacArthur believed that the Soviet fighter aircraft and pilots were of extreme value. However, he calculated that the capabilities of Soviet fighter pilots could only be briefly maintained in an open war environment. MacArthur contended that the capability of these units were severely hampered by logistical issues. The General stated that in an open conflict the Soviet fighters would suffer from “a lack of maintenance facilities, gasoline, petroleum supplies,” among other things. He questioned their sustainability and how long they would be able to maintain

the fighter's mission readiness. In an all-out war, MacArthur asserted, Soviet fighter "efforts would deteriorate from the beginning of hostilities."⁸³

In addition to its air power deficiencies and weak navy, MacArthur also thought the Soviet Union faced logistical problems. MacArthur explained that the entire defense of the Soviet Union depended upon the resources and support manufactured "almost entirely out of European Russia." MacArthur elucidated to Senator Russell that the eastern part of the Soviet Union had "no industrial set-up of major proportion, so that all of the munition equipment, all the strategic weapons, all of the sustenance that goes in in such major quantity to support armed forces." All of this operational "sustenance" had to come from the west on a railway from "European Russia" to the required location in Siberia. According to MacArthur, the Soviet Union had difficulty in maintaining the resupplying needs in a non-war environment; the "line is strained to the very utmost now to maintain on a normal peace basis the forces which the Soviet [Union] maintains in Siberia."⁸⁴

The Trans-Siberian railroad supply-line also had a negative effect upon the Soviet Union's already hampered navy. Admiral Charles M. Cooke, Commander of U.S. naval forces in the western Pacific, succinctly summarized MacArthur's position concerning the Soviet Union and its allies: "If the Soviet position in the [Russian] maritime provinces is not integrated to the industrial and agricultural support of Manchuria, not supported by the strategic reinforcement of warm water ports of Port Arthur, Dairen, and northern Korea, and is forced to continue to be dependent upon a line of supplies over the trans-

Siberian railway, the maritime province position continues to be a source of weakness and vulnerability to Russia.”⁸⁵

In the event of an open war, the Soviet Union’s Trans-Siberian railroad would be vulnerable. The United States, with one single strategic blow, MacArthur explained, could paralyze the capabilities of the Soviet Union’s fighting force in the Far Eastern. This single supply route stood out as a key strategic weakness of the Soviet Union. MacArthur wrote, “this single railroad system” from Western Russia through Siberia, the only means of mass troop movement and resupply, “could be cut by air interdiction almost at will.”⁸⁶ The ramifications of the destruction of the Trans-Siberian railroad would devastate the Soviet Union’s Far Eastern flank.

The significance of this supply line did not only reside upon the Soviet required resupply of its military in the Far East, but also the distribution of supplies to its allies. The militaries of the PRC and DPRK had no modern capabilities and were completely reliant upon supplies emanating from the Soviet Union – by way of the Trans-Siberian railroad. The DPRKs capabilities, MacArthur informed Senator John C. Stennis, existed as the result of trade with the Soviet Union; “It [the invasion of South Korea] could not have been launched by the North Koreans without the supplies which were furnished them by the Soviet.”⁸⁷ Absent of this, MacArthur contended, the DPRK would not have had the material needed to wage war against South Korea.

This support served as a key factor that facilitated the Sino-Soviet Alliance. Evidence of this can be seen in MacArthur’s conversations with Averell Harriman in Tokyo on August 6 and 8, 1950. According to MacArthur, Harriman wrote, the Chinese

preference was not “to come under Russian domination,” citing that, “[China had] have historically opposed invasion from the North.”⁸⁸ The devastation of World War II in China followed by Civil War influenced the PRC to ally with the Soviet Union only for tactical reasons, to consolidate power on mainland China, and get recognition in the international community. This meant that, unlike the Truman Administration, MacArthur viewed the PRC’s commitment to the Sino-Soviet Alliance as provisional, lasting only until the PRC achieved modernization in significant portions of its military and solidify its position in the international community, thereby achieving its goals.

In November of 1950, MacArthur noted his belief that similar to the Soviet Union, the PRC also held imperialistic ideals.⁸⁹ Similar to the desires of the Soviet Union, MacArthur believed that the Chinese Communist sought expansion into Manchuria, Formosa, Indo-China, and Korea.⁹⁰ During a meeting with George Marshall on November 7, MacArthur argued that Chinese intervention into the Korean War was not done in defense of their borders and the hydroelectric facilities along the Yalu River, but instead provided proof of Red China’s “lust for the expansion of power.”⁹¹ He wrote in his memoir an assessment of the Chinese Communists: “Through these past fifty years the Chinese people have thus become militarized in their concepts and in their ideals. They now make first class soldiers and are developing competent commanders and staffs. This has produced a new dominant power in Asia, which for its own purpose has allied with Soviet Russia, but which in its own concepts and methods has become aggressively imperialistic, with a lust for expansion and increased power normal to this type of imperialism.”⁹² He perceived their aggressive actions in Indo-China, as well as Tibet and now Korea, as proof of their own territorial desires.⁹³ However, until that time came that

the PRC could act solely independent, the PRC's control over mainland China was suspect, and the Chinese Civil War continued. This assessment convinced MacArthur that, even in 1951, the Chinese Nationalists were capable of regaining the upper hand and ultimately attaining victory over the Chinese Communists.

General MacArthur believed that the course of the Chinese Civil war could be reversed in 1951 based upon his assessment of the vulnerability of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF). China "is a country of poverty. . . . They live only a couple jumps ahead of starvation."⁹⁴ "Red China lacks the industrial capacity to provide adequately many critical items necessary to the conduct of modern war," MacArthur argued. "He lacks the manufacturing base and those raw materials needed to produce, maintain and operate even moderate air and naval power, and he cannot provide the essentials for successful ground operations, such as tanks, heavy artillery and other refinements science has introduced into the conduct of military campaigns."⁹⁵ The vulnerability of the CCF also extended beyond complex military supplies to also include basic battlefield necessities such as food and standard munitions.⁹⁶ These military deficiencies made the CCF reliant upon the Soviet Union for militarily essential ground supplies, by way of the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

The PRC's mass armies could not compensate for these weaknesses, MacArthur argued. "Formerly his great numerical potential might well have filled this gap but with the development of existing methods of mass destruction, numbers alone do not offset the vulnerability inherent in such deficiencies."⁹⁷ He continued, "control of the seas and the air, which in turn means control over supplies, communications and transportation, are no

less essential and decisive now than in the past. When this control as in our case, and is coupled with an inferiority of ground fire power as in the enemy's case, the resulting disparity is such that it cannot be overcome by bravery, however fanatical, or the most gross indifference to human loss."⁹⁸ China's vulnerability was also magnified by its dependence on the Trans-Siberian railroad. MacArthur testified that, "I believe that the weakness of Red China, a weakness which is very noticeable in the air and on the sea, is a corollary of the inability of the Soviet logistical system to send out those munitions to assist its ally."⁹⁹ He continued, "the slightest dislocation in [China's] normal process of distribution," by way of the Trans-Siberian railroad, "causes the greatest convulsions in various sections of Chinese society."¹⁰⁰ For example, "if you disturb or should disturb in the slightest degree the distributive systems of their food, you might well have 50,000,000 men, 50,000,000 people, starving at any one time."¹⁰¹ For all of these reasons, MacArthur fervently believed that, in conjunction with air and logistical support from the United States, these weaknesses of the CCP could be exploited by the Chinese Nationalists.

MacArthur had been supportive of the Chinese Nationalist for some time. In 1948, as the CCP had begun to dominate the field of battle over the KMT, the Secretary of the Army, Kenneth Claiborne Royall, Sr. requested (through General Draper) the opinion of General MacArthur "as to whether or not the U.S. should provide additional military aid to China." MacArthur described "the situation in China today as deteriorating, but not yet hopeless." In order prevent the situation from deteriorating any further he advocated the immediate distribution "to the Chinese Government, of all US military surpluses in the Pacific Area." He went even further advocating that the Truman

Administration should “take the wraps off our present advisory mission to the Chinese Government,” instructing them “to get going, using all means in its power to advise the Chinese military and to train China’s forces.” He also recommended that advisors should additionally be sent “to other branches of the Chinese Government and we should send officers to supervise the delivery to the field forces, of the equipment which we donate.” In conjunction with military surpluses and advisors, MacArthur suggested that “moderate economic and financial assistance” be provided, while “at the same time instituting reasonable control measures to insure the most effective utilization of this assistance, which is practicable in the circumstances.” This oversight caveat was needed, he explained, because China’s current “methods are insufficient and many key officials are corrupt.” General MacArthur believed that at that moment the United States, “would have everything to gain and very little to lose by furnishing moderate support to the Chinese Government at this critical time.”¹⁰²

In the aftermath of the KMTs retreat to Formosa and the establishment of the PRC, MacArthur believed that the Chinese Civil War was still yet to be won. This belief was emboldened by the KMT victory over the CCF at the battle of Gunningtou, October 25-27, 1949, which prohibited the CCP from conquering Formosa. Evidence of this assessment resided in MacArthur’s reaction of disdain to the international recognition of the PRC by the Soviet Union and Britain. Harriman wrote that MacArthur contended that such recognition, “would only strengthen the prestige of Mao Tse-tung’s Government in China and destroy what he considers should be our objective: splitting of the present supporters of Mao Tse-tung and the developing of strengthened resistance movements.”¹⁰³ He argued that this recognition merely emboldened the temporary regime

of Mao Zedong and the CCP.¹⁰⁴ MacArthur remained unmoved by this event, even the signing of the new Sino-Soviet Alliance in January of 1950.¹⁰⁵ No event occurred that would alter this position. He ardently believed that PRC control over China was only temporary, either the communist government would fail on its own or eventually be defeated by the Nationalists upon their return to the mainland.¹⁰⁶

In 1950, following his unsanctioned visit to Formosa, MacArthur attempted to persuade the Truman Administration on the reason for his visit and on the issue of supporting the Chinese Nationalists. He explained to the State Department that his visit was, “merely following the old precept that ‘*The enemy of my enemy is my friend.*’” Even “if he has horns and a tail, so long as Chiang is anti-Communist, we should help him.” Remonstrating he declared, “rather than make things difficult, the State Department should assist him in his fight against the Communists—we can try to reform him later.”¹⁰⁷

MacArthur’s fervor on this issue was expressed succinctly during his testimony in 1951. Senator Wayne Morse inquired if the interdiction of Chinese Nationalists upon mainland China could reverse the Chinese Civil War? MacArthur testified that he “[understood] that in China, as in Russia, the number of Communists is rather small, in proportion to the total population.” In the same line of questioning with Senator Morse, MacArthur explained that utilization of Nationalist troops “would bring to life an enormous number of Chinese who would take heart, and attempt to resist the present regime of Red China.” MacArthur expounded, providing a blueprint that would result in the CCP’s ultimate expulsion. Through “the use of the Nationalist troops, now, might

result in greater support for the Nationalist troops than they received when the Generalissimo was driven off the mainland, because of the experience of the Chinese population with the tactics and methods of the Red Chinese.” The success of the hypothetical operations that MacArthur described, to Senator Morse, remained in conjunction with a bombing campaign initiated by the United States. The air campaign would severely damage a majority of Chinese Communist Forces, which were stationed in Manchuria. ¹⁰⁸

The significance of this testimony can be seen in an analysis of his three statements. To MacArthur communism was inherently oppressive, thus this inherent nature would result in ostracizing a number of the populace. Therefore, it would only be supported by a small portion of the population and power would only be maintained through suppression of the majority through a culture of fear. Communism was no different from the totalitarian regimes that once held power in Germany and Japan. MacArthur contended that over time the Chinese populace had learned the true nature of their communist regime and they desired freedom, a freedom which Nationalists forces on Formosa could help achieve. MacArthur argued that this desire would lead to rebellion against the tyrannical regime the moment that Nationalist forces landed on the mainland.

This time the civil war would be fought differently. The initial victories that were granted to CCF over the KMT, according to MacArthur, were the result of the lack of support provided by the Truman Administration. He explained to Senator Russell B. Long that, “I believe that at that time the forces of the generalissimo were stronger than the forces of the Chinese Communists against him. I believe that had we furnished a little

added assistance to those forces, they would have been able to defeat the Chinese Communist forces. I believe that the great lull that took place there enabled the Soviet and others that were assisting the Chinese Communists to accelerate and accumulate a sufficient balance of force which gave them victory.”¹⁰⁹ This error in judgment by the United States could be fixed. General MacArthur argued that with minor support from the United States Chinese Nationalist forces would seize back control of mainland China.

The result of a KMT victory in the Chinese Civil War would have a ripple effect throughout the world. Without support of the PRC, North Korea would be defeated resulting in a unified Korea. The Soviet Union would lose its strategic allies in the Far East, along with the warm water access that were gained through the alliances. The loss of its warm water access in the Far East would negatively affect the development of the Soviet Union’s navy, setting its modernization back decades more. The military flexibility that had once been afforded by an alliance with China would no longer be available. This affect would be detrimental to the Soviet Union’s expansionist desires since the position of the United States would be expanded in the Far East forcing the Soviet Union to remove vital military resources of its own from its position in the west to the east in order to maintain security. This rebalancing of the Soviet military would decisively shift the pendulum of power in the Cold War.

However, if prohibited from supporting the Chinese Nationalists against the PRC, MacArthur believed that the United States could still defeat the Soviet Union and its allies in an open war. Within the modern military construct, General MacArthur identified that logistical impediments, such as those that plagued the Soviet Union and its

allies, prohibited the successful execution of war time practices. The PRC and North Korea lacked any semblance of a modern military, and was entirely reliant upon the Soviet Union for modern military supplies. What hindered the Soviet Union, according to MacArthur, was their overwhelmingly limited logistical capability of supporting an aggressive open war in the Far East while also maintain its position of strength in Western Europe. The inability of the Soviet Union to have the capability to swiftly transfer needed supplies from the western front to the eastern front in a time of war led the General to believe that the United States position in the Pacific could bring to bear the force necessary to win any open war in the Far East.¹¹⁰

CHAPTER III

THE SOVIET AVERSION TO RISK

General MacArthur's assessment of the Soviet Union included its capabilities, and the methods that the Soviets preferred to achieve their goals. He thought, contrary to the NSC-68 view, that the Soviet Union was cautious and risk-averse in its efforts to expand. He insisted that the passivity of the United States to aggressively defend strategically significant territories in the Far East played right into the Soviet Union's desire to expand without getting itself involved in a war.¹¹¹ This was evident, he wrote, in "the enormous expansion of Soviet influence since the end of World War II has been brought about without the Russian soldier firing a shot in battle."¹¹² MacArthur wrote that he saw the Soviet relationships with the DPRK and the CCP – in China and in Korea – as evidence of the Soviet Union's effort to gain control throughout the "entire area of the Orient" by way of "political penetration."¹¹³ When it came to warfare, the Soviet Union's policy, MacArthur wrote, "is not to sacrifice its own troops, but to use those of its friends."¹¹⁴ These two methods of expansion allowed the Soviet Union to maintain little risk. MacArthur determined the Soviet Union to be prudent, utilizing subversive tactics to achieve political influence in a country.

The initial experience of General MacArthur with the subversive tactics of the Soviet Union's expansion took place in Japan, as Commander in Chief of the Far East. In 1946, as part of the reconstruction process in Japan, MacArthur granted independence

back to the organized labor movement.¹¹⁵ This resulted in the growth of organized labor. Pre-war labor in Japan numbered under one dozen unions with nearly 100,000 members.¹¹⁶ From 1945 to 1948 these numbers grew exponentially, with the number of unions totaling nearly 34,000 and the number of its members surpassing 6.6 million people.¹¹⁷ This growth led to numerous strikes in which union members sought higher wages. These strikes were resulted from the terrible living conditions of urban centers throughout Japan. MacArthur saw that some of these unions came to be controlled by communists who desired to utilize them as “instruments for prosecuting class war.”¹¹⁸ What troubled MacArthur, writes historian Geoffrey Perret, was “the prevalence of Communists in the leadership of unions that represented government workers, such as schoolteachers.”¹¹⁹ Fearful of the damage that these unions could cause, MacArthur launched multiple purges in 1947 and 1948 against striking unions in order to eradicate communists from the labor movement.¹²⁰

These events in Japan, according to MacArthur, were supported by the Soviet Union. The negotiations at the Yalta Conference in early 1945 demonstrated that Stalin had desired to gain Japanese territory. Following the surrender of Japan in late 1945, Stalin sought to divide Japan into sectors of influence, as had been done in Germany. While this desire for sectors was also supported by the British and Australians, MacArthur refused, believing that if the Soviets “were allowed in they would never leave willingly.”¹²¹ However, MacArthur lacked the authority to make this decision and eventually concessions were made by the United States at a conference in Moscow.¹²² There allied members agreed to the creation of two councils; Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) and the Far Eastern Commission (FEC).¹²³ Although these councils were

comprised of various nations, decisions regarding the politics of Japan could only be implemented as the result of a majority vote from the four powers; the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China.¹²⁴ Regardless of the agreements made at the Moscow Conference providing nations a voice in post-war Japan, MacArthur, supported by Truman, was allowed to ignore the desires of these advisory groups.¹²⁵

The result of the Soviet Union's inability to influence the organization of post-war Japan resulted in the utilization of other tactics, such as political infiltration and propaganda. In his memoir, MacArthur wrote about his frustration with the Soviet Union's representative in the FEC. MacArthur declared that the Soviet Union had been purposefully attempting to incite and promote anti-government feelings throughout the Japanese people. In 1947, MacArthur perceived the Soviet representative in the FEC to be attempting to undermine the "orderly [Japanese] government" by way of "derogatory speeches and statements." He publicly denounced these actions as a Soviet attempt to "absorb Japan within the orbit of the Communistic ideology," explaining that their "effort has been incessant and relentless from the inception of the occupation." He damned their methods which "sought by every means within its power to spread discord and dissension throughout this country reduced by the disasters of war to an economy of poverty originally threatening the actual livelihood of the entire nation." Although these subversive tactics were unsuccessful they did not give up, noted MacArthur.¹²⁶

Throughout the negotiation process and until the signing of the Treaty of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, the Soviet Union used the Japan treaty negotiation process as a propaganda tool to gain support among the Japanese. During a meeting with

Sebald and Philip C. Jessup in Tokyo on January 9, 1950, MacArthur noted that “the Russians are making considerable progress in their propaganda that it is the United States which is holding up the Treaty.”¹²⁷ Months later on June 14, MacArthur readdressed this issue in his nineteen point *Memorandum on the Peace Treaty Problem*. MacArthur wrote, “More recently the Soviet and Communist China publicly espoused an immediate peace treaty for Japan as part of their treaty of alliance and entered upon a campaign of propaganda charging that the Western Powers and particularly the United States bear responsibility for the treaty delay, alleging for its purpose the ‘colonization’ of Japan and its use as a military base from which to mount aggressive warfare against the Soviet and Communist China.”¹²⁸ This propaganda, MacArthur wrote, “furnished... the international press” with the perception that a conflict between the Department of State and the Department of Defense had been the issue that prevented the creation of the peace treaty.¹²⁹ The result of the Soviet tactic of “exposing” the United States as being responsible for the delay of the treaty, MacArthur hypothesized, could be “that an early Soviet move may be to seize itself the initiative in calling upon the Powers to join it in such a peace conference or proceed directly toward a separate peace with Japan.”¹³⁰ “In either such eventuality,” MacArthur explained, “the United States would indeed be placed on the horns of a dilemma and our position would become virtually irretrievable.”¹³¹ MacArthur speculated that the Soviet Union’s propaganda had an effect not only on the perceptions of the international community but also among the Japanese people. Therefore, MacArthur stressed that the Soviet Union’s propaganda would have a disastrous effect upon the position of the United States in Japan if they did not tread carefully in the treaty process.

This June 14 memorandum, written almost 5 years after the surrender of Japan, noted the responsibility and delicate execution necessary to secure long term Japanese relations with the United States. MacArthur argued that any further delay of the peace treaty until it was assured that the United States would be allowed access to Japan's military bases "was ill-advised."¹³² He reasoned that such a demand implied that the U.S. cared more about "the defense of the United States rather than the defense of Japan."¹³³ The mindset of the Japanese had shifted as a result of this notion, MacArthur wrote. They believed that the United States was "laying great stress upon the need for Japanese bases in the United States Western Pacific defense line as a means of preserving United States security."¹³⁴ This nationalistic turn within "Japanese political circles" had been "fanned by Communist propaganda that the reservation of such military bases to the United States would be a move toward the "colonization" of Japan and an aggressive threat against the mainland of Asia."¹³⁵ MacArthur concluded that even in the event the United States secured the bases, their value "to the United States would be limited by the bitterness and resentments which would dominate the Japanese mind."¹³⁶

MacArthur stressed that the United States had to walk a fine line to achieve a swift resolution to the current delays without creating a treaty that could displease the Japanese people. While the Japanese people "fully understand and accepted the fact that the delay in the restoration of such freedom has been due to the procedural difficulties preventing the holding of a peace conference," MacArthur explained, "once a formula is found for arriving at a peace settlement, even if only based upon partial representation of the Allied Powers, it would be impossible to explain with any semblance of sincerity or validity the failure to grant the same." Failure to construct a peace treaty that restored

Japanese freedom would provide the Soviet Union more propaganda opportunities. MacArthur doubted that the United States would be able to fight against this propaganda. It would invariably succeed in convincing “many Japanese who have loyally supported the occupation and worked diligently to achieve its stated objectives, that the aims and purposes of the United States conform indeed to the line of Communist propaganda.” The result of these failures, he stressed, would “arouse much bitter opposition in Japan and push it into the Soviet camp. These tactics used by the Soviet Union in Japan were also applied in North Korea and South Korea.¹³⁷

Meanwhile in Korea, the Soviet Union had been steadily establishing its control in North Korea, while maintaining aspirations for its expansion south. The Soviet Union had been fully engaged in the affairs of the North Korean state since they accepted the surrender of Japanese troops that were positioned north of the 38th parallel in 1945. Instrumental in the rebuilding and reorganization of the North Korean government, the Soviet Union assisted in the establishment and formation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1948. That same year the Soviet Union began training the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA). Following the selection of Kim Il-sung as DPRK leader, March 17, 1949 the DPRK and the Soviet Union signed an “agreement on economic and cultural collaboration” which developed trade relations between the two countries.¹³⁸ This new agreement expanded the previous trading of weaponry, which began in 1946, to now include heavy weaponry – such as artillery, tanks, and air craft. This trading demonstrated to MacArthur the Soviet Union’s desire to fortify their interests in North Korea.¹³⁹ However, the political solidification that transpired in North Korea – immediately after World War II and into 1946 – and the subsequent attempts to

expand into South Korea demonstrated the Soviet Union's method of expansion through political infiltration.¹⁴⁰

In the first months of 1946, General MacArthur sent a telegram to the Secretary of State outlining the recent political developments of Korea. On February 12 Tass announced, with the assistance of the Soviet Union, the establishment of the Korean Central Government of North Korea. This government was comprised of a three party system; Democratic Party, Yenan Independence League, and the Korean Communist Party. The three party system projected to the entire Korean people and the international community the presence of political option in a democratic society. However, MacArthur and the South Korean government discredited this projection. The names of the members of the North Korean government and council were "screened ... by well informed moderates now refugees from North Korea." These defectors uncovered "that all [the] names are either violent Communists or unknown Koreans brought in from Russia or Manchuria." Furthermore, the political parties held fallacious names. The Democratic Party was "known to be Communist stooges named by Russians to replace the Democratic leaders." The Yenan Independence League was discovered to be a "Chinese-Korean-Manchurian Communist group trained" by the Soviet Union. The final group, the Korean Communist Party was described as puppets of the Soviet Union. Having taken control of North Korea, MacArthur's informed the Secretary of State that the Soviet Union hoped to use the guise of the three party democracy in North Korea to influence the political party formation in South Korea.¹⁴¹

On February 14, leaders from various South Korean Communist parties – such as the Communist Party of Korea, the People’s Party, “farmers associations, Labor Unions, and the People’s Republic” – gathered together and, influenced by North Korea, rebranded themselves the “Democratic People’s Front.” Upon the solidification of the North Korean government and the formation of the Democratic People’s Front in South Korea, propaganda began to arise calling for the formation of centralized government of all Korea. A South Korean local newspaper, noted MacArthur, wrote “that now the “People’s Government” has been set up in north Korea and the “Democratic Front” is perfected in south Korea, the problem of interim Korean Government is a simple get-together of the two.” This publication “together with all the other trends and activities,” MacArthur explained, provided reasonable evidence that would suggest that the Democratic People’s Front, led by the People’s Party, here had “completely sold out to the Russian directed communists” for guaranteed government positions in the coming United Korea. The press publication coupled with the political maneuvering of South Korean communist groups to create a democratic society guided MacArthur to write that the, “Russians no doubt plan to force us to accept their Government as the Democratic representatives of north Korea while trying to force us to give enough Communistic representation from south Korea to gain control of Korean interim Government by Communists.” He noted that his duty to maintain the “prestige of the Korean Representative Democratic Council” by achieving full support of the Korean people and by discrediting the communists. MacArthur concluded with a warning to the Secretary of State that these events in Korea, as well as those currently occurring in Manchuria,

demonstrated that the Communists are in “an all-out effort now to gain full control of this entire area of the Orient through political penetration.”¹⁴²

All of these events in both Japan and Korea proved to MacArthur that the Soviet Union preferred expansion through political infiltration. MacArthur also saw Soviet caution in its apparent preference to let its allies expand communism through force rather than risk initiating a fight the West itself. This perspective can be seen in MacArthur’s assessment of Korea in 1949-50. The North Korean leader Kim Il-sung was an extreme nationalist who desired to unite all of Korea under communist rule. Similar to his counterpart in South Korea, Syngman Rhee, Kim Il-sung used his new expanded armory to conduct frequent border raids along the 38th parallel, in 1949.¹⁴³ That autumn tensions were raised by these actions, and some leaders in Washington worried that a war might erupt. MacArthur, however, saw little need to worry about any possible military action. He maintained that the monolithic nature of communism present in North Korea prohibited them from acting autonomously from the Soviet Union in seeking their goal of the unification of Korea.¹⁴⁴ In September of that same year, this sentiment was reiterated in more detail to congressional committee members who were visiting MacArthur in Japan: “South Korea is in no danger of being overrun by North Korea. The Kremlin has South Korea outflanked and knows that eventually it must go the way the continent of Asia goes. As long as South Korea is not a threat to North Korea, no action will be taken by the Kremlin to absorb it as there would be nothing to gain by taking it over. However, if South Korea tries to take over North Korea, retaliatory measures could certainly be expected.”¹⁴⁵

The outbreak of the Korean War had many officials throughout Washington D.C. and the Truman Administration extremely fearful. Dean Acheson explained his concern at a National Security Council Meeting, November 28, 1950; “Time is shorter than we thought,” Acheson declared. “We used to think we could take our time up to 1952, but if we were right in that, the Russians wouldn’t be taking such terrible risks as they are now.”¹⁴⁶ They believed that the Soviet Union’s willingness to take risks exceeded their assessment outlined in NSC-68.¹⁴⁷ MacArthur, on the other hand, supported the complete opposite position, even though he had not expected the North Korean attack. He acknowledged in his description of North Korean forces, to Acheson, the source of their support, “North Korean military forces are as previously reported, backed by considerable strength in armor and a well-trained, well directed and aggressive air force equipped with Russian planes. It is now obvious that his force has been built as an element of Communist military aggression.”¹⁴⁸ However, MacArthur did not believe that this confirmed the NSC-68 view of a risk taking overly aggressive Soviet expansion. Following the initial invasion by North Korean forces, MacArthur met with John Foster Dulles, William J. Sebald, and John M. Allison and expressed his belief that “the attack was not an all-out effort [and] the Soviets were not necessarily behind the attack.”¹⁴⁹ He contended that the Soviet Union’s obvious military inaction provided the proof that they were still yet unprepared to militarily expand. The North Korea invasion had been initiated almost a year after both the Soviet Union and United States removed their armed forces from North and South Korea respectively.¹⁵⁰ Soviet troops did not participate in any aspect of the fighting. Even after the United States joined the fighting and significantly reversed the course of the war, the Soviet Union remained on the outside,

preferring instead to propagandize the Korean War as a civil war that should be left out of international intervention. Evidence of this can be seen in Soviet press publications which were available throughout the world. The Soviet Union was outraged at the U.N.'s process and conclusion to intervene in what they saw as a civil war. They decried the U.N. Security Council for ignoring the new international law and kowtowing to U.S. desires. On August 6-7, 1950, the *Pravda* and *Izvestia* ran editorials entitled "Comment and Reports on the Korean War," which examined the U.N. decisions against International Law in order to expose the Western Powers deviation from international doctrine which was created to prevent war: "The United Nations Charter, which obligates the Security Council to take measures necessary to preserve and maintain international peace and security, stipulates inter alia that "it shall not authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially in the domestic jurisdiction of any state" (Article 2, Paragraph 7, of the U.N. Charter)." The Soviet Union not only condemned the Security Council's decision but also attempted to expose American imperialism as having been the motivating factor: "No matter how much the American imperialists have tried, no matter how much their representative in the Security Council has dodged, perverting the most important principles and standards of international law, no matter how much the obedient satellites of the U.S.A. in the agencies of the United Nations have voted on orders from Washington, there is no force in the world capable of depicting as aggression the liberation movement of the Korean people, who are fighting for their national unification and independence."¹⁵¹ Was this assessment of the Soviet Union just a large oversight by MacArthur?

Insight into this understanding was provided by the General during his meeting with President Truman at Wake Island on October 10, 1950. In this meeting, MacArthur told Truman that there was “very little” chance Soviet Union would get involved in Korea because they have too few controlling assets in the region to mount a credible offensive. MacArthur assumed that the Soviet Union partially recognized this “self-weakness” and would thus not intervene because their men and equipment would just be lost: “They have an Air Force in Siberia and a fairly good one,” however, “they are probably no match for our Air Force” MacArthur determined. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has “no ground troops available for North Korea.” In the event that they attempted to mobilize troops into the field, it would take “six weeks to get a division across” and in six weeks winter will have also arrived compounding the issue.” Absent the capability of employing its ground forces in a timely manner, MacArthur explained to Truman that their “only other combination would be Russian air support of Chinese ground troops.” Currently, “Russian air is deployed in a semicircle throughout Mukden and Harbin, but the coordination between the Russian air and the Chinese ground would be so flimsy that I believe Russian air would bomb the Chinese as often as they would bomb us. Between untrained Air and Ground Forces an air umbrella is impossible without a lot of joint training. I believe it just wouldn’t work with Chinese Communist ground and Russian air.” MacArthur speculated that the Soviet Union recognized these tactical deficiencies in the Far East, safely remaining outside the war zone, building her up military. This risk-averse assessment by MacArthur applied to not only the Soviet Union but also the Chinese Communists.¹⁵²

In 1950, although they shared a closer regional connection than the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communist support for North Korea was given little consideration by General MacArthur. He assessed that, even though North Koreans fought with Chinese Communist forces in Chinese Civil War, there was little reason for the PRC to get involved in the Korean War. MacArthur echoed this belief to President Truman on Wake Island; stating that there was “very little” chance of PRC involvement in the Korean War.¹⁵³ He explained that if the PRC chose to intervene they would have “in the first or second months” and “it would have been decisive.” He continued, “We are no longer fearful of their intervention. We no longer stand hat in hand.” (Although his analysis of Chinese dedication was later to be incorrect his assessment of Chinese capabilities remained consistent throughout the war.) He explained to Truman that the Chinese had 300,000 men positioned in Manchuria and “of these probably not more than 100,000-125,000 are distributed along the Yalu River.” Of those, “only 50,000-60,000 could be gotten across the Yalu River” – admittedly the freezing of the Yalu River changed this perception as it allowed Chinese forces to flow across the border by way of this natural bridge. MacArthur concluded that their lack of Air Force coupled with the establishment of UN airfields and Air Force in Korea would cause the “greatest slaughter” “if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang.”¹⁵⁴ Any attempt by the Chinese Communists to intervene, MacArthur contended, could be easily thwarted by UN forces due to their vast technological superiority. MacArthur’s strategic assessment was predicated upon the idea that if the Chinese attempted to fully intervene that he would be allowed to utilize all options in order to swiftly and decisively crush the enemy forces. Furthermore, it can be assumed that MacArthur believed that the PRC too recognized the futility of an attempted

intervention in Korea. Evidence of this can be found in MacArthur's dismissal of the Chinese premier Chou En-lai's threat - relayed through the Indian Foreign Minister Sardar Pannikar - that the CCF would not intervene in the entry of South Korean forces in North Korea, however, "an American intrusion into North Korea will encounter Chinese resistance."¹⁵⁵ Truman and MacArthur alike paid little heed to this warning. MacArthur commented to the United States Air Force (USAF) Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg, that "the only passages leading from Manchuria and Vladivostok have many tunnels and bridges," which could be easily destroyed with airpower.¹⁵⁶ The troop movement and building up of Chinese Communist Forces in Manchuria did little to alter MacArthur's assessment that they would not intervene. They were bluffing, with a show of force.

In November 1950, only after confirmed reports, did MacArthur finally believe that the Chinese were in North Korea. His initial assessment of Chinese intervention, made on November 14, 1950 in meeting with Ambassador Sebald, was founded upon China's self-interests. Sebald wrote that MacArthur "expressed the opinion that the entry of Communist China into the Korean War was largely motivated by the Chinese themselves, and that such entry is merely one more manifestation of what he termed "Chinese imperialistic aspirations."¹⁵⁷ These aspirations, MacArthur noted, that were also present in Communist China's invasion of Tibet and in the assistance of Ho Chi Minh, were conducted on its own accord.¹⁵⁸ However, MacArthur continued to explain that he believed that the CCF did not intervene in the Korean War to achieve any kind of victory. Instead he felt that the CCF sought to demonstrate "their desire to be of assistance to the North Koreans, and ... also to [prove] to the world their ability to engage in a first-class war." MacArthur defended this belief explaining that the delayed entry of CFF proves

that they “they had not thought it necessary previously to enter into the war, as they had believed that the North Koreans would drive the UN Forces into the Sea.” The UN counter offensive at Inchon demonstrated to the Chinese Communists that “something must be done.” However, this delayed decision to militarily assist the North Koreans resulted in wasted time for the necessary relocation of CCF “armies and supplies from Central and South to the northeast.”¹⁵⁹

The shifting assessment of the desires and capabilities of the Chinese Communist in regards to the Korean War is connected in some manner to the consistent assessment of the desires and capabilities of the Soviet Union. MacArthur felt that the CCF would not involve themselves in the Korean War because the PRC understood that its forces could not defeat UN Forces. Newly established and vying for international recognition as a legitimate government, the PRC – he believed – would not risk losing its gains in China with a war against the UN in Korea. Had the CCF joined in the initial assault against South Korea, MacArthur argued, the risk would have been drastically less.

The CCF intervention had enacted the prohibitive clause in MacArthur’s NSC-81 directive which outlined that “in the event of the occupation of North Korea by Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces ... no ground operations north of the 38th parallel ... should [be] undertaken.”¹⁶⁰ Following the intervention of the CFF MacArthur believed “that Soviet Russia, despite its satisfaction derived from action parallel to its own objectives, has remained in the background.”¹⁶¹ Wishing to maintain the NSC-81 goal of unification and in the face of wavering commitment to its achievability from the Truman Administration, he remained adamant that “there is no evidence available that Soviet

Russia is taking a direct part in the Korean War. While, admittedly, the material being used by the North Koreans and Chinese Communists is of Soviet origin, the General believed that the North Koreans and Chinese Communists have paid for such in either cash or kind.”¹⁶² These statements made in MacArthur’s conversation with Ambassador Sebald, deviated from MacArthur’s initial assessment of the Soviet’s support of the invasion. The reason for this would have been not only the lack of evidence of expanded Soviet support outside of the original support given in the creation of the North Korean Army, but also active military support. At the time of that November meeting the North Koreans were all but defeated and CCF’s had just begun their counter offensive. The situation was not as dire as it would become in later months. So to MacArthur it seemed that the Soviet Union, due to their lack of open military support, was indifferent to the outcome of the Korean War. It was not until his Senate hearings that MacArthur attempted to revise his original statements: “I am... convinced that all three [North Korea, China, and Russia] were in the general conspiracy to make that attack in North Korea. It could not have been launched by the North Koreans without the supplies which were furnished them by the Soviet. It could not have been kept up without the actual national assistance by the Chinese Red army.”¹⁶³ MacArthur continued to explain that since “it takes time to organize such an army as that North Korean army was,” an agreement of some type must have been made “before the attack was launched, I believe it was conceived months before it was actually launched.”¹⁶⁴ MacArthur’s evolved opinion, in this context, does not discredit his final perception of the Soviet Union’s methods. It revealed the goals and willingness of the Soviet Union to achieve its goals. When military force was required to expand or solidify a newly established government,

it would not be the military forces of the Soviet Union that fought but the forces of its allies. It is in this retrospective view that the Soviet Union sought to maintain its distance and international deniability.

The inaction of the Soviet Union in Korea was evidence, MacArthur believed, that the Soviets recognized their own comparative weakness. If the Soviet Union assessed its comparative capabilities as in line with those outlined in NSC-68, then why were they risk-averse when it came to waging an open war? Why were they allowing the inferior militaries of other communist nations to fight their wars? This self-understanding guided the Soviet Union in its risk-averse expansion. The Korean War was MacArthur's proof. This notion was the factor that resonated within MacArthur's messages to the JCS and other United States officials when he explained that the Soviet Union would not enter and could not be enticed into the Korean conflict. The evidence, MacArthur argued, existed in the Soviet Union's absence of open activity in key periods of the Korean War; the initial invasion, Inchon, and what became known as MacArthur's Christmas offensive.

After the PRC intervened, MacArthur remained consistent in his assessment of the Soviet Union. He insisted that the events of the Korean War had no bearing upon the decision of whether or not the Soviet Union would go to war. He contended that the Soviet Union would only engage in an open conflict if it thought that victory was guaranteed. He stated multiple times throughout his Congressional testimony the belief that the Soviet Union would not begin a Third World War if the United Nations became more aggressive in their war effort in the Far East. MacArthur contended that the Soviet Union would act in its best interest regardless of the UN's actions: "If [the Soviet Union]

has determined that he is not going to attack, that he is doing well enough in the present atmosphere, that he is acquiring and expanding as rapidly as he can digest it; and that he is not going to attack, and that is his basic policy – I do not believe that anything that happens in Korea, or Asia, for that matter, would affect his basic decision.”¹⁶⁵ MacArthur continued, “if he has determined that he is going to use force, sooner or later, what occurs in Korea, or Asia, might affect his timetable. I believe that he will make his decisions on a higher basis than the incidents that are occurring in Asia.”¹⁶⁶ MacArthur held the notion that the overall basis for the Soviet Union’s decision to go to war would be based upon their assessment of the strength of the enemy and themselves.¹⁶⁷ MacArthur explained to Senator J.W. Fulbright, “The greater relative strength that they possess and have would probably be an inducement if they decided to go to force instead of their present political force.”¹⁶⁸

Further evidence of the Soviet Union’s risk-averse methods resided in the locations in which they sought to expand. While Japan and Germany were key strategic goals of the Soviet Union, they did not aggressively pursue them. They sought Greece, Eastern Europe, Middle Eastern locations, and nations in the Far East – such as Manchuria, Tibet, and Korea. When questioned by Senator Long, MacArthur agreed with the Senator’s statement “that wherever the Communists knew they were not having or going to have resistance, they invariably went.”¹⁶⁹ MacArthur summarized, “They exploited the weak points.”¹⁷⁰ Why would a nation that was drastically stronger, as NSC-68 suggested, focus only on gaining ground in weak areas? More importantly, why would they risk the success of their expansion with the use of its allies’ forces which were comparatively inferior to the forces they faced on the battlefield?

MacArthur argued that the Soviet Union's continued reliance upon its Far Eastern allies to defeat United Nations forces in Korea, at the risk of losing their gains, was proof not only of the Soviet Union's weakness, but also their risk-averse strategy. The perceived risk-averse expansionist nature of the Soviet Union affected MacArthur's perception of the Soviet Union's capabilities because they were fundamentally connected. He believed that the Soviets' chosen actions reflected a self-analysis, which demonstrated that they recognized their own weaknesses and self-belief that they were not yet prepared to win an open war against the United States. This was evident, to MacArthur, in the Soviet Union's actions in Japan, China, and Korea, most notably in the Korean War.

CHAPTER IV

MACARTHUR'S POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The policy recommendations of General MacArthur during the Korean War were formulated around his strategic assessments. First, MacArthur saw Asia as key to the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union, because the spread of communism in Asia gave the Soviet Union access to vital resources and secured its flank which enhanced their position in Europe. Second, the General believed the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China to be weak militarily, suffering from logistical vulnerabilities, a lack of nuclear weapons and bombers, and the PRC had yet to even consolidate power at home. Finally, MacArthur saw the Soviet Union as risk averse in its communism expansion strategy. These views guided MacArthur to promote an aggressive strategy during the Korean War aiming to attain a complete victory. The Korean War, MacArthur insisted, represented an opportunity to inflict a major defeat on the Soviet Union with little risk of sparking a general war, because the Soviet Union would not risk intervening in the conflict.

The success at the Battle of Inchon in September 1950 had General MacArthur's confidence soaring and seeking to unite Korea. However, the decision had already been made by Truman, near the end of August, to pursue the enemy northward.¹⁷¹ The official order was issued in NSC 81 to MacArthur on September 16. The restrictions placed upon MacArthur were limited to the scenario of Chinese or Soviet Union intervention. In the

event that either nation militarily presented itself, MacArthur was directed to cease advancement. Furthermore, upon approach to the Yalu River South Korean forces will be the vanguard.¹⁷² The directive of NSC 81 was “the pursuance of a rollback.”¹⁷³ Understanding this directive and eager to unify Korea, MacArthur proceeded with the utmost confidence in his ability and the ability of his forces aggressively drove north across the 38th parallel.

The drive north followed the guidelines of NSC 81 until October 17. MacArthur defied the JCS directive to halt his forces at the determined defensive line “running from Chongju to Hungnam” and use Republic of Korea (ROK) forces to conduct military operations north of that line. Instead, he secured a defensive line well north of the JCS directive and ordered General Walker and General Almond “to drive forward with all speed and ... use any and all ground forces ... to secure all of North Korea.”¹⁷⁴ This deviation from NSC 81 guidelines demonstrated that MacArthur desired to unify all of Korea and completely destroy the DPRK and its forces.

In early October reports of Chinese Communist soldiers operating in North Korea began circulating.¹⁷⁵ It was not until October 22 that CCF began operating in full force across the Yalu River. These Sino-Korean units had success against the 8th Army and other United Nations forces driving them from the Yalu River. This counter offensive by the CCF and the subsequent surge of CCF units across the Yalu River following its initial success urged MacArthur to request authorization from the JCS to bombard the bridges. MacArthur’s rationale was that the “way to stop this reinforcement of the enemy is the destruction of these bridges and the subjection of all installations in the north area

supporting the enemy advance to the maximum of our air destruction.”¹⁷⁶ The JCS denied this request. Then on November 7 the enemy, inexplicably, broke contact and withdrew back into Manchuria. This withdrawal had MacArthur convinced that although elements of the CCF intervened, he did not believe that the entirety of the CCF was committed, these soldiers had been merely volunteers.¹⁷⁷ With this assertion, along with the assessed comparative capabilities of the CCF, MacArthur believed that United Nation forces could resume their maneuver north to eradicate DPRK forces and unify Korea. This knowledge guided the planning of the *Home by Christmas Offensive*, also known as “reconnaissance in force.”¹⁷⁸ On November 24, further deviating from the JCS directive, MacArthur launched a campaign to end the war. After three days of advancing without heavy opposition they were met by the full weight of a CCF counter attack. The superiority of MacArthur’s air and artillery was negated by the tactics of the CCF.¹⁷⁹ These tactics enabled them to route large sections of UN forces; forcing their retreat and recapturing the key cities of Pyongyang and eventually Seoul on January 4, 1951. The CCF maintained pressure upon UN forces for the rest of that year and into the spring. The aggressiveness and success of the CCF led MacArthur to send a telegram three days after beginning the offensive, in which he described to the JCS that the full force of the CCF had created “an entirely new war.”¹⁸⁰

This “new war” caused MacArthur to believe that he should be permitted to meet this force with equal force.¹⁸¹ He believed that this new scenario should allow him expanded options to utilize any military means necessary to defeat the enemy in Korea and secure Korea. Although he asked repeatedly for reinforcements, in the early weeks of December MacArthur also sought permission to have the freedom to determine the

implementation of atomic weaponry.¹⁸² One of the earlier examples of this came on December 24, MacArthur submitted to his superiors “a list of retardation targets” of the CCF that required twenty-six atomic bombs.¹⁸³ This list provides one of the earlier examples of MacArthur’s desire and willingness to achieve a victory in Korea.

Six days later, on December 30, 1950, MacArthur telegraphed the JCS outlining the strategic crossroads facing the United States and the United Nations. In it he described two paths, one of which would result in the degradation of the United Nations, including the initial step in an eventual rollback of the United States defensive perimeter. The second path would be to meet the enemy on the battlefield, matching equal force with equal force. In the case the JCS sought to pursue victory, MacArthur devised a comprehensive four step plan that he believed would ensure victory. MacArthur outlined that the moment the United Nations recognized the new state of war the following four measures should be implemented: “Blockade the coast of China; Destroy through naval gun fire and air bombardment China’s industrial capacity to wage war; Secure reinforcements from the Nationalist garrison on Formosa to strengthen our position in Korea if we decided to continue the fight for that peninsula; and release existing restrictions upon the Formosa garrison for diversionary action (possibly leading to counter-invasion) against vulnerable areas of the Chinese mainland.”¹⁸⁴

On January 9, 1951, the JCS responded to MacArthur detailing what the “new war” strategy would be: “There is little possibility of policy change or other external eventuality justifying strengthening our effort in Korea.” The JCS cautioned MacArthur’s blockade proposal of the Chinese Coast responding that the “blockade of China Coast, if

undertaken, must await either stabilization of our position in Korea or our evacuation from Korea. However, a naval blockade of the coast of China would require negotiations with the British in view of the extent of British trade with China through Hongkong. It is considered necessary to obtain UN concurrence.” They accepted his proposed “Naval and air attacks on objectives in Communist China” adding the caveat “only if the Chinese attack United States forces outside of Korea and decision must await that eventually.” The proposed use of Chinese Nationalists as reinforcements for Korea was deemed too risky by the JCS because “in view of improbability of their decisive effort on the Korean outcome and their probable greater usefulness elsewhere.” The JCS had become tired of fielding MacArthur’s persistent requests for reinforcements, so they followed their response to the proposed nationalist reinforcements with the final opinion on reinforcements in Korea: “If our position in Korea could be stabilized with forces now committed, 2 partly-trained National Guard Divisions could be deployed to Japan in order to increase the security of Japan. If our Korean position cannot be stabilized, this means purpose must be served by part of the troops evacuated from Korea. This is the final reply to your [previous requests for reinforcements].” However, the JCS did accept two portions of MacArthur’s proposal: The rearmament of Japanese Security Forces and intensifying the economic blockade of trade with China.¹⁸⁵

Overall, the cautioned MacArthur fearful that expanding military operations in Korea could jeopardize the United States strategic holdings in Western Europe and Japan. They believed that if MacArthur’s four point plan was enacted that the Soviet Union would then intervene. The last portion of the JCS telegram to MacArthur was a directive as to his mission in the current conditions of the Korean War: “Defend in successive

positions as required ... inflicting maximum damage to hostile forces in Korea, subject to primary consideration of the safety of your troops and your basic mission of protecting Japan.” The JCS concluded in their instructions with two points: First, “Should it become evident in your judgment that evacuation is essential to avoid severe losses of men and material you will at that time withdraw from Korea to Japan.” Second, “All directives and instructions in conflict with the foregoing are revoked.” This final instruction is significant because this directive was designed to prevent MacArthur from continuing to conduct the Korean War as he saw fit, using old JCS directives as proof of permission.¹⁸⁶

This shift in strategy by the JCS and the Truman Administration did not sit well with MacArthur. He believed that the goal of unifying Korea should remain. The entrance of the PRC into the war had presented itself as a prime opportunity for the United States and the United Nations to achieve a dramatic strategic shift in the power dynamic of the Far East. Continuing to fight for the victory was necessary and of the utmost importance in order to not only secure the defensive perimeter of the United States but also their position in the Far East as well as Europe. MacArthur rebuked the JCS decision and described the strategic ramifications of abandoning the fight in Korea, “If we are forced to evacuate Korea without taking military measures against China proper, as you suggested in your message, it would have the most adverse effect upon the people of Asia, not excepting the Japanese, and a material reinforcement of the forces now in this theater would be mandatory if we are to hold the Littoral Defense Chain [Ryukyus and Philippines] including Japan against determined assault.”¹⁸⁷ Here MacArthur argued that the abandonment of Korea by the Truman Administration would only force the United States to retain more resources and materials in the Far East in

order to deter any potential offensive against its defensive perimeter. Furthermore, this transfer of resources would be a permanent necessity and not a temporary one. However, this would be avoided if MacArthur was granted flexibility and temporary access to the some of the military resources in Europe to achieve a victory in Korea. The permanent transfer of resources, MacArthur contended, would have an effect on the security of Europe to the extreme of insuring the “later defeat in Europe itself.”¹⁸⁸ “On the other hand,” MacArthur explained, “if the primary political interest of the United States in the Far East lies in holding a position in Korea and thus pinning down a large segment of the Chinese military potential, the military course is implicit in political policy and we should be prepared to accept whatever casualties result and any attendant hazard to Japan’s security.”¹⁸⁹

Furthermore, MacArthur rebuked the idea that the Soviet Union would militarily respond to any action of the United Nations or the United States in the Korean War. MacArthur challenged the Administration’s perceived notion that his plan of action would result in the immediate entrance of the Soviet Union into the war. He advised the JCS that the Soviet Union’s decision to enter into the Korean War could not be influenced by the actions of the United Nations or the United States in Korea.¹⁹⁰ The Soviet Union would only enter into a war or openly incite one if they believed that they could achieve a victory. “Some say to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China; others, to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation seems valid. For China is already engaging with maximum power it can commit and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike

whenever it feels that the relativity in military and other potential is in its favor on a world –wide basis.”¹⁹¹

Seen in this example is one of MacArthur’s attempts to persuade the JCS to understand that the current situation in Korea had only two possible outcomes; victory or defeat. In defeat, the United States would be forced to abandon Korea to the Chinese Communists, and more importantly, to communism. This would inherently mean that the Soviet Union’s position in the Far East would have been drastically bolstered, to include the potential of Soviet success in securing Japan, either politically or militarily. However, in victory the United States would have unified Korea and delivered a devastating defeat against the Chinese Communists, with the possibility of turning the tide of the Chinese Civil War. This would have led to the ‘rollback’ of communism in Asia, striking a devastating blow to the Soviet Union in the process.

As the Korean War dragged on, it became clearer in the late winter and early spring of 1951 that the mindset of the United Nations and the Truman Administration was to return to Korea’s antebellum division. General MacArthur despised this mentality. He argued, during his second counter offensive south of the 38th parallel, that the return to the antebellum structure of Korea would continue to allow the PRC to maintain its aggressive attitude in Asia along with “her power to make war.” Therefore, he planned and carried-out the counter offensive, in February 1951, with some of the same tactics that made the Inchon operations successful. These tactics were not designed for a simple military advance back to the 38th parallel. MacArthur hoped that he could break the back of the CCF just as he had the North Korean Forces in the war’s first counter offensive.¹⁹²

The intervention of the PRC was often blamed upon the actions of MacArthur on his drive to the Yalu River. By using MacArthur's "guarantee" of nonintervention of CCFs in Korea at the Wake Island conference, the Truman Administration maintained public support for a limited war strategy. MacArthur, in complete opposition to this, wrote public letters and traded correspondence with Republican leaders promoting his belief in his strategy for victory. His strategy for victory remained the same, even after the signing of the armistice.

In the aftermath of General MacArthur's dismissal from his Far Eastern command, he returned to the United States and toured the United States giving speeches. However, first and foremost on his agenda was a speech on April 19 in front of a joint session of Congress, as well as testifying before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate. These political platforms provided General MacArthur the opportunity for the first time to address Congress and expound upon his strategic beliefs in an attempt to repair his reputation as a fanatical warmonger.¹⁹³ Before the joint session of Congress MacArthur refuted this depiction, "Nothing could be further from the truth. I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition. . . . But once war is forced on us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory – not prolonged indecision. In war, indeed, there can be no substitute for victory."¹⁹⁴ This was how MacArthur perceived the concept of conducting warfare. When engaged in a military struggle the goal should be victory, there are no political victories in war.

Shortly after MacArthur's April 19 address he was called upon to testify before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations. During MacArthur's four day testimony he explained and reiterated his assessments of the strategic importance of the Far East, as well as the capabilities and strategy of the Soviet Union and its allies, and his victory strategy in Korea. Portions of his testimony were aimed to show a shared assessment between himself and the JCS. However, these claims were not substantiated in the testimonies of the members of the JCS. This resulted in the eventual political disassociation of General MacArthur from influential figures, who might have – at one time or another – sought his strategic assessment on issues. The final meeting MacArthur had with the purpose of advising came in 1952 with President elect Dwight Eisenhower.

In late 1952, President elect Eisenhower went to Korea on a campaign promise. Upon his return one of the first meetings he held was with the retired Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur had been stating since late 1951 that he had a plan to officially end the war in Korea. While the JCS requested that he reveal his plan to them, MacArthur preferred to explain it in person to his former subordinate. On December 17, 1952 MacArthur presented to Eisenhower his "Memorandum on Ending the Korean War." Within this memorandum were eight points:

- (1) "Call a two-party conference between the President of the United States and Premier Stalin.
- (2) That such a conference explore the world situation as a corollary to ending the Korean War.
- (3) That we insist that Germany and Korea be permitted to unite under forms of government to be popularly determined upon.

- (4) That thereafter we propose that the neutrality of Germany, Austria, Japan and Korea be guaranteed by the United States and the Soviet with all other nations invited to join as co-guarantors.
- (5) That we agree to the principle that in Europe all foreign troops should be removed from Germany and Austria, and in Asia from Japan and Korea.
- (6) That we urge that the United States and the Soviet [Union] undertake to endeavor to have incorporated in their respective constitutions a provision outlawing war as an instrument of national policy, with all other nations invited to adopt similar moral limitations.
- (7) That at such conference, the Soviet [Union] be informed that should an agreement not be reached, it would be our intention to clear North Korea of enemy forces. (This could be accomplished through the atomic bombing of enemy military concentrations and installations in North Korea and the sowing of fields of suitable radio-active materials, the by-product of atomic manufacture, to close major lines of enemy supply and communication leading south from the Yalu, with simultaneous amphibious landings on both coasts of North Korea.
- (8) That the Soviet [Union] be further informed, in such eventuality, it would probably become necessary to neutralize Red China's capability to wage modern war. (This could be accomplished by the destruction of Red China's limited airfields and industrial and supply bases, the cutting of her tenuous supply lines from the Soviet [Union] and the landing of Chin's Nationalist forces in Manchuria near the mouth of the Yalu, with limited continuing logistical support until such time as the communist government of China has fallen. This concept would become the great bargaining lever to induce the Soviet to agree upon honorable conditions toward international accord."¹⁹⁵

Eisenhower, historian Geoffrey Perret writes, realized that "this was ... a perfectly infeasible plan."¹⁹⁶ This would be the final moment that General MacArthur would be sought for his strategic assessment and advice on a geopolitical issue. He would never again in his lifetime be sought out for such strategic advice. Washington remained committed to NSC-68, and on July 27, 1953 the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed. This armistice cemented what MacArthur believed to be one of the largest political blunders which would have an effect upon the security of the entire Far East for decades to come.¹⁹⁷

The last documented strategic plan outlined by MacArthur came in 1954. This plan was presented during an interview conducted by Bob Considine of the *Hearst Press* on January 27, 1954. Just after MacArthur's death in 1964, the *New York Times* published this *Hearst Press* interview. This interview was one of the last in which the retired General expressed his opinion on what the end of war solution could have been. The strategy laid out in the interview was a more detailed version of the one he provided Eisenhower. MacArthur's strategy began with the neutralizing the foe's air force: "The enemy's air (power) would first have been taken out," he began. "I would have dropped between 30 to 50 atomic bombs on his air bases and other depots strung across the neck of Manchuria from just across the Yalu River from Antung (northwestern tip of Korea) to the neighborhood of Hunchun (just north of the north-eastern tip of Korea near the border of the U.S.S.R.)." This mission "under the cover of darkness," he explained, "would have destroyed the enemy's air force on the ground, wiped out his maintenance and his airmen." The logistical problem of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, MacArthur pointed out, would then prohibit a swift resupply and rebuild. The next phase of the war would be fought on the ground by way of two amphibious landing forces. The first would be made up of 500,000 Chinese Nationalist troops and one Marine division "would have landed at Antung and proceeded eastward along the road that parallels the Yalu." The second landing force, comprised of the other Marine division, "would have landed simultaneously at Unggi or Najin, hit the same river road, and charged very quickly westward. Forces could have joined in two days, forming a wall of manpower and fire-power across the northern border of Korea." The defeat for the enemies' superior numbers would happen as a result of starvation, "he would have sued for peace

immediately after learning his air had been taken out” and his supply lines had been cut.¹⁹⁸

The most telling portion of the interview came when discussing the threat of the Soviet Union. The significance of this interview can be found in its embittered language. Wittner asked MacArthur what he would have done had the Soviet Union intervened. MacArthur responded, “Russia? It makes me laugh when I recall the fears of the Truman-Acheson-Marshall-Bradley-general staff group that Russia would commit its armies to a war in China’s behalf at the end of an endless one-track railroad to peninsular battleground that led only to the sea.” He continued, “Russia could not have engaged us. She would not have fought for China. She is already unhappy and uncertain over the colossus she had encouraged. The truce we entered into—that stupendous blunder of refusing to win when we could have won—has given China the breathing time she needed.” She had been allowed to update her “primitive airfields in Manchuria” transforming them into “modern installations with 10,000 foot runways.” As for her war making capabilities, she has expanded her limited “concentrated arms-producing area” from one to four. MacArthur went even further stating that “in 50 years, if she can develop her plane-building facilities, China will be one of the world’s top military powers.” Embittered [angrily], MacArthur declared “it was in our power to destroy the Red Chinese army and Chinese military power. And probably for all time. My plan was a cinch. I was refused the right to carry it out by a group of isolationists and the politically minded joint chiefs.”¹⁹⁹

Finally to Wittner, MacArthur condemned the policies and political positioning the decision makers during the Korean War period. “They were the true isolationists. They made only one revision in what we came to know as isolationism in this country. They expanded their walls to include Western Europe. They never understood the world as a whole. They never understood the enormous forces of Asia.” Eisenhower maintained this isolationism. MacArthur concluded that all his decades spent serving and fighting in the Pacific were all for naught, “in time, we will scuttle our holdings and interests in the Pacific.”²⁰⁰

While the strategies of MacArthur were given little credence in the present limited war scenario of the Korea War, his strategy made sense given his assessment of Sino-Soviet capabilities and the Soviet Union’s aversion to risk. The Soviet Union had sought expansion through political infiltration and then civil war. At no point was the Soviet Union redistributing large amounts of military troops and resources to the Far East. It had become evident in the course of the Korean War that the Soviet Union could not be enticed to enter into that war. Therefore, it was logical to assess that the Soviet Union’s decision engage in warfare would be based upon an assessment of their own capabilities. Instead the Soviet Union used China as their proxy to assist the North Korean’s. The use of the PRC, a nation in its infancy with no modern military capabilities, was proof that while the Soviet Union desire solidification of its eastern front, she was not going to risk its new growing status as a world power to achieve it. The Soviet Union was not fighting its own wars, she sought others to do this for her. The opportunity had presented itself to the United Nations and the United States to damage the reputation of the Soviet Union in the Far East, roll back communism in Korea and China, and prevent the Soviet Union

from solidifying its current foot hold in the Far East. Collectively, this would have substantially weakened the Soviet position in Europe.

The four point plan provided to the JCS outlined a method by which this could be achieved. In MacArthur's mind the sooner the Truman Administration and UN officials realized this new state of war and what it meant, the sooner European peace could be solidified. He insisted that, without greatly weakening the western flank of men, he could completely destroy Communist China's military capability which included the possibility of complete reversal of the Chinese Civil War. This was the final element in the fourth point of his plan. The release and implementation of Chaing Kai-shek's Nationalist forces in Formosa upon the Chinese mainland and in Korea. The effect of this strategy would have been two fold. First, MacArthur would have had access to the reinforcements that he needed, without draining human resources from Europe. Second, Washington would have had the opportunity to reverse their blunder in the Chinese Civil War. The reversal of the Chinese Civil War would be possible for two reasons; the inherent civil distrust that which is the oppressive nature of communism and the overstretched CCF. The Chinese Communists had committed most all of its strength stationed in Manchuria and committed to the Korean War. Stretched to this magnitude and fully engaged in warfare on the Korean front the initiation of a second front in southern China was attractive to MacArthur. While the CCF had surprised MacArthur in their tactical abilities and had seen some amount of initial success, a two front conflict would result in the imminent collapse on both their fronts. Throughout Korea and Manchuria, the CCF would be heavily bombarded – their resources and infrastructure would be destroyed. They would be pinned down unable to swiftly move soldiers and supplies from the north back to the

south. Further yet, a decision to retreat to focus on combating the Kuomintang in southern China would risk exposing their north flank and industries even further. They would be paralyzed and their defeat would be all but guaranteed.

To MacArthur, this entire strategy would severely obstruct the continued attempts by the Soviet Union to modernize its military. They would again be denied warm water access, their naval development again set back decades, so too would their access to natural resources and raw materials be hindered. The execution of this strategic plan would have resulted in the expansion of the Pacific defensive perimeter, allowing the development and the permanent establishment of governments with the complete capability to fend off the spread of communism.

The Truman Administration and JCS, however, did not share MacArthur's strategic views. They remained focused solely upon Germany and Japan. To them Germany was in a more precarious and vulnerable position due to the proximity of the strength of the Soviet military and its current possession of German land. The possible threat of the Soviet Union's potential capabilities was a major factor in their refusal to permit MacArthur the proper men and equipment to conduct military action in Korea.

For General MacArthur the time was now to deliver a decisive blow to the desires of these communist nations establishing themselves as a world power. It was understood that at the moment the Chinese and Russian relationship was one of convenience and at the moment would never expand to full military support for one another – due to Russia's vulnerability. However, if China was allowed to grow and they were allowed to firmly establish themselves upon the coastal waters of Asia, it would foster the growth of a

powerful ally in Soviet Russia which would then shift the “balance of military power in the struggle for the world.”²⁰¹

In MacArthur’s mind, UN forces held ground and air superiority and thus could only be defeated by its own politics. While the western leaders were obsessed with the fear of Soviet Russia’s perceived desire in Europe, they were blinded by propaganda and thus failed to see their glaring weakness, their southern and eastern flank. Thus, there was never serious danger of active Soviet intervention. MacArthur advised the JCS that the Soviet Union could not be coaxed into a war in the Far East. Furthermore, if she decided that the moment to take military action in the Far East was at hand, MacArthur maintained that the logistical impediments would be her ruin. Most importantly he assessed that the chief advantage lay with America’s atomic bomb, while Soviet manufacturing has just begun. Accepting this logic reveals that the time was right to aggressively roll back communism absent of fear and restriction. The opportunity to strike a crippling blow to the Soviet Union’s desire of a “Pacific Wall” and to quarantine communism behind strong stable governments was at hand. The battlefield had been chosen and MacArthur desired to oblige the enemy. In the eyes of MacArthur this was the opportunity to suffocate the Cold War enemies, forever limiting their potential power. The moment was at hand, and the evidence was there.²⁰²

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

General MacArthur's strategy for the Korean War and the Cold War overall in 1950 was marked with aggression. Combine fervent militancy with a resolute mindset that victory was the only option and one might begin to comprehend MacArthur's strategy. He advocated that "we defend every place, and I say that we have the capacity to do it. If you say that we haven't, you admit defeat. If the enemy has that capacity and is divided on all these fronts, we should be able to meet it."²⁰³ It was for this reason that General MacArthur so ferociously supported Formosa and the unification of Korea – meeting force with equal counter force in Korea. MacArthur's letter to Congressman Joe Martin, dated March 20, 1951, clearly explains what was at stake in Asia: "It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communists conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to Communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable; win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you point out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory."²⁰⁴

Segments of MacArthur's memoir illustrate the imperativeness with which he regarded victory over maintaining the status quo in Korea: "Its disastrous consequences

were reflected throughout Asia. Red China promptly was accepted as the military colossus of the East. Korea was left ravished and divided. Indochina was partitioned by the sword. Tibet was taken almost on demand. Other Asian nations began to tremble toward neutralism. It confirmed Red control of continental China, and fostered the growth of a powerful ally of Soviet Russia which well might become a balance of military power in the struggle for the world.”²⁰⁵ The situation in Korea was a microcosm of the entire Cold War; victory in Korea would mean a victory over the Soviet Union and global preponderance. The Korea War offered the opportunity to destroy emerging totalitarian regimes preventing them from achieving and then challenging the global preponderance of the United States.

This was evident in the proposed strategies by MacArthur. At bottom, he was willing to risk general war with the Soviet Union and the PRC to achieve a complete victory in Korea. He accepted this risk because he thought the gains from victory would be great while the chances of general war actually breaking out were relatively low. This assessment was based on his view of the significance of Asia in the global balance of power, the military superiority of the United States, and the Soviet’s unwillingness to take big risks in their confrontation with the United States. Even if general war did break out as a consequence of pursuing victory in Korea, moreover, MacArthur was confident the United States would win it. Now, then, was not the time to be cautious. Now was the time to go for victory.

Nuclear weapons and (especially), the nuclear balance had much to do with MacArthur’s strategy. He saw this weaponry as usable, a necessary part of the new

method of warfare in which the implementation of this decisive weapon could achieve victories in war. Evidence of this weapon's capability to gain victory was already demonstrated in the summer of 1945 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The United States had used its navy, air force, and ground troops to "rollback" the Japanese in the Pacific. Authorization of the use of the atomic bomb against Japan was designed to expedite the forgone conclusion of Japan's defeat. The success of the atomic bomb in 1945 and the United States numerical monopoly during the Korean War led MacArthur to believe that atomic weaponry should be made available for use in modern warfare when called upon. This understanding of this made him more apt to deploy atomic weaponry on the field of battle. This is evident in his strategic bombing plans that included the creation of a "radioactive belt" along the Yalu in order to allow United Nations ground forces to defeat the Sino-Korean armies and unify Korea. He viewed the usage of atomic weaponry as predicated upon the basic needs of combat. The point of developing such military weapons is their strategic implementation in wartime practices.

MacArthur's entire discussion on the decisiveness that nuclear weapons offered a modern military and his stress on what he saw as an overwhelming United States advantage in nuclear weaponry in 1950-1951, implied, though, that he may have doubted their useability in the context of United States – Soviet Union parity in which the Soviet Union could retaliate against the United States after absorbing a United States first strike. Therefore, if the United States sought an aggressive strategy against the Soviet Union the Korean War offered the opportunity. MacArthur's assessment of the Soviet Union's Air Force capabilities implies that he did not believe that the Soviet Union was capable of launching bombing missions against the mainland of the United States. This assessment

suggests that MacArthur's belief in the usability of nuclear weapons in Korea was based upon his cost benefit analysis which suggested that the only retaliation the Soviet Union could take would be against the United States forces positioned in Germany or in Japan. The latter of which would be restricted to an aerial campaign because the Soviet Union lacked the capability to mount an invasion of Japan. In the West – where the United States stationed the majority of its foreign based military – MacArthur believed that United Nations' forces would be capable of absorbing any immediate counter operations by the Soviet Union and be able to launch a strategic campaign which could halt and dissuade the Soviet Union from ever conducting future military operations. Collectively, this would result in a severe “rollback” of the Soviet Union. However, timing was everything in MacArthur's strategic assessments. MacArthur believed that any delaying of the aggressive “rollback” of the Soviet Union would only permit the Soviet Union time to build its stock-pile of nuclear weaponry, which would result in making these weapons eventually unusable when – according to the timeline of NSC-68 – the United States was ready.

The Soviet Union's successful acquisition of atomic capabilities, coupled with their aggressive expansion and success in the Far East, had MacArthur on the defensive. While he did not believe that the Soviet Union's capabilities were comparable with the United States, this new acquisition had them moving swiftly in that direction. This meant that the Soviet Union's atomic achievement destabilized the United States – Soviet relationship. Soon the Soviet Union would not be using its allies to achieve her desired goals, but her own military. It was for that reason that MacArthur argued the imperative nature of winning the Korean War in the larger Cold War context. The Soviet Union had

to be controlled before she completely modernized her military. Passively permitting the Soviet Union to surpass the United States' nuclear preponderance would destroy the United States' containment capabilities in both Europe and Asia with threats of general war and the use of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union being suicidal. MacArthur's "obsession" with seizing the opportunity in Korea against the Soviet Union and the PRC was to avoid facing this dilemma.

From that perspective, MacArthur was not very different from members of the JCS, State Department, or the Truman Administration. The whole premise of NSC-68 was to regain a decisive first-strike advantage against the Soviet Union. At the very least NSC-68 was to reinforce the credibility of containment – but ideally to go beyond containment and “rollback” Communism. MacArthur agreed with the notion outlined in NSC-68 that the Soviet Union “could be a victim of its own dynamism: if its forward thrusts were frustrated, and the Soviets had to deal with a superior counterpressure, the seeds of decay within the Soviet system would begin to flourish and fructify.”²⁰⁶ This concept was the same used by MacArthur in his assessment of the weakness of the PRC. The Korean War provided the opportunity to fulfill what NSC-68 designed to accomplish. While MacArthur too saw that a military buildup was needed for the Soviet Union would be all the more powerful when it developed the hydrogen bomb, he argued that the United States – at that moment in time – still maintained military preponderance. This was the main difference between the Truman and MacArthur. Each perceived differently the moment when the “window of vulnerability” was upon the United States. MacArthur believed that the longer they waited the less desirable outcome of a general

war with the Soviet Union would be and the more vulnerable their geopolitical preponderance would be.

In the 1950s no one was comfortable with the prospect of what would eventually become known as a situation of mutual deterrence based upon mutual assured destruction (MAD). Leaders throughout Washington D.C. knew that such a situation must be avoided at almost any cost, for it would lock in the status quo and only exacerbate an already unstable situation. Eisenhower stated this in 1953 during his State of the Union address: “[The] free world cannot indefinitely remain in a posture of paralyzed tension.”²⁰⁷ There is no doubt that General MacArthur too shared these beliefs. The key difference was that MacArthur was simply more of a risk-taker in this regard than the other leadership throughout Washington D.C.

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- ² Trachtenberg, Marc. *A Constructed Peace*. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1999, 101; Trachtenberg, Marc. *History And Strategy*. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1991, 114.
- ³ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 96-97.
- ⁴ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 97.
- ⁵ Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy*, 107-113, 153; Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 96-97.
- ⁶ Leffler, Melvyn P. *A Preponderance of Power*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992, 253, 255, 258, 298, 338.
- ⁷ Leffler, Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy*, 107-113.
- ⁸ James, Clayton D. *The Years Of MacArthur*, Vol. I. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970-1985, 87-97, 130-135, 300-305, 325-332, 340-347, 479-484, 525.
- ⁹ MacArthur, Douglas. *Reminiscences: General of the Army*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964, 370: Unfortunately the defenders of General Douglas MacArthur consist mainly of his supporters during that same period. Also see Frank, Richard B. Clark, Wesley K. *MacArthur*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, xv.
- ¹⁰ Whitney, Courtney. *MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History*. New York: Knopf, 1955, 515: "[Communists] found a ready, thought initially innocent, ally in the 'Europe-first' cliques in the War and State Departments in Washington at the time of the outbreak of World War II. Together, for their separate reasons, these two groups sought to block acceptance of MacArthur's view that Europe and Asia – the Atlantic and Pacific – were equally important in the contemplation of our national interest and security. Together they attempted to discredit MacArthur in every way and thwart even his efforts against the enemy in World War II and Korea. Together they fostered the tragic notion that appeasement instead of defiance would win in Asia. Together they were responsible for MacArthur's recall."
- ¹¹ Stueck, William Whitney. *Rethinking The Korean War: A New Diplomatic And Strategic History*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; 2004, 97: "MacArthur was a highly political general, a man who had permitted his name to be placed on the ballot in the Republican presidential primary in Wisconsin in 1948." MacArthur was politically involved during the the Korean War, granting interviews (to journalists he approved of) and writing correspondence with congressional and senatorial members its subject matter often critical of Presidential policy in the Far East.
- ¹² Kaufman, Burton Ira. *The Korean War: Challenges In Crisis, Credibility, And Command*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986, x.
- ¹³ Blair, Clay. *The Forgotten War: America In Korea, 1950-1953*. New York: Times Books, 1987, 31.
- ¹⁴ This provides no glorious insight because all military members are trained to believe in their superiority.
- ¹⁵ Rosemary Foot. *The Wrong War: American Policy And The Dimensions Of The Korean Conflict, 1950-1953, 1950-1953*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985, 85.
- ¹⁶ Foot, *The Wrong War*, 85; Ridgway, Matthew B. *The Korean War*, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967, 38.
- ¹⁷ Lowe, Peter. "An Ally and a Recalcitrant General: Great Britain, Douglas MacArthur and the Korean War, 1950-1." *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 105, No. 416 (Jul., 1990), 652; Lowe, Peter. *The Korean War*, New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 2000.
- ¹⁸ Lowe, *An Ally and a Recalcitrant General*. 648.
- ¹⁹ They promoted the idea that the Western European economic and political rebuild would directly affect the rebuilding nations in the Far East. The Truman Administration believed that the United States did not have the capabilities to simultaneously facilitate East and Western Rebuilding.

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- ²⁰ Cummings, Bruce. *The Origins Of The Korean War*, Vol. 2. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990, 54.
- ²¹ United States Congress. *Military situation in the Far East hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, first session, to conduct an inquiry into the military situation in the Far East Washington*. Vol. 1, U.S. G.P.O. (1951). 119-120, 253; All citations from this source will be abbreviated as *MSFE*.
- ²² *MSFE*, 119; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 253, 309.
- ²³ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 30-31.
- ²⁴ *United States State Department. Foreign Relations of the United States*. U.S. G.P.O. (1946-1951), 1947, Vol. VI, 684; All citations from the Foreign Relations of the United States will be abbreviated as *FRUS*.
- ²⁵ *MSFE*, 7-8: "The Russian has always believed that he could not take his rightful place in the international sphere of commerce and industry unless he shared the commerce of the seas. For centuries he has been seeking warm waters. The objective of Russia for many decades was the Mediterranean. It not only would have given her warm water, given her a chance to develop transportation, her water transportation facilities, but would have cut the lifeline of her greatest rival [Britain]. Now recently the Russian has probably had a new vision opened. It is the possibility of reaching the warm waters of the Pacific and Indian Oceans."
- ²⁶ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 161-165; *MSFE*, 7-8.
- ²⁷ *MSFE*, 8.
- ²⁸ *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. VII, pt. 2, 774; Also see Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 298.
- ²⁹ *MSFE*, 120.
- ³⁰ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 390-392.
- ³¹ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 390-392.
- ³² MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 400.
- ³³ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 400.
- ³⁴ *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. VII, pt. 2, 655-658.
- ³⁵ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 400.
- ³⁶ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 168-169.
- ³⁷ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 392.
- ³⁸ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 390-392.
- ³⁹ *MSFE*, 263.
- ⁴⁰ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VI, 1215.
- ⁴¹ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 350.
- ⁴² MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 379.
- ⁴³ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 386.
- ⁴⁴ *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. VII, pt. 2, 656.
- ⁴⁵ *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. VII, pt. 2, 656.
- ⁴⁶ *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. VI, 700.
- ⁴⁷ *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. VI, 700; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 257.
- ⁴⁸ *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. VI, 700.
- ⁴⁹ *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. VI, 700, 709.
- ⁵⁰ *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. VI, 700.
- ⁵¹ James, Clayton D. *The Years Of MacArthur*, Vol. III. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970-1985, 401.
- ⁵² *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. VI, 700.
- ⁵³ James, *The Years of MacArthur*, Vol. III, 401.
- ⁵⁴ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 161-165.
- ⁵⁵ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 162.
- ⁵⁶ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 162.
- ⁵⁷ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 165.
- ⁵⁸ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 162; MacArthur, *A Soldier Speaks*, 219-220.
- ⁵⁹ MacArthur, Douglas. *A Soldier Speaks: Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965, 218-222.
- ⁶⁰ MacArthur, *A Soldier Speaks*, 220.
- ⁶¹ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 162.

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- ⁶² MacArthur, *A Soldier Speaks*, 218-222.
- ⁶³ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 162.
- ⁶⁴ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 162-163.
- ⁶⁵ MacArthur, *A Soldier Speaks*, 218-222.
- ⁶⁶ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 162-163.
- ⁶⁷ MacArthur, *A Soldier Speaks*, 221.
- ⁶⁸ *MSFE*, 53.
- ⁶⁹ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 164.
- ⁷⁰ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 1950, L. P. Beria, "Election Speeches by Politburo Members" *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, March 10, 1950, 9.
- ⁷¹ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 164.
- ⁷² *MSFE*, 32.
- ⁷³ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 292-293, 299, 301.
- ⁷⁴ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 292.
- ⁷⁵ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 392.
- ⁷⁶ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 369; Cummings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 749; Cummings research found the atomic weapon estimates for the United States to be about 450 and the Soviet Union maybe 25.
- ⁷⁷ *MSFE*, 7.
- ⁷⁸ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 441.
- ⁷⁹ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 307; This belief aligns with a CIA report, cited by historian Melvyn Leffler, on the capability of Soviet air forces: "Soviet air forces were reported to be beleaguered by a shortage of trained technicians and specialists, poor air crew proficiency, and insufficient spare parts. Defectors from the air force indicated that the number of planes was much smaller than suggested in formal tables of organization. In squadrons of thirty planes, usually only six or eight were operative. The speed and ceilings of the jet aircraft almost always seemed to be exaggerated. When a Soviet jet crashed in Sweden, U.S. investigators noted the absence of any advanced electronic equipment. Moreover, Soviet pilots appeared to be inexperienced in night and all-weather flying, high-altitude bombing, and long-range navigation. The capacity of the Soviet air force to engage in anything but tactical support of Russian land armies was still severely circumscribed."
- ⁸⁰ *MSFE*, 6-8.
- ⁸¹ *MSFE*, 7-8.
- ⁸² *MSFE*, 8.
- ⁸³ *MSFE*, 7.
- ⁸⁴ *MSFE*, 6.
- ⁸⁵ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 168-169.
- ⁸⁶ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*. 392.
- ⁸⁷ *MSFE*, 173-174.
- ⁸⁸ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 428.
- ⁸⁹ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*. 367; *MSFE*, 142.
- ⁹⁰ James, *The MacArthur Years*, Vol. III, 523-524, 528.
- ⁹¹ James, *The MacArthur Years*, Vol. III, 523-524; MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 367.
- ⁹² MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 367.
- ⁹³ James, *The MacArthur Years*, Vol. III, 523-524; MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 367.
- ⁹⁴ *MSFE*, 136.
- ⁹⁵ James, *The MacArthur Years*, Vol. III, 586.
- ⁹⁶ *MSFE*, 136.
- ⁹⁷ James, *The MacArthur Years*, Vol. III, 586.
- ⁹⁸ James, *The MacArthur Years*, Vol. III, 586.
- ⁹⁹ *MSFE*, 6.
- ¹⁰⁰ *MSFE*, 136.
- ¹⁰¹ *MSFE*, 136.
- ¹⁰² *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. VI, 711.

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- ¹⁰³ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 428.
- ¹⁰⁴ *MSFE*, 183.
- ¹⁰⁵ *MSFE*, 183.
- ¹⁰⁶ Foot, *The Wrong War*, 85; Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 37-38; Also see *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 428.
- ¹⁰⁷ Perret, Geoffrey. *Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life Of Douglas MacArthur*. New York: Random House, 1996, 550.
- ¹⁰⁸ *MSFE*, 265.
- ¹⁰⁹ *MSFE*, 183.
- ¹¹⁰ *MSFE*, 78.
- ¹¹¹ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 370, 392.
- ¹¹² MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 392.
- ¹¹³ *MSFE*, 142; Also see James, *The MacArthur Years*, Vol. III, 394.
- ¹¹⁴ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 392.
- ¹¹⁵ As a part of reconstruction the government controlled the labor force; Also see Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur*, 521.
- ¹¹⁶ Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur*, 521-522.
- ¹¹⁷ Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur*, 522.
- ¹¹⁸ Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur*, 522.
- ¹¹⁹ Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur*, 522; Also See *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VI, 955.
- ¹²⁰ Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur*, 522.
- ¹²¹ Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur*, 532.
- ¹²² Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur*, 532.
- ¹²³ Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur*, 533.
- ¹²⁴ Message from Washington to MacArthur dated December 28, 1945. *National Diet Library*. 2003-2004. Accessed January 3, 2015. <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryō/03/053/053tx.html>.
- ¹²⁵ Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur*, 533-534.
- ¹²⁶ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 293, 309.
- ¹²⁷ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VI, 1113.
- ¹²⁸ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VI, 1214.
- ¹²⁹ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VI, 1214.
- ¹³⁰ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VI, 1216.
- ¹³¹ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VI, 1216.
- ¹³² *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VI, 1216-1217; *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VI, 1189-1191. Dean Rusk held the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs from March 1950 until December 1951.
- ¹³³ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VI, 1217.
- ¹³⁴ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VI, 1217.
- ¹³⁵ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VI, 1217.
- ¹³⁶ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VI, 1217.
- ¹³⁷ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VI, 1217-1218.
- ¹³⁸ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 1950, G. Tavrov, "Soviet Korean Friendship Grows Stronger", *Izvestia*, March 17, 1950, 3.
- ¹³⁹ *FRUS*, 1946, Vol. VIII, 641.
- ¹⁴⁰ *FRUS*, 1946, Vol. VIII, 641.
- ¹⁴¹ *FRUS*, 1946, Vol. VIII, 640.
- ¹⁴² *FRUS*, 1946, Vol. VIII, 640-642.
- ¹⁴³ While the DPRK received weapons and training from the Soviet Union, the South Koreans received theirs from the United States.
- ¹⁴⁴ James, *The Years of MacArthur*, Vol. III, 399-402.
- ¹⁴⁵ James, *The Years of MacArthur*, Vol. III, 399-400; *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. IX, 545-546.
- ¹⁴⁶ Trachtenberg, *History & Strategy*, 114.
- ¹⁴⁷ Trachtenberg, *History & Strategy*, 114.
- ¹⁴⁸ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 249.

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- ¹⁴⁹ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 140.
- ¹⁵⁰ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 252.
- ¹⁵¹ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 1950, (Editorial) "Comment and Reports on the Korean War." *Izvestia and Pravda*, August 6-7, 1950, 4.
- ¹⁵² *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 953-954.
- ¹⁵³ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 953; Rovere & Schlesinger, *The MacArthur Controversy*, 280.
- ¹⁵⁴ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 953; General MacArthur reiterated this assessment during his Congressional testimony.
- ¹⁵⁵ Perret, *Old soldiers Never Die*, 560.
- ¹⁵⁶ Perret, *Old soldiers Never Die*, 560.
- ¹⁵⁷ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 1149.
- ¹⁵⁸ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 1149.
- ¹⁵⁹ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 1149.
- ¹⁶⁰ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 689.
- ¹⁶¹ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 1149.
- ¹⁶² *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 1149.
- ¹⁶³ *MSFE*, 173-174.
- ¹⁶⁴ *MSFE*, 173-174.
- ¹⁶⁵ *MSFE*, 9.
- ¹⁶⁶ *MSFE*, 9.
- ¹⁶⁷ *MSFE*, 131.
- ¹⁶⁸ *MSFE*, 131-132.
- ¹⁶⁹ *MSFE*, 175.
- ¹⁷⁰ *MSFE*, 175.
- ¹⁷¹ Cummings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 711; Foote, *The Wrong War*, 74.
- ¹⁷² Cummings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 711; Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die*, 559.
- ¹⁷³ Cummings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 711.
- ¹⁷⁴ Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die*, 560-561.
- ¹⁷⁵ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 1237.
- ¹⁷⁶ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 1057-1058.
- ¹⁷⁷ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 1237; Collins, *War in Peace Time*, 199.
- ¹⁷⁸ Cummings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 741-743; *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 1237-1238; Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die*, 564.
- ¹⁷⁹ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 1237-1238.
- ¹⁸⁰ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 1237.
- ¹⁸¹ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 386; MacArthur's letter to Congressman Martin, March 20, 1951: "My views and recommendations, with respect to the situation created by Red Chinese entry into war against us in Korea, have been submitted to Washington in most complete detail. Generally these views are well known and clearly understood, as they follow the conventional pattern of meeting force with maximum counter-force as we have never failed to do in the past. It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communists conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to Communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable; win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you point out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory."
- ¹⁸² Cummings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 750.
- ¹⁸³ Cummings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 750.
- ¹⁸⁴ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 1630-1633; Wittner, Lawrence S. *MacArthur*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971, 49.
- ¹⁸⁵ *FRUS*, 1951, Vol. VII, pt. 1, 41-43.
- ¹⁸⁶ *FRUS*, 1951, Vol. VII, pt. 1, 41-43.
- ¹⁸⁷ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 1632; James, *The MacArthur Years*, 551.
- ¹⁸⁸ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 1632; James, *The MacArthur Years*, 551.

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- ¹⁸⁹ *FRUS*, 1951, Vol. VII, pt. 1, 56.
- ¹⁹⁰ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. VII, 1630-1633.
- ¹⁹¹ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 400-405; MacArthur, *Soldier Speaks*, 243-252.
- ¹⁹² Whitney, *MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History*, 460-462.
- ¹⁹³ Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die*, 573.
- ¹⁹⁴ Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die*, 573; MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 403.
- ¹⁹⁵ James, *The MacArthur Years*, Vol. III, 653-654; Also see Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die*, 576.
- ¹⁹⁶ Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die*, 576.
- ¹⁹⁷ Wittner, *MacArthur*, 57-59.
- ¹⁹⁸ Wittner, *MacArthur*, 57-58.
- ¹⁹⁹ Wittner, *MacArthur*, 58-59.
- ²⁰⁰ Wittner, *MacArthur*, 59.
- ²⁰¹ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 390.
- ²⁰² MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 390-392.
- ²⁰³ *MSFE*, 83.
- ²⁰⁴ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 386.
- ²⁰⁵ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 390; Long, Gavin. *MacArthur As Military Commander*. London: Batsford, 1969, 226.
- ²⁰⁶ Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy*, 110; *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. 1, 248-287.
- ²⁰⁷ Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy*, 150.