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WHY DID THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION DECIDE TO DEPLOY JUPITER
MISSILES IN TURKEY: A CASE STUDY IN NUCLEARIZATION
OF NATO STRATEGY

MURAT IPLIKCI

91 Pages

Looking out at the international political landscape of the late 1940s and the early 1950s, the Eisenhower administration was determined to challenge the evident appeal of Communism, particularly in Western Europe. NATO, which was a fragile organization due to the devastation of World War II (WWII), and its members were prone to any communist attack, either by military forces or through political parties. They had to be defended. The Eisenhower administration saw nuclear weapons as the only means to defend the alliance against the massive threat of the Soviet Union. Therefore, President Eisenhower committed nuclear weapons to NATO as a critical security strategy in 1953. This nuclearization process continued throughout the Eisenhower's presidency and stayed one of the top priorities of the administration's foreign policy goals. When Eisenhower left the office in 1961, Britain, Italy, and Turkey were the NATO states who had American nuclear weapons in their soil. This consequence paves the way to the question of why the Eisenhower administration decided to nuclearize NATO. Specifically, why did his administration deploy Intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), a.k.a. Jupiters, in Turkey? This thesis is going to answer these questions in the light of primary sources and several respected historians' arguments in this field.

KEYWORDS: The Eisenhower Administration, NATO, Turkey, Forward Defense, Nuclear Sharing, Credibility

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A Thesis Submitted in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

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OF NATO STRATEGY

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INTRODUCTION

NATO nuclear arrangements go back to the foundation of the alliance. The first NATO strategy document was ratified in 1949. It includes a reference that ensures the ability to carry out strategic bombing promptly with all types of weapons. This statement means nuclear weapons. Then, in 1951, the U.S. estimated that the Soviet Union's conventional forces in 1954 would pose a constant threat of Europe to be overrun. The Eisenhower administration saw nuclear weapons as the only means to defend the alliance against the massive conventional forces of the Soviet Union. Therefore, President Eisenhower committed nuclear weapons to NATO as a critical security strategy in 1953. The first atomic bomb arrived on European soil the next year. This nuclearization process continued throughout the Eisenhower's presidency and became one of the top priorities of the administration's foreign policy goals. When Eisenhower left the office in 1961, Britain, Italy, and Turkey. Why did the Eisenhower administration decide to nuclearize NATO? Specifically, why did his administration deploy Intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), a.k.a. Jupiters, in Turkey? This thesis is going to answer these questions in the light of primary sources and several respected historians' arguments in this field.

Marc Trachtenberg sees there are some reasons behind the nuclearization of NATO. First, Eisenhower stressed that NATO's only chance of victory was to paralyze the enemy at the outset of the war. With a preemptive attack, which would destroy the enemy's strategic forces.¹ To carry out such an attack the U.S. needed to deploy nuclear weapons close to the enemy's borders, or at least on the same continent.

Secondly, the President believed that this nuclear strategy might allow the U.S. to withdraw its conventional forces from Europe. Eisenhower knew that, against masses of Soviet conventional forces, militarily weakened Europe, even though it was defended by the American

¹ Marc Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1991), 22.

ground forces, would not have a chance to resist. Replacing these forces with nuclear weapons would both bring American boys back to the home and stop any Soviet nuclear or conventional offensive to Europe before it started. The U.S. Army, in 1954, opposed cuts in conventional forces because it would lead U.S. forces to lose their offensive capability in case of a general war. However, Eisenhower noticed ground forces' weaknesses during the Korean War and believed that they could not be an essential military focus any longer. Therefore, he focused on developing tactical nuclear weapons for both national security and transformation of the American presence in Europe. It would be easier to convince European partners for an American withdrawal if they feel secure under the nuclear umbrella. Eisenhower, as the supporter of a more committed alliance with less U.S. dependency, wanted Europe has its share in the defensive strategy of NATO by nuclearizing themselves.²

The last reason for the nuclearization of NATO involved Eisenhower's mindset about transforming Europe into a third great power bloc.³ He wanted Europe to pull together to create a self-sufficient nuclear power that would not need to depend on American military capabilities. From the military perspective, the building up of the European power meant the nuclearization of the European forces. If the Europeans were only armed with conventional weapons, the Soviet Union would overrun Europe in any war scenario. However, nuclear sharing could give Europe its own means of self-defense.

Peter Roman, similar to Trachtenberg's arguments, explains the nuclearization of NATO by featuring that the nuclear weapons would be the Eisenhower administration's first reliance in case of a Soviet hostility. He also agrees with Trachtenberg that transferring larger numbers of

² Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), 157.

³ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 146.

the nuclear weapons to Europe would provide an immediate and decisive improvement to the Europe in a battlefield.⁴ He includes this strategy to the "New Look" policy. This policy focuses on a new national and international security strategy by emphasizing the roles of NATO and nuclear weapons. In addition to them, the nuclearization of NATO would counter the budgetary constraints imposed by the Truman administration. This administration believed that the U.S. needs to spend on both nuclear and conventional forces to sustain a war. However, this option would be very costly. Instead of that strategy, the Eisenhower administration decided to focus on developing nuclear weapons while reducing the conventional forces for economic stability. In fact, bringing the economic consequences in forwarding dissociates Roman from Trachtenberg distinctly.

Roman underlines the Eisenhower administration's efforts to strengthen NATO during the missile gap period as a milestone, as well. Due to the political and military changes in the late 1950s, the U.S. deployed one-hundred and five IRBMs to Britain, Italy, and Turkey as the expansion of nuclearization policy. However, Roman underlines that this process suffers from a variety of problems, including the technological weakness of the weapons and the restrictions of the McMahon Act of 1946. This act only allowed the host countries to own the missiles, but the nuclear heads would be owned by the U.S.; which was an awkward way to share power with the allies, according to Roman.⁵ Throughout his presidency, Eisenhower was in favor of the nuclearization of NATO, and he accepted any additional nuclear solutions he can provide to European allies. Only, he rejected the escalation of conventional forces due to the budget concerns and their controversial functionality in a nuclear war. In terms of Eisenhower's decision limiting conventional forces and replacing them with nuclear weapons in Europe, Roman

⁴ Peter J. Roman, *Eisenhower and the Missile Gap* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 22.

⁵ Roman, *Eisenhower and the Missile Gap*, 28.

underlines this idea as one of the main reasons why did the Eisenhower decide to nuclearize NATO. On the other hand, Trachtenberg discusses this reason to some extent but does not believe its significance in terms of the policy-shaping process.

Roman argues that several abstract motivations also prompted the Eisenhower administration to nuclearize NATO. For example, the estimations about threat assessment that the intelligence provided were consistently exaggerated and these assessments accelerated the nuclear force acquisition and deployment.⁶ In his lines, Roman analyzes U.S. nuclear policy in wake of the panic inspired by Sputnik incident and shot down of U.S. spy plane U2 in the Soviet soil. Although these technological innovations enhanced strategic intelligence, he argues that the inability to ensure an early warning in case of a Soviet attack fostered perceptions of vulnerability. He also states that the "worst-case scenarios" generated by the administration, as well as the other institutions, contributed the belief of the need for quick responses to the Soviet nuclear capabilities. In the end, these intelligence reports combined with fear of inadequate deterrence led the Eisenhower administration to take necessary steps for strengthening the defense of NATO.⁷ In Roman's narrative, this panic culminated in the Sputnik incident, which also triggered the debates about the "Missile Gap" issue. In response to the perception of vulnerability to Soviet missiles, the Eisenhower administration authorized the massive deployment of nuclear ballistic missiles (ICBMs and IRBMs) in the NATO states. The result of a such policy did not only enabled a massive nuclear build-up in NATO soil but also helped the U.S. to maintain its nuclear superior image against the Soviet Union.

Philip Nash does not challenge the common argument that both Trachtenberg and Roman underline. In Nash's perspective, Eisenhower's nuclear strategy and its relations with NATO is

⁶ Roman, *Eisenhower and the Missile Gap*, 44-46.

⁷ Roman, *Eisenhower and the Missile Gap*, 60.

also related to the replacement of the conventional forces and incorporation of nuclear weapons into the alliance. The reasons for this policy were being capable of hitting and thus deterring the Soviet Union as soon as possible and including NATO to the nuclear sharing program to create a third great power. In these terms, Nash includes the IRBM offers as the continuation of the nuclearization process, which was the successor of the Eisenhower administration's nuclear agenda of 1953.

What separates Nash from the other authors is that he brings the credibility issue on the table. Credibility is a loose, intangible concept in Nash's lines. It is discussed in the realm of psychology, and for this reason, it is difficult to track or measure with any precision. However, Nash explains this term and its relationship with the nuclearization process of NATO by focusing on IRBM deployments in Europe. He says the Eisenhower administration was continually attempting to preserve credibility among the NATO members, especially after the launch of Sputnik.⁸ This incident caused a great panic among the allies and a perception U.S. nuclear forces would be vulnerable to the Soviet first strike. In such a period full of fearful comments on increasing Soviet nuclear capabilities, the Jupiter were deployed as the strategic nuclear weapons when the issue of credibility and alliance commitments were discussed. By this strategy, Eisenhower aimed to have a retaliation power to deter the Soviet Union from a preemptive attack. Therefore, the Eisenhower administration offered IRBMs to the NATO states in late 1957 for a complex jumble of reasons, large and small, but primarily to address an existing lack of U.S. strategic credibility that Sputnik had exacerbated. In brief, it can be said that Nash joins Trachtenberg's arguments in general and adds an updated reason for the late 1950s when he tries to explain the Jupiters' deployment to Turkey.

⁸ Philip Nash, *The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963* (North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 13.

Among the authors, only Nash directly discusses Eisenhower's decision to deploy the Jupiters to Turkey. He accepts that American nuclear weapons would hit the targets to stop the Soviet Union before it launched an attack. After stung by Sputnik, the Eisenhower administration accelerated the deployment of these weapons to NATO members. In his narrative, Nash calls the Sputnik incident as a significant milestone; in terms of Eisenhower's decision to nuclearize Turkey. After that incident, as well as another contributing factor the Suez Crisis of 1956, the credibility issue became prominent. Turkey, which have already had security concerns due to the threats of the Soviet Union since the post-WWII period, asked for any American military support for its survival. To sustain American credibility in Turkey's eyes, the deployment of the Jupiters was an important decision, Nash says.

In addition to these three main authors who directly focuses on this issue, some others also discuss the Eisenhower administration's decision to nuclearize NATO and allow readers to interpret their ideas about nuclearization of Turkey. For example, Saki Dockrill also relates the Eisenhower administration's decision to nuclearization of NATO in terms of organizing a collective security in Western Europe. She considers the security policies like "New Look", balancing the budget by reducing the conventional force while focusing on the nuclear armament, and "Massive Retaliation", to deter an aggression by using a force disproportionate to the size of the attack, as key the factors which paved the way to the nuclear-sharing strategy of the U.S. with her allies in Europe. The institutionalization of the American nuclear capacity and promotion of this policy in the NATO states were essential to construct a forward defense to prevent a Soviet overrun threat against Europe.⁹She does not agree on Trachtenberg's comments that a nuclear war can appear in the age of nuclear weapons. Therefore, by the nuclearization of

⁹ Saki Dockrill, *Eisenhower's New Look National Security Policy, 1953-1961* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 72.

NATO, Eisenhower did not hope for a decisive victory against the Soviet Union; but he stepped forward to obtain the enemy's weaknesses and launched a program to exploit the opportunities which would hold Moscow back from Western Europe. This strategy did not only create a self-sufficient Europe with nuclear capabilities but also it eliminated the threats over the American economy and allowed the withdrawal of troops abroad.¹⁰

John Lewis Gaddis underlines the similar reasons that Dockrill pointed out when he tries to explain the reasons for the Eisenhower administration's decision to deploy nuclear weapons to NATO states. Eisenhower's "New Look" policy accepted the notion of global communist danger; as a result, he decided to hang on a more committed strategy, which can protect and sustain security overseas. Possessing a nuclear strategy, which aimed to hold the line everywhere and being ready to act would help the administration to face Soviet threat was related to the universal control, which meant an asymmetrical strategy in Gaddis' lines. The notion of asymmetrical response recognizes the reality of the nuclear age, which requires steady nerves to sustain the Cold War, and the ability to distinguish rationally vital interests, tolerable and intolerable threats, feasible and unfeasible responses.¹¹ The best examples of this response include the "New Look" foreign policy and its reflections as the forward defense.

Campbell Craig's work focuses on Eisenhower's views of nuclear warfare and nuclear deployment; however, he challenges the idea of forward defense and the preemption. The nuclearization of NATO was about showing the president can push any button to destroy the Soviet Union rather than conducting a severe attack. Eisenhower was trying to avoid nuclear war at all costs by adopting a risky policy - deploying IRBMs in the NATO states for intimidation.¹²

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 165-166.

¹² Campbell Craig, *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 36.

On the other hand, Craig also states that one of the primary reasons for Eisenhower to nuclearize NATO was reducing the cost of American conventional forces in Europe, which brings him on the same page with other authors.¹³ Craig also demonstrates that this nuclearization strategy was related to create a more unified and powerful alliance, rather than a weak and dependent of American aid.¹⁴

Robert Divine covers the political ramifications of the Sputnik's launch and argues that Eisenhower's initial response to this incident was ineffective in terms of calming his allies' fears. Taking bolder steps was a necessity to conduct psychological warfare; therefore, Divine connects the Sputnik incident's influence in the international sphere with the administration's strategy of nuclear deployment in NATO.¹⁵ In addition to Nash, Divine also proposes that the Eisenhower administration put emphasis on the deployment of IRBMs to Western Europe for both calming American public and the allies down not due to concerns over American credibility in the international arena. In Divine's lines, Sputnik is explained as a real threat that may lead to Soviet missile attacks and nuclearization of NATO aimed to counter increasing Soviet missile threats to U.S. national and NATO securities.¹⁶

It seems all of these authors meet on two common grounds: The Eisenhower administration decided to nuclearize NATO states to construct a forward defense in Europe which would both allow the allies to first strike opportunity and deter Soviet aggression towards Europe. In addition to that, the launch of Sputnik caused a panic among the alliance and the president felt that he had to do something to restore American credibility. Both of these reasons are valid to explain the process.

¹³ Craig, *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War*, 51.

¹⁴ Craig, *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War*, 52.

¹⁵ Robert A. Divine, *The Sputnik Challenge* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 41.

¹⁶ Ibid.

In terms of the Turkish case study, Trachtenberg does not comment on this topic. However, his arguments go hand in hand with the deployment of Jupiter missiles in Turkey. As the southern neighbor of the Soviet Union, Turkey was a strategic place to deploy these missiles in terms of conducting a retaliatory attack. Even though the defensive capabilities of the Jupiters were questioned, these concerns were irrelevant to the Eisenhower administration's decision to deploy these missiles in Turkey. Constructing a forward defense strategy was also about retaliation, like it was the main idea in the Turkish case. On the other hand, Trachtenberg's argument about creating a self-sufficient and nuclearized NATO can be applied to the Turkish case, as well. As one of the top geostrategic parts of the alliance, the nuclearization of Turkey meant expanding NATO's nuclear deterrence to the frontiers of the alliance.

Probably, Roman's explanation that Eisenhower hoped to nuclearize NATO to gain a massive retaliation capability advantage is a valid reason for the Turkish case. On the other hand, he does not seem as engaged as Trachtenberg about answering the question of why the Eisenhower administration nuclearized NATO. Budget constraints and reducing the conventional forces were relevant to the Turkish case, as well. Since the join of NATO, Turkey received a significant amount of U.S. economic and military aid to stabilize its economy and create its own military forces. In addition to that, there were numerous U.S. conventional forces were in Turkish soil. Therefore, as soon as Turkey receives these Jupiters, the burden of the U.S. economic and military aid to Turkey can be reduced. On the other hand, Roman's argument that the restrictions of the McMahon Act would not allow the Eisenhower administration to imply a total nuclear sharing with the allies is not valid for the Turkish case. Unlike the other European states, the Turkish government saw this strategy as a natural task to assign for the alliance and ready to get these missiles under the U.S. administration's sharing terms.

Turkish historian Nur Bilge Criss addresses the nuclearization of NATO issue specifically in terms of the deployment of Jupiter missiles in Turkey. She generally focuses on the Turkish determination to obtain these missiles in the concerning period after the Sputnik incident. In her lines, Turkey is defined as an important NATO member, placed in the frontier and surrounded by the Soviet Union and its satellite states. The Turkish government have always had security concerns and asked to host these nuclear missiles in Turkey, to create a deterrence towards the Soviet threats to some extent. Criss states that Turkey was ready to accept any accords that the Eisenhower administration would decide on and ease the deployment process without any political problems.¹⁷ This eagerness probably contributes to the Eisenhower administration's decision to nuclearize Turkey.

In the light of these arguments, this thesis is going to argue that the nuclearization of NATO, as well as the Jupiters' deployment to Turkey, was the result of the "forward defense" idea of the Eisenhower administration, primarily. To conduct a speedy and accurate preemptive attack to the Soviet targets before any Soviet offensive, Eisenhower decided to nuclearize closer states to the Soviet bloc in the early 1950s. This forward defense strategy remained after the Sputnik incident when the Soviet nuclear capabilities seem to gain the upper hand, as well. In these years, the Eisenhower administration decided to construct a forward defense in Turkey for having a retaliation capability against a prospective Soviet threat. Secondly, nuclear sharing with the allies had a significant role in the Eisenhower administration's foreign policy goals. To reduce the conventional forces, withdraw American troops from the NATO soils, and improve NATO as the third great power; this policy was crucial. In Turkey's case, deployment of the Jupiters would be helpful to the reduction of the economic and military aid and withdrawal of the

¹⁷ Nur Bilge Criss, "Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959–1963", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 20:3 (1997): 98-99.

American conventional forces. It also went hand in hand with policy aims contributing to NATO's great nuclear power status. As the frontier of the alliance and neighbor to the strategic areas as the Balkans, the Middle-East and the Soviet Union, nuclearizing Turkey was a significant branch of the nuclear sharing strategy. Lastly, the Suez and Sputnik crises updated the nuclearization of NATO goal with the credibility issue. In the wake of these crises, the allies started to question U.S. nuclear capabilities to take down the Soviet ones with a preemptive attack. Therefore, after 1957, the Eisenhower administration had another motivation to deploy/share nuclear weapons with the NATO members; which briefly aimed to show that the U.S. was still credible and can protect NATO with its nuclear capabilities. As one of the most insecure minded states among the NATO members, deploying these missiles to Turkey served well to American credibility in Turkey.

CHAPTER I: NUCLEARIZATION OF NATO, 1949-1957

The concepts of forward defense, which emerged during WWII continued to provide a new framework for thinking about how to pursue such a policy during the atomic age. In this age, it is assumed that the key concepts would be conducting a war of attrition and endurance as much as possible.¹⁸ The idea of keeping the conventional forces was becoming less feasible, they would only be useful to cripple enemy's economic capabilities or standing forces. On the other hand, the idea did not die entirely after the invention of the atomic bomb; even, both superpowers obtained atomic bombs in 1949.¹⁹ However, this perspective started to change with the invention of tactical nuclear weapons in the early 1950s. Thermonuclear weapons, the hydrogen bomb, and fission bombs were believed the ultimate game-changers during battles. Their effect would be much greater than the ones were dropped to Japan, and probably would be unendurable.²⁰

A group of strategists predicted that the coming of a new nuclear age would start a revolution in military technology. Bernard Brodie, one of the leading military strategists in RAND corporation, stated that the atomic bomb had limits in terms of its destructive capabilities and might not be very accurate all the time. However, nuclear weapons would achieve them both.²¹ In such conditions, the war and strategy would change from ground wars with the conventional forces to prevent greater destruction through the threat of nuclear retaliation. As these weapons would have fewer limits, the objections of the war would have fewer limits, as well. To avoid any military offense that can go out of control, violence must be controlled and

¹⁸ Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy*, 4.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Bernard Brodie, "Towards a New Defense for NATO: The Case for Tactical Nuclear Weapons", National Strategy Information Center, Agenda Paper No. 5 (1976): 1.

²¹ Bernard Brodie, "Changing Capabilities and War Objectives," Lecture to the Air War College (1952): 10-11.

limited.²² However, in the age of destructive nuclear weapons, how can one control and limit a war?

Trachtenberg says, at the heart of these concerns and debates, two approaches emerged as the keys to sustaining a nuclear age. Firstly, break out of a war between the superpowers was among the possibilities. Secondly, there was no guarantee that nuclear weapons would not be used in such a war.²³ The question was what should be the military strategy for such cases. Would each side's decision-makers risk a nuclear escalation and hope that these weapons cancel each other at some point? Or, would they come up with worst-case scenarios, when the deterrence cannot be reliable and plan to select targets to stop the enemy before it acts?

In the chronological perspective, preliminary thoughts on these questions were based on survival. For instance, Brodie thought that nuclear weapons might be used against the enemy's strategic forces on the battlefield and there would be no escaping from this scenario.²⁴ Another RAND strategist Albert Wohlstetter's approach on this topic was different. He thought that strengthening the strategic forces to bear a surprise attack and conduct a retaliatory strike would be a reliable strategy to pursue. His analysis was focusing on surviving from enemy attacks, which he thought it would be small in scale and focused on limited targets. He explained his theory on the example of U.S. air forces and stated that even if 85 percent of the U.S. air forces was wiped out, the remaining 15 percent would take care of roughly 600 targets.²⁵ Probably, this would be enough for deterrence. Or, would it?

What if the enemy's nuclear capabilities were enough to knock down the whole SAC? In fact, Wohlstetter's approach could be valid when the atomic bombs of the atomic age were only

²² Brodie, "Changing Capabilities", 21-22.

²³ Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy*, 11.

²⁴ Brodie, *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), 77.

²⁵ Albert Wohlstetter, "Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases," RAND Report R-266 (April 1954), xxiii, 233.

great weapons of their times. Their effects were measurable, limited and survivable. However, in the age of nuclear arms, depending on survival chances would be very risky. Furthermore, at the moment of chaos, it would be impossible to know the locations, or the use of remaining forces and planning would be inadequate. The strategy of retaliation in case of receiving the enemy's first strike cannot be utilized efficiently in a nuclear age. This idea prompted the Eisenhower administration to focus on constructing a forward defense to gain the upper hand in a nuclear war.

In his article, "The Delicate Balance", Wohlstetter accepts the risk of nuclear war and updates his argument as having significant numbers of nuclear weapons by each side would not create a stable balance of terror. Rather than a mutual deterrence, which needs serious efforts to sustain, possession of these weapons would not stop the break of a general nuclear war.²⁶ In fact, the general idea of the 1940s was a nuclear war would break out, probably in Europe in the 1950s. This scenario seemed inevitable for both strategists and decision-makers. Therefore, a new nuclear plan was needed to consider. Wohlstetter and Brodie were among the strategists who believed that a nuclear war was inevitable as long as the Soviet decision-makers would look for any opportunity strike when American forces were vulnerable. Whenever they felt confident about their destruction capability, they would not hesitate to launch a surprise attack over American retaliatory force.²⁷

This suspicious idea and preventive war approach were very popular in the late 1940s and early 1950s in the U.S. They, underlined by the Soviet specialists, had an important impact on revising deterrence policy. In the development of American strategic thought, hanging on to the deterrence policies was abandoned and preventive war terms evolved into the logic of

²⁶ Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror." *Foreign Affairs* 37:2 (1959): 211-234.

²⁷ Bernard Brodie, "New Preface for Paperback Edition of 'Strategy in the Missile Age.'" *RAND Paper (P-3033)*, *Santa Monica: RAND*, (December 30, 1964):355.

preemption. The vulnerability of strategic forces was a concern before the nuclear age; but, the counterforce became a real necessity with the coming of the new age. Since there was no effective defense against an unrestricted nuclear offense, the only way to survive from this would be destroying the enemy forces before they moved, says Trachtenberg.²⁸ Furthermore, crippling the enemy's economic centers and industrious cities was a significant part of this preemptive strategy.

If the political and military environments of the early 1950s are considered, when both powers had their nuclear weapons, striking first was vital to win the war. Because one moment of hesitation might result in receiving a destructive blow from the other side. Wohlstetter, with Fred Hoffman, in "Defending a Strategic Force after 1960", stated that the decision to strike the first blow might be unpleasant but it would be unpleasant to receive it, as well.²⁹ In such a turbulent time, it would be extraordinarily risky not to attempt to destroy other side's nuclear weapons or wait for it too long. Actually, this was the risk that any side should take in the age of nuclear weapons as a trustworthy strategy.

The logic of this strategy was not entirely military, but it required a real political determination, as well. Politicians are expected to be tougher in such tense periods to give difficult decisions. In addition to that, they have masses of citizens to protect from external attacks. Therefore, rejecting a preemption for keeping their hands clean might not protect their cities, life, economy, and industries. To challenge the preemptive strategy, some strategists as Thomas Schelling, Morton Halperin, Hedley Bull, and Donald Brennan came up with the idea of

²⁸ Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy*, 22.

²⁹ Albert Wohlstetter & Fred Hoffman, "Defending a Strategic Force after 1960," unpublished RAND working paper, February 1, 1954, 18.

strategic stability and mutually assured destruction.³⁰ These terms were urging a non-threatening policy to be adopted by both sides to prevent any nuclear devastation. These terms came to provide the conceptual basis for arms control discussions. However, these claims were still risking both sides would abide by the mutual agreement, like the prisoner's dilemma scenario in the game theory. Probably, President Eisenhower kept these terms in mind during his administration, organized and attended several meetings to discuss nuclear armament control in the international arena; however, they might not be the priority in his foreign policy goals in the early 1950s.

President Eisenhower did not solely adopt the nuclearization of NATO idea from the military strategists like Brodie or Wohlstetter. In the late 1940s and the early 1950s, the basic idea that the Truman administration was also predicting a nuclear war and constructing a forward defense for deterrence. There was a common understanding in the American society that an unrestricted nuclear arms race would lead a war when nobody would deter. In the State Department people like George Kennan, were worried about what would happen if the Soviet Union had enough nuclear weapons to attack the U.S. He thought that deterring the Soviets from a nuclear war would be the best solution for the U.S. in the long run, in 1950.³¹ For this purpose, he offered a new type of containment policy that the U.S. should build-up nuclear weapons in Europe and increase its cooperation with the NATO members.³² This new containment idea laid within the U.S. Air Force (USAF) in the early 1950s. However, this idea has never ratified

³⁰ Thomas Schelling & Morton Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund 1961); Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race* (London: Praeger for the Institute for Strategic Studies, 1961); and Donald Brennan, *Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security* (New York: Kessinger Publishing, LLC, 1961).

³¹ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 48n.

³² Dockrill, *Eisenhower's New Look National Security Policy, 1953-1961*, 34.

during the Truman administration, which preferred deterrence over preemption. Still, this idea remained valid among the Army Staff during the Eisenhower administration.

Despite bolder expectations, National Security Council (NSC) 68 ruled out a strategy of preventive war, in the sense of not provoking the Soviet Union with a surprise attack. It is stated that the ability of the United States to launch effective offensive operations is now limited to attack with atomic weapons. A powerful blow could be delivered upon the Soviet Union, but it is estimated that these operations alone would not force or induce the Kremlin to capitulate and that the Kremlin would still be able to use the forces under its control to dominate most or all of Eurasia. This would probably mean a long and difficult struggle during which the free institutions of Western Europe and many freedom-loving people would be destroyed, and the regenerative capacity of Western Europe dealt a crippling blow.³³

However; the number of key documents was echoing some standard benefits of the preventive war, as well. The role of military power was to serve the national purpose by deterring an attack upon the American soil by fighting, if necessary, was vital for American society's security and to defeat any aggressor.³⁴

Such document included several statements as the military and political situation were not developing in harmony with the stability and more dangerous periods were approaching. In fact, the Truman administration admitted that America was dealing with a ruthless enemy intent on to destruct the United States; therefore, NSC 68 underlined that a preventive war would be supported by the Americans. Some Americans favor a deliberate decision to go to war against the Soviet Union in the near future. It goes without saying that the idea of "preventive" war--in the

³³ Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1950, Vol. 1, A Report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive of January 31, 1950. 281-282.

³⁴ Harry S. Truman Papers, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security - NSC 68", 14 April 1950. President's Secretary's File.

sense of a military attack not provoked by a military attack upon us or our allies--is generally unacceptable to Americans. Its supporters argue that since the Soviet Union is in fact at war with the free world now and that since the failure of the Soviet Union to use all-out military force is explainable on grounds of expediency, we are at war and should conduct ourselves accordingly. The case for war is premised on the assumption that the United States could launch and sustain an attack of sufficient impact to gain a decisive advantage for the free world in a long war and perhaps to win an early decision.³⁵

In brief, the Truman administration did not want to have a general war, but it was determined to create an overwhelming power to deter the Soviet Union. At least, they believed in being prepared to conduct a nuclear war in the worst-case scenario. After the American nuclear monopoly was broken in 1949, more active policy and preparation to conduct a preemptive attack to destroy Soviet cities became a necessity.

Another milestone that shaped Eisenhower's thinking on nuclear weapons was a briefing that he received in 1951, on the conclusions of the Project VISTA. This project was conducted by a study group from the California Institute of Technology on the possible utilization of tactical nuclear weapons.³⁶ According to the briefing of this report, having as few as hundred small atomic bombs could tip the scale in favor of the NATO and the efficient use of these nuclear weapons might be a decisive factor in European security.³⁷

When Eisenhower took the presidency in 1953, he confronted the issues raised by the shifting nuclear balance. The military environment was changing dramatically. The Soviet Union tested and obtained its first nuclear weapons, the result of the Korean War showed that

³⁵ Ibid

³⁶ David C. Elliot, "Project Vista and Nuclear Weapons in Europe." *International Security* 11.1 (Summer 1986), 175.

³⁷ Elliot, "Project Vista and Nuclear Weapons in Europe ", 170.

conventional forces were ineffective to defeat the communist forces, and Europe, as well as NATO, was at the door of a nuclear war. As the nuclear war threat was emerging, the new administration tried to come up with new policies. This war had to be avoidable. Deterring the adversary could be one option but should not be the only one. The administration had the idea that in the early nuclear age, a nuclear war would be not fightable. The extraordinary advancements in the nuclear weapon technology shattered the whole military and political predictions. In such a case, no one would survive.³⁸

The reappraisal of the strategy obligated the discussion of the stability of deterrence in the escalating nuclear age's environment. In such a period, it would be less likely to contain the Soviet Union and deter it from a nuclear attack. On the other hand, adopting an aggressive policy option was also unclear. Only, it was clear that the U.S. could not permit the Soviet Union to reach the position that it can choose to annihilate America.³⁹ This idea enabled the new administration to take decisive actions.

Advantageously, the president was not alone in terms of designing a nuclear strategy, he received support from his subordinates and army staff, as well. Dulles was on the same page with the president that it would be difficult to build up adequate forces to counter the threat of Soviet aggression by only depending on conventional forces. He urged the president to make necessary adoptions to increase the military diversity with the power of nuclear weapons for not only deterrence but also for the first strike capability.⁴⁰ He has never been a supporter of a preemptive attack but admitted the need for assertive policies to stop Soviet conventional

³⁸ Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy*, 134-35.

³⁹ Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy*, 136.

⁴⁰ Papers of John Foster Dulles, Memorandum from John Foster Dulles to President Eisenhower, Fall 1953, 1, General Foreign Policy Matters, 3.

aggression.⁴¹ Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also showed support to the nuclearization of NATO and its conventional forces with the U.S. nuclear weapons would provide the necessary firepower to prevent the overrun of Europe in case of war by.⁴² These pieces of advices probably have contributed to Eisenhower's thinking regarding the potential of these tactical nuclear weapons.

Therefore, the Eisenhower administration accepted that nuclear weapons became a fact of the decade and any policy should be built on this basis. On the other hand, this policy was requiring some military risks like nuclear devastation after an unlimited war. In fact, these risks also create dissidence among the Western alliance. Despite the military and political risks, the president decided to put his primary reliance on nuclear forces and improving the SAC because he believed such strategies would allow the U.S. to neutralize the increasing nuclear forces and massive manpower of the communist bloc by preemption.⁴³ On the other hand, nuclear weapons were dominating all lesser forms of weaponry which made them very crucial even in the general wars of the future. In such a war, destruction would be great the gaining a total victory would be the only that thing would matter. Therefore, in Eisenhower's mindset, the U.S. should apply a destructive nuclear force that the Soviets could not bear.⁴⁴

The MC 48 placed a significant emphasis on nuclear weapons for the defense of Europe and the adoption of it as a NATO strategy was a milestone. It was built on the assumption that the massive use of nuclear weapons, tactically or strategically, would be the only way to stop the Soviets overrun Europe. Preemption, with the counter-air offensive, was considered as the most

⁴¹ Andrew Johnston, *Hegemony and Culture in the Origins of NATO Nuclear First-Use, 1954-1955* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 224-225.

⁴² History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Volume II: The Test of War 1950-1953, 381.

⁴³ Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy*, 137-138.

⁴⁴ FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 2, Memorandum of Discussion at the 190th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 25, 1954. 639-641.

important factor in the overall air defense. The only presently feasible way of stopping an enemy from delivering atomic weapons against selected targets in Europe is to destroy his means of delivery at the source. NATO Council admitted that an early atomic counter-attack against the enemy's delivery system was a requirement.⁴⁵

It was also urging the construction of a forward defense in Europe for both preemptive and retaliatory purposes. The Military Committee considers that a surprise onslaught with atomic weapons constitutes the most dangerous threat the West has to face and that the Soviets would not jeopardize the attainment of surprise by any major pre-deployment of their forces. Ensure that, in the event of aggression, NATO forces would be able to initiate immediate defensive and retaliatory operations including the use of atomic weapons.⁴⁶

In the pre-1954 period, NATO strategy had been plagued by the complex relationship between military requirements and resources of the NATO members were willing to generate. On the other hand, it seems after 1954, massive nuclear armament possibility of the Soviet Union and its capability to overrun Europe were still on the table. Therefore, the forward defense was offering more than deterrence. The essence of it was allowing a massive and rapid nuclear attack on the Soviet Union by the NATO forces.⁴⁷ In the case of a general nuclear war, any delay could have fatal results. Therefore, NATO forces should be ready to use nuclear weapons in a defensive mindset but in a preemptive way.

On the other hand, adopting MC 48 was embracing a strategy of an extremely rapid escalation of the European conventional forces, as well. Develop 'forces in being' in Europe which would be capable of effectively contributing to success in the initial phase and of

⁴⁵ NATO Strategic Documents 1949-1969, North Atlantic Military Committee Decision on M.C. 48, November 22, 1954, 3.

⁴⁶ North Atlantic Military Committee Decision on M.C. 48, November 22, 1954, 6.

⁴⁷ Robert E. Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 116.

preventing the rapid overrunning of Europe. To do this these forces must be highly trained, mobile, have an integrated atomic capability and be properly positioned in depth.⁴⁸

It was probably increasing the chance of a war breaking out and preparing NATO for every option. Specifically, Eisenhower called the strategy as the plan of a possible WWII. He believed that the alliance's only chance of victory in a third world war against the Soviet Union would be to paralyze enemy at the outset of the war. Since keeping the United States an armed camp or a garrison state was unsustainable, the administration must make plans to use an atom bomb if they become involved in a war.⁴⁹ Despite provoking a war was not the intention but preserving the advantage while destroying the enemy's nuclear forces would be key to victory. In this sense, MC 48 strategy was preemptive and NATO members also admitted it.

For European partners, a nuclear strategy would only be tolerable if it were not suicidal. It would be acceptable if the Soviet retaliation was nearly certain and nuclear weapons would destroy the Soviet ones without exception. The best way to defuse an attack was to destroy enemy planes while they were on the ground.⁵⁰ Therefore, the key would be attacking the enemy's heart and its sources of power. Europe, in this perspective, had a vital position when a general war would breakout. In such a war, probably both sides would use whatever forces they had. Therefore, expecting only a conventional war in the nuclear age was unrealistic, NATO would need both conventional and nuclear forces to defend itself. The president believed that the question was simply one of a war between the United States and the Soviets, and in this, he felt that thinking should be based on the use of atomic weapons. If the alliance has been

⁴⁸ North Atlantic Military Committee Decision on M.C. 48, November 22, 1954, 7.

⁴⁹ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. 2, Memorandum of Discussion at the 227th Meeting of the National Security Council, Friday, December 3, 1954, 805-806.

⁵⁰ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 160.

heavily attacked, there would be neither planes nor the airbases need to take them in Europe. Therefore, Europe must understand the necessity of nuclear forces in Europe.⁵¹

Even though this sounds that NATO would strike before the Soviets had actually started the war, a Soviet military hostility has always been expected. The war might begin with a conventional strike to Europe or other parts of the world. In such a case, American retaliatory strikes would take place after the Soviets had already committed acts of military aggression. In addition to that, the Soviets might launch a nuclear attack on America even though the chances were low. Still, the U.S. should not leave receiving a sudden blow to the chance and use its nuclear weapons at once with full force.⁵² In fact, the U.S. receiving a massive blow would be crucial damage to the survival of the western alliance, as well. This total victory versus defeat idea was containing NATO's future. This view was widely shared by the top American military authorities. General J. Lawton Collins, American representative on the NATO Military Committee, stated that a short delay in retaliatory operations might lead to a serious disintegration of NATO's military position, in 1953.⁵³ General Alfred Gruenther, the NATO commander, emphasized that SACEUR should implement the plan to use of atomic weapons immediately before a counter-attack.⁵⁴ These generals were not underlining the importance of responding or reacting but preemptive strike.

All these advantages explain that the MC 48 was a promising strategy, only, it would have to move fast and be accurate. The Soviets had the nuclear capability to launch a nuclear attack on Europe, so Europe should have the same option. SACEUR believed that the attack

⁵¹ FRUS 1955-57, Vol. 19, Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, Washington, May 24, 1956, 10:30 AM, 311-315.

⁵² FRUS 1955-57, Vol. 19, Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, Washington, May 24, 1956, 10:30 AM, 312.

⁵³ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 163.

⁵⁴ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 164

should be directed against the adversary's key positions and the decision and execution should be taken in the shortest time. In such a tense and short period, only NATO could destroy the Soviet nuclear force before it was able to strike at the NATO countries.⁵⁵

At this point, conflicts about authorization issues were one of the most debated topics of this preemption strategy. The Eisenhower administration insisted repeatedly that the decision to use nuclear weapons must be taken unilaterally when the authorized staff could not waste precious minutes with the political consultation. In addition to delay threat, Eisenhower also worried about a possible veto on actions by European partners, when the U.S. essentially considered the use of these weapons for its security.⁵⁶ He offered to task SACEUR for this job, who would be an American commander. Still, the Europeans were in a great dilemma posed by the new strategy. Putting faith in the alliance into the hands of a commander was difficult but losing time with the necessity of civil authority to decide during the hectic period might be destructive. This issue caused endless debates in the European parliaments.

In the end, the allies could not find a common ground on this issue and no formal decision was made on the control question. The NATO Council approved MC 48 as a basis for defense planning and preparations by the NATO military authorities without involving responsibilities of delegation or governments in case of military hostilities.⁵⁷ In a preliminary form, this agreement contained the allies' consent to adopt a nuclear preemption strategy. They were aware that a highly integrated NATO defense strategy with American nuclear weapons play the key role for the defense of Europe. This is why they mostly embraced MC 48

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ FRUS 1955-57, Vol. 19, Memorandum of Discussion at the 243rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 31, 1955, 70.

⁵⁷ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 168.

wholeheartedly. A rejection of the plan might have caused American withdrawal from the forward defense policy, which might have left Europe defenseless.⁵⁸

In fact, the Eisenhower administration had anticipated much greater opposition to MC 48 and were pleasantly surprised by the acceptance of the new strategy in the mid-1950s.⁵⁹ At the NATO Council meeting in December 1956, defense ministries of the allies backed the principles giving NATO commanders the authority to use nuclear weapons if necessary. Several NATO states were skeptic towards the Eisenhower's decision about nuclear sharing with them before; however, in 1956, they seemed reconciled with the idea. The president was pleased with the progress in convincing their friends of the validity of his views on the use of atomic bombs. For example, the NATO powers were now clamoring that we share atomic weapons with them.⁶⁰

In case of a Soviet aggression towards Europe, the allies would need to arm themselves with nuclear weapons. Because, as long as the allies did not have such weapons, the only option to count on would be the U.S. and European combined conventional forces. However, they would not stand against the massive Soviet forces. To some extent, the U.S. was essentially asking the allies to put their faith in American hands. Could anyone put such trust in America while the U.S. was unsure about its nuclear capabilities? Until 1958, NATO has already developed an integrated command structure. However, it can be stated that Americans were running the show and giving orders to their European partners.

Eisenhower's basic thinking was straightforward. In a U.S.-Soviet war in Europe, nuclear weapons would certainly be used. To limit the Soviet damage in Europe, NATO members had to prevent any Soviet nuclear attack. That meant that the NATO forces had to strike as soon as

⁵⁸ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 175.

⁵⁹ FRUS 1952-54, Vol. 5, Memorandum of Discussion at the 229th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 21, 1954. 562.

⁶⁰ FRUS 1955-57, Vol. 20, Memorandum of Discussion at the 248th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 10, 1956, 399.

possible and destroy the Soviet nuclear capabilities. It did not mean NATO should start a war; however, it should not wait a disaster to come.⁶¹ And a policy that placed such a great emphasis on extremely rapid preemptive action should be implied by the high military authority, like SACEUR.

Eisenhower was neither interested in building a defensive fortress in Europe with the nuclear capabilities nor leaving it to the Soviets' tender mercies. Instead, with the power of nuclear weapons deployed in the overseas, he would have an upper hand before any Soviet threat. In such case, deploying the weapons in Europe was not only about avoiding disaster in case a surprise attack but destroying the Soviet nuclear targets before they would have utilized.⁶² The president stressed that he was expecting a major nuclear attack from the Soviet Union; therefore, nuclear deployment in Europe and a preemptive strategy would stop both a Soviet offensive and the overrunning of Europe.

The Eisenhower administration gave the military emphasis to develop strategic and tactical nuclear weapons for several purposes and in the end, this strategy became a foreign policy goal when the administration decided to nuclearize NATO. In the first place, the U.S. government believed that developing these weapons and sharing them with its allies would help to economize the defense/military spending. This economization was including the policy to reduce American forces in the overseas while allowing the mobilization of European conventional ground forces to secure their own defense.⁶³ This policy would save the U.S. from the cost of keeping a standing army in Europe without damaging European security. By the nuclear sharing policy, the U.S. government would keep defending Europe with U.S. air forces

⁶¹ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 172.

⁶² FRUS, Vol. 2, 1952-1954, Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State, September 8, 1953, 461.

⁶³ Steven Metz, "Eisenhower and Planning of American Grand Strategy." *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol.14, No.1 (1991): 56.

and new nuclear weapons. According to Dockrill, the Korean War showed that the U.S. nuclear capabilities were insufficient for the deterrence and their conventional power against masses of communist forces unconvincing.⁶⁴ Therefore, rather than keeping the U.S. as a garrison state, highly depending on conventional forces in the overseas⁶⁵, it would be better to defend the alliance with tactical nuclear weapons, says Bacevich.

In fact, the "New Look" national strategy was also backing the idea of nuclearization of NATO. Basically, this policy was arguing a redeployment of American forces back to the U.S. soil. The forces overseas were limiting the U.S. freedom in action, as well as limiting its budget allocations. In addition to their cost to military spending, they had to be withdrawn due to changing general war priorities of the nuclear age, as well. Rather than these less functional and more costly forces, nuclear weapons would have capabilities for delivering swift and powerful retaliatory attacks. Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford voiced that the main purpose of our military bases on the foreign soil was to deter global war or, if it occurred, to win the war. Therefore, the U.S. would certainly continue to deploy nuclear forces to maintain effective readiness.⁶⁶ According to the new plan, while the U.S. was focusing on large scale nuclear weapons, the European allies were expected to handle the local hostilities by their forces in the early 1950s.

Therefore, the Eisenhower administration challenged the idea to the conventional force structure build-up, which would only provoke an unpromising war rather than deter any Soviet threat in Europe, due to the military reasons.⁶⁷ From an economic perspective, these forces were

⁶⁴Dockrill, *Eisenhower's New Look National Security Policy, 1953-1961*, 50-51.

⁶⁵ Andrew Bacevich, *The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam* (Washington DC, National Defense University Press, 1986), 33.

⁶⁶ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. 2, Memorandum of Discussion at the 160th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, August 27, 1953, 444-445.

⁶⁷ Dwight D. Eisenhower and Robert H. Ferrell ed., *The Eisenhower Diaries* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1981), 213.

enslaving the U.S. economy to themselves, causing budget deficits, and inefficient increment in military spending. The Truman administration's financial reports between 1951 and 1954 were clear evidence of these deficits in military spending. Continuation of a higher level of military spending on conventional forces would suffer and ruin the American economy in the nearest future.⁶⁸ As a result of these thoughts, Eisenhower entered the White House with an urgent intent on modifying the military force in consideration of a balanced budget, in the first place.⁶⁹ Eisenhower witnessed that the mobilization of a standing army with excessive numbers was the most expensive factor in military spending; therefore, decreasing their number would result in substantial savings.

In February 1953, Eisenhower mooted the idea of replacing U.S. forces in Europe with European soldiers which would cost less than a fifth of the price it would require.⁷⁰ Probably, the upkeep cost of an American soldier in the overseas was higher than the upkeep cost of a local soldier. In such a scenario, it would be cheaper to help create standing forces of local divisions for the U.S. It seems Eisenhower adopted that idea from his SACEUR times, and he evaluated that the U.S. did not need large conventional forces to ensure NATO's security. In fact, it was a necessity of the European allies as well, drafting their own forces and contributing NATO's military spending. In his mindset, the president stressed that the U.S. cannot, or should not, go to every spot in the world to defend the alliance's interests.⁷¹ Therefore, this policy opposed the American troops in European soils in the first place, who was creating an unnecessary cost and blocking the new administration's desire to pursue a freer military strategy.

⁶⁸ Eisenhower and Ferrell ed., *The Eisenhower Diaries*, 212.

⁶⁹ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 134-135.

⁷⁰ Staff Secretary notes of the 132nd NSC Meeting, February 18, 1953. 10.

⁷¹ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 133.

Furthermore, Eisenhower was determined to be clear about American goals to the Europeans in the late 1950s. The previous administration evaded the issue; but Eisenhower felt that America's presence in Europe was becoming permanent. After he noticed keeping conventional forces in Europe was developing a serious balance of payments problem, he started to look for new policies for cutting back the expensive military presence in Europe without harming the alliance's security.

Eisenhower was looking forward to withdrawing American conventional forces from Europe soon and create a self-sufficient Europe rather than a dependent one on the U.S. aid. It was a fact that the allies were militarily and economically weakened afterward WWII and they all could be fallen into the hands of communism if the U.S. abandons them. This post-WWII period was obligating the presence of the U.S. divisions in Europe. However, this strategy was unsustainable in the long run and Europe would have to defend itself sooner or later.⁷² Therefore, the president shaped his foreign policy dynamics around the ideas that Europeans should defend themselves and create a self-sufficient NATO not solely depended on the U.S. guarantee. These ideas were urging constructing a militarily unified and developed Europe to sustain its political existence during the nuclear age. Therefore, the nuclearization of NATO, even it means nuclearizing West Germany, was the key to such existence.

Eisenhower's initial interest in withdrawing American forces from Europe generated great pressure on the Europeans. In addition to that, relying on America's new nuclear policy instead of ground forces increased the risks, as well as the concerns, in the eyes of European allies. This strategy might have escalated a nuclear war in Europe and turned the continent into a battleground. However, to address growing Soviet nuclear power, they thought that accepting the

⁷² Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 147.

nuclearization plan of the U.S. was the only solution.⁷³ Former great powers, Britain and France, were in a struggle with their decolonization process; therefore, expecting an effective military effort they could make in Europe seemed inadequate. The other members had no military strength to defend the alliance in case of a Soviet assault, as well.

To overcome Europe's overdependence on the U.S., they had to be armed with nuclear weapons which would be under their control. In early 1954, the president suggested Dulles explain his intentions about sharing the responsibility of U.S. nuclear weapons with Europe to the British and French governments. The aim in the short term was working out a division of responsibilities with these two states for the European defense. The administration did not intend to have full control over these weapons due to the McMahon Act's restrictions and hoped that Britain and France would consider having them and taking responsibility.

Formation of European forces while leaving the strategic air offensive to the American nuclear capabilities was still meaning the Europeans would continue to be dependent on the U.S. for their security. However, giving authorization of nuclear weapons to the allies would reduce the workload on America's shoulders. Furthermore, this division of labor would show that the U.S. was trusting to its allies and treating them as equals. If the Europeans were treated as second-class members of the alliance, how would NATO survive?

If the resources of Europe are considered, it can be said that Eisenhower did not expect something unrealistic from his allies. The NATO states had 350 million, highly skilled and well-educated people with tremendous industrial capacity compared to the 190 million people of the Soviet Union. They needed to put their differences aside, unify and, take responsibility for their own military and political fate against the Soviets. This was the U.S. administrations' idea since

⁷³ Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy*, 186.

Truman when Eisenhower was the SACEUR.⁷⁴ Clearly, Eisenhower did not have an objection to the U.S. forces' presence in Europe until they form their own forces. A large scale American military presence was originally supposed to be temporary during the crisis period. He stated that the Stationing of U.S. divisions in Europe had been at the outset of an emergency measure not intended to last indefinitely. Unhappily, however, the European nations have been slow in building up their own military forces and had now come to expect U.S. forces to remain in Europe indefinitely.⁷⁵

If it can be achieved, NATO's own conventional forces would reach the desired numbers and the U.S. would have no reason to maintain their troops at the top level in European defense.⁷⁶ This increment would not only increase the commitment of European partners to the alliance but also help them reduce their dependence on Americans.⁷⁷ Ultimately, the American soldiers were pulled out whenever Europe would be ready to defend itself.

Ultimately, the Eisenhower administration expected that the European ground forces to do their best in defense of Europe. According to a report to the National Security Council, it is stated that the military striking power necessary to retaliate depends for the foreseeable future on having bases in allied countries. Furthermore, the ground forces required to counter local aggressions must be supplied largely by the allies.⁷⁸

If distinguishable progress can be made in terms of build-up the strength, cohesion, and common determination by maintaining feasible and common conventional forces, such progress

⁷⁴ FRUS 1951, Vol. 3, Notes on a Meeting at the White House, January 31, 1951, 449-458.

⁷⁵ FRUS 1952-54, Vol. 2, Memorandum of Discussion at the 165th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, October 7, 1953. 527.

⁷⁶ History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Volume II: The Test of War 1950-1953, 391-392.

⁷⁷ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 151.

⁷⁸ FRUS 1952-54, Vol.2, Statement Policy of the National Security Council, 591.

would also pave the way for a more collective defense strategy based on a nuclear sharing policy rather than focusing only American military presence.⁷⁹

That goal cannot be achieved overnight, and the build-up of a unified army needed a real political unification, as well. In Eisenhower's mindset, Europe would not be fully developed as long as it acted in sovereign political territories. He stated that single balanced military force for the whole area would be a lighter burden for each country. The alliance must have a European army. Collective security throughout cooperation must be brought about, otherwise no hope for any plan defense.⁸⁰

He hoped to create the United States from Europe. If they can achieve such political and economic unity, there would be no reason to worry about collective security and from the American perspective, there would be no reason to keep garrisons overseas, as well.

Still, Eisenhower wanted this change to be as fast as it can be and any major elements in U.S.' European policy in the 1950s were rooted in this kind of thinking. On the political grounds, the Eisenhower administration gave any support toward European unification. From a military perspective, the basic goal was achieving self-defense in Europe. Western Europe should not remain a strategic protectorate of the U.S. but had the best military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, to take care of itself. For instance, when the European Defense Community idea emerged with a true federal system in the early 1950s, Eisenhower decided to support that concept. The plan was including every kind of political obstacles and difficulties in one package, according to Eisenhower.⁸¹ However, it should have been supported, anyway.

⁷⁹FRUS 1952-54, Vol.2, Statement Policy of the National Security Council, 585.

⁸⁰ FRUS 1951, Vol. 3, The United States Delegation at the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State, 734.

⁸¹ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 149.

Under the influence of the political terms, the U.S. decision-makers considered a security system, which should focus on more than simply preventing Soviet aggression, a necessity. This policy needed to construct relevant institutions, cooperation, and progress to promote long-term stability in international politics with any tools. In Eisenhower's perspective, the best way to do that was fostering the development of an autonomous Europe, in terms of political and military aspects. In politics, multilateralism was the goal and organizing collective security for deterrence of invasion was the military's one. Both ideas were directly related to any prospective Soviet aggression through the use of force. When such horrific scenarios struck Eisenhower's mindset about European security, combining it with American security priorities became a necessity, as well.

In such a combination, the Eisenhower administration's priority was becoming one great power under the alliance's umbrella and this power should include unified security which would ally to threaten the Soviet Union. Probably, without such partnership, the U.S. could pursue its national security with Eisenhower's "New Look" policy; however, the collective security was aiming to protect smaller nations in the alliance from any direct threat to their existence. In fact, the Soviet Union was imposing such collective security arrangements with its East European neighbors since the late 1940s. With similar organizational principles, the Soviet Union was aiming to maximize its influence over the subordinate states, as well as smaller states of the western alliance. For this purpose, the Soviet governments continued to increase military efficiency as a basis for broader cooperation among the socialist community, by either convincing or threatening the smaller states and sustaining communist spread throughout the

world. Both Stalin and Khrushchev were willing to spend money on military advancements for this ultimate purpose.⁸²

The structural position of that the Eisenhower administration proposed to the alliance was different, certainly far from the Soviet Union who forced the Eastern European states. However, Eisenhower believed that convincing the allies to collective security with necessary military tools would be essential to deter the Soviet threat. Among these necessary tools, nuclear weapons had a significant place. The use of nuclear weapons would have made it relatively easy and inexpensive for the U.S. to set a collective security policy among the partners. With this strategy, the U.S. would be in a good place to extend the security umbrella in the alliance.⁸³

Lastly, in parallel with the nuclear sharing policy with Europe, Eisenhower's grand strategy was creating a third nuclear great power from Europe. He believed that nuclear sharing with the allies was crucial in terms of giving them a chance to use American weapons as well as treating them as equals.⁸⁴ From this point of view, it was absurd about denying the allies from the weapons that the Soviets were already deploying against them. Keeping nuclear weapons in the monopoly of the U.S. would be an obstacle to create a stronger alliance. These weapons needed be worked into an overall NATO program based on a common strategic concept.

After the EDC failed, the Eisenhower administration moved on to two other projects which they put their faith in them for a European economic, political, and nuclear unification. They were the European Common Market and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The Common Market probably would serve an economically unified Europe idea and contribute Europe's goal to be a third great power. More importantly, EURATOM was

⁸² A. Ross Johnson, "The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Military Policy in Eastern Europe," in Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, ed., *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984), 259.

⁸³ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 10.

⁸⁴ Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy*, 187.

representing the notion of an independent power with nuclear capabilities. Dulles remarked that with this institution Europe can constitute a unified pool of power to balance the Soviets by itself.⁸⁵

The Eisenhower administration directly linked the EURATOM project with an idea about integrated European nuclear capability. Instead of the development of national nuclear programs by leading powers of Europe, like Britain and France, an integrated European nuclear force sounded safer and favorable. On the other hand, some of the American decision-makers opposed the idea of an independent European nuclear program and the Eisenhower administration's help to the buildup of it. However, as long as this program serves an integrated and powerful Europe, it would go hand in hand with the Eisenhower's foreign policy.

It seems constructing a nuclear forward defense was a quite popular idea for the Eisenhower administration for both a secure preemptive strategy and avoiding Europe to be overrun by the Soviet forces. Even though the Soviets balanced the nuclear armament in 1949, the Eisenhower administration did not back down from its persistence having the capability to destroy Soviet nuclear bases with a surprise attack. For this strategy, deploying nuclear weapons in Europe would both increase speed and accuracy. In addition to that, a nuclear war was expected in the early 1950s and being prepared for it was seen a vital policy to gain the upper hand in such a scenario.

The preemptive strategy was believed as a significant option to win the nuclear war; however, it was not the only reason to nuclearize NATO. As was stated above, a general war expected in Europe and in such a scenario the president believed that conventional forces cannot be depended on entirely. Europe was militarily weak and the U.S. forces in the continent were

⁸⁵ FRUS 1955-57, Vol. 4, Memorandum Prepared in the Office of European Regional Affairs, December 6, 1955, 355-356.

unconvincing to stop a Soviet invasion. Besides its military incapability, Eisenhower believed that keeping divisions in Europe was costly upkeep for the U.S. economy. Withdrawing them might help him to focus more on nuclear development. In such a perspective, he hoped to replace U.S. conventional forces with nuclear weapons, which would be more trustworthy forces to prevent or deter a Soviet attack.

In political aspects, the Eisenhower administration hoped to create a third nuclear power from NATO, which would contribute to the integration of the alliance as well as strengthen Europe's military status. Constructing a nuclear collective defense can be achieved by the U.S. nuclear weapons because European states did not have any capability to promote their own weapons in the early 1950s. This situation obligated a nuclear sharing policy for the Eisenhower administration. Europeans with self-control over the U.S. nuclear weapons was expected to deter any Soviet threat without depending on U.S. consent. Such capability might be a more reliable strategy to deter Soviet aggression against Europe because in this case, the Soviets would receive a direct retaliation from Europe if they decide to attack it.

Constructing a forward defense and nuclear sharing in terms of political, economic, and military needs were valid reasons to nuclearize NATO between 1949 and 1957. In the second half of the 1950s, the objectives started to change due to the changes and milestones in the nuclear armament race between the sides, which brought another dimension to the Eisenhower administration's decision to nuclearize NATO.

CHAPTER II: THE DEPLOYMENT OF JUPITERS IN TURKEY AS A CASE STUDY

According to Trachtenberg, the nuclearization of NATO has two main military objectives. It would allow the U.S. to launch a decisive attack on the Soviet targets and prevent Soviet nuclear strikes on the west; then, it would also keep western European forces away from being overrun.⁸⁶ The forward defense strategy was believed as a proper solution to hold the western alliance together in the long run. In such a context, the key was relying on airpower and wartime mobilization to provide total security to Europe. It was also urging the U.S. to share its strength with the Europeans to form a collective defensive front.

Trachtenberg did not evaluate the nuclearization of Turkey in the late 1950s with the Jupiter deployment. Still, his assessments about the Eisenhower's motivations to nuclearize NATO in terms of constructing a forward defense can be interpreted to explain this case, as well. Nuclearizing Turkey, with some certain risks, was serving to construct a NATO forward base in the frontiers of the alliance. As its geographical closeness to the Soviet border, a nuclear attack launched from Turkey might hit the target accurately in a very short time.

In addition to that, it must be underlined that the Turkish government wanted these weapons desperately. In the post-WWII period, Turkey was one of the most threatened states by the Soviet Union. Due to the fear of being overrun by the Soviet forces from the Caucasia or throughout the satellite neighboring states as Bulgaria and Syria, Turkey needed to be nuclearized. As being a part of the alliance, the Eisenhower administration needed to think about Turkey's possible overrun as much as West Germany's chances. Therefore, constructing a forward defense in Turkey made sense in this perspective, as well.

First of all, it was a well-known fact that the functionality of the Jupiter missiles, which Turkey was given in terms of nuclearization, was debatable. They were liquid-fuel IRBMs,

⁸⁶ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 173-174.

taking a couple of hours to fire, suspiciously accurate, and very vulnerable. Still, they were quite useful militarily for a retaliatory strike.⁸⁷ As part of constructing various forward defense bases, the Eisenhower administration aimed to nuclearize different NATO members to have an active retaliation capability in case of a Soviet attack. For instance, if the Soviets decide to launch a conventional offensive towards West Germany, U.S. nuclear weapons would be launched from Italy, Britain, and Turkey. Again, in case of a nuclear attack, these variously deployed forces would have the capability to retaliate. In such understanding, these missiles sound provocative to use for a preemptive attack; however, they could be handy to create deterrence and retaliation. In the event of hostilities, assuming that NATO will strike a blow, so these weapons were expected to take out the several Soviet bases with a nuclear attack.⁸⁸

Criss states that neither the government of the Democratic Party, nor the opposition, the Republican People's Party, or the National Unity Committee which facilitated the coup d'état of 1960, questioned the actual deployment of nuclear missiles in Turkish territory. In fact, there were no domestic impediments, politically or legally, to pursue such a decision in Turkey. All the political parties perceived hosting nuclear weapons was a natural part of Turkey's commitment to NATO.⁸⁹

In fact, before constructing a NATO forward defense in Turkey with the nuclear weapons, Turkey had already been conducting other political and military forward defense missions for the alliance. In the 1950s, Turkey was building a chain of alliances that extended from Balkans to Pakistan, where Turkey would be instrumental in initiating regional defense organizations aimed at preventing communist influence in the Middle East area as well as

⁸⁷ Barton J. Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey." *Political Science Quarterly* 95:1 (1980): 99.

⁸⁸ U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on the Military Posture, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 30 January 1963, 277-81.

⁸⁹ Criss, "Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959-1963", 98.

maintaining a link with the Tito's Yugoslavia. In spring 1953, Dulles and Director for Mutual Security Harold Stassen made two successive trips to the Middle-Eastern countries and explained that the U.S. should concentrate upon building a defense organization in the region. According to Dulles the State Department needed to support arrangements between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan preferably within framework Turk-Pakistan Pact a most realistic basis for development Middle East defense.⁹⁰

Turkey was to become the cornerstone in the efforts to setup this new security system in the Middle East. For that reason, Turkey played a key role in the formation of the Baghdad Pact of 1955, which was aiming a common action against the Soviet spread in the region. The U.S. was not an official member of the Pact; however, with Turkey's initiatives, it made separate bilateral agreements of cooperation with Iran and Pakistan. The Balkan Pact signed in 1953 was aiming the same objectives, which succeeded in separating ex-communist Yugoslavia from the Soviet satellites by associating itself with two NATO countries; Greece and Turkey.

Furthermore, when the U.S. forces wanted to pledge assistance against the communist threat in the Middle-East, specifically in Lebanon, the American units used the Incirlik Base in Turkey as the staging for this operation in July 1958. Due to the need for haste in preparation of the force deployment, the Eisenhower administration only notified Turkey after the operation about what had occurred. In such a condition, the Turkish government was fine with being part of the organization and receiving information afterward of an operation.⁹¹ In fact, the

⁹⁰ FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 9, Memorandum of Discussion at the 147th Meeting of the National Security Council, Monday, June 1, 1953, 385.

⁹¹ George McGhee, *The US-Turkish-The Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992), 275.

Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs praised Turkey's position in facilitating U.S. troop transfers to a small nation facing the communist threat.⁹²

In political terms, Turkey was acting as a spokesperson and the defender of the alliance's policies, as well. A Turkish delegation led by Turkish Deputy Prime Minister defended NATO and in general the Western Bloc's policies in the Bandung Conference of the Asian-African states in 1955. Turkish delegation had a tough meeting throughout the conference and tried to explain NATO's perspective to the neutral states.⁹³ Even later, the Deputy Prime Minister explained that Turkey participated in that conference upon the request of its Western allies and to address the Non-Aligned Movement for them.⁹⁴ He said the mission that fell upon Turkey was clear. Turkey needed to defend its national policy as well as the alliance's policy. The Turkish delegation participated at the Bandung Conference for the sake of its allies and it considered this participation as a political branch of the NATO duties.

According to the "Agreement of Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Turkey" signed in March 1959, the two governments affirmed their right to cooperate for security and defense. Before that, the U.S. and Turkey have already signed a Pact of Mutual Cooperation in 1955, which the sides agreed to cooperate for their security and defense. In this declaration, the U.S. governments agreed to cooperate with the Turkish government to maintain its collective security and to resist direct or indirect aggression.⁹⁵

⁹² Criss, "Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959–1963", 102

⁹³ Mehmet Gönübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995 (Turkish Foreign Policy with Events 1919-1995)* (Ankara: SiyasalKitabevi, 1996), 274-276.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Treaties and Other International Act Series (TIAS), 4191, Cooperation: Agreement Between the United States of America and Turkey, March 5, 1959.

Rather than Trachtenberg's preemptive strategy, constructing a forward defense in Turkey was related to contributing NATO's power of deterrence and retaliation in case of a Soviet attack. In addition to that, this strategy can be explained by preventing the overrun of Turkey, which was a serious issue in the post-WWII period. In these perspectives, Nash and Roman were more convincing to explain Turkey's case because they considered forward defense as a deterrence factor rather than the possibility of preemption. In both cases and approaches, the main idea was preventing the Soviet forces to overrun a NATO member, Turkey was in this case.

Nash underlines that these weapons were quite vulnerable to trust in a preemptive attack. At least, they might create some deterrence and reduce the tone of the Soviet threats. Probably, Roman would join him in this opinion. On the other hand, Trachtenberg, as the supporter of the preemptive attack theory would give the credits of the Eisenhower administration for taking such risk. In fact, he discussed possible nuclear armament of West Germany by the U.S. government in his research, which can be compared with the Turkish case because these two states had many similarities. They both were border states to the Soviet Union and desperately looking for any opportunity to defend themselves from a Soviet overrun. However, in the Turkish case, the Jupiters were the key determinant because they were far from being effective to conduct a preemptive strike.

On the contrary to the disagreements about the active and passive functions of the Jupiters, all of the authors would probably evaluate that Turkey was in a condition to be overrun by the Soviet forces. After 1945, Stalin sent the signals of a possible offensive to Turkey by sending notes about the annexation of northeastern cities of Turkey and demanding bases in the Turkish Straits. These demands were turned down by the Turkish government; however, consolidating Turkey's position in the western alliance became much more important. Turkey's

integration with the western alliance started after Turkey sent forces to the Korean War and join NATO. Afterward, Turkey took every responsibility that the alliance assigned to it to strengthen its position. Probably, the accord that "if a NATO member attacked by another state, the alliance would come to aid" encouraged taking any risky decision for the alliance. The Eisenhower administration and the Turkish government knew the vulnerability of Jupiters; however, in case of a Soviet conventional or nuclear attack on Turkey, the missiles from Italy and Britain would hit the Soviets back. This idea would both explain the reasons to construct a forward defense in various NATO states and nuclear deterrence factor against a possible Soviet attack. Therefore, probably, all of the authors would approve the validity of Turkey's concerns to be overrun and the deployment of these missiles' as a part of the forward defense strategy and its significant role preventing an overrun.

Several archival documents suggest that Eisenhower was personally involved in the discussion of the level of U.S. economic assistance and security advantage to Turkey and how this policy should be set for the future. He pointed out that the real criterion with respect to the level of U.S. economic assistance was the security advantage that the United States obtained. U.S. economic assistance to Turkey was the best possible way to buttress the U.S. security interests in the Near Eastern area. Moreover, it was much better and cheaper to assist the Turks to build up their own armed forces than to create additional U.S. divisions.⁹⁶

Thus, the new policy's objective was to assure that Turkey would make efficient use of American economic aid in the first place. Since it was a priority for the Eisenhower administration that reducing the budget which would be spent overseas, Turkey was expected to create a self-sufficient economy and army because it would receive less aid from the U.S. in the

⁹⁶ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 24, Editorial Note, 608.

future.⁹⁷ In return for these aids, the Eisenhower administration was expecting Turkey to take some military responsibilities for NATO, as assigning bases and hosting NATO forces in its soil. This objective was negotiated in a secret agreement under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, in February 1953.⁹⁸ In addition to that, Turkey was also tasked to construct a belt of alliances at the southern periphery of the Soviet Union and in the Balkans and Middle-East for NATO, as well.

In return to Turkey's diligent cooperation in NATO, Ambassador Warren sent a memo to the Department of State in January 1954, stating that the U.S. government should consider increasing military capabilities of Turkey. In fact, for several years, NATO was organizing a regional defense for the vulnerable southern periphery of the Soviet Union and such an organization successfully conducted thanks largely to the existence of the Turkish deterrence against Soviet aggression in the area. Therefore, Warren thought that the U.S. can ask from the Turks to take more responsibility for organizing the security of the region by revising and improving the Turkish forces in consideration of NATO's military strategies.⁹⁹ According to Warren, asking the Turks to assume considerable additional risks and responsibilities without compensatory protection, in both economic and military terms, would not be a policy to sustain. If the budgetary constraints would be limited due to new national security strategies, this policy should not harm aiding Turkish military build-up and help must be given to the Turks while sharing the NATO burdens.¹⁰⁰ The Eisenhower administration was on the same page with the

⁹⁷FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol.8, Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Turkey (McGhee), May 2, 1953, 923.

⁹⁸ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. 8, The Ambassador in Turkey (McGhee) to the Department of State, February 7, 1953, 913.

⁹⁹ FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. 8, Ambassador Warren to the Department of State, January 21, 1954, 940-941.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

ambassadors that the basis for U.S. aid to Turkey was to help Turkey reaching the NATO approved force goals, as well.

Therefore in the next NSC in February 1955, the Eisenhower administration set some improved objectives and courses of actions in U.S.-Turkey relations until the 1960s. The policy was requiring accords which would serve to the win-win case for both sides. While Turkey was receiving the needed aid, the U.S. was consolidating its accession to the Turkish military installations facilities.¹⁰¹ The U.S. had full access to those facilities can be underlined as the most satisfactory point in developing a security sharing program. In addition to that, Turkish willingness to share security responsibilities by providing its resources and military facilities to the NATO purposes continued unchanged throughout the Eisenhower administration.

Turkey showed its willingness to host these missiles in political terms, as well. Turkey was a task-based mindset state towards NATO's strategic decisions compared to the others. In parallel with President Eisenhower's policies, and had no problem to act with the alliance's orders to accelerate the decision-making process. Unlike the other NATO members, Turkey had always been ready to take responsibility for nuclear weapons and follow SACEUR's orders. This attitude eased the nuclear sharing process, which the Eisenhower administration struggled a lot while dealing with other NATO members. Even, Turkey was not the first choice of the Eisenhower administration to deploy nuclear weapons; they decided to go with it in this strategy in the late 1950s.

Compared to the other states, setting the legal basis of the nuclear deployment would be smoother in Turkey, which might have attracted the Eisenhower administration to conclude the deal with the Turkish government. There were no legal impediments in the way of the Turkish

¹⁰¹ FRUS 1955-1957, vol. XXIV, Memorandum from the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford), Washington, March 15, 1955, 628-629.

government. The Turkish Constitution was allowing any government to sign and execute international agreements with the U.S. Such agreements had to be presented to and approved by the parliament within six months. It meant the governing party with the majority in the parliament would not have trouble to enforce any bilateral agreement.¹⁰² Indeed, both states signed note on 18 September 1959, agreeing to the deployment of Jupiters in Turkish soils, under the general banner of an "Agreement Relating to the Introduction of Modern Weapons into NATO Defense Forces in Turkey". This agreement was presented to the Turkish Grand National Assembly only after a month, on 26 October 1959.¹⁰³ The cabinet was notified of the Agreement on introducing modern weapons at a closed session and the ratification of the bilateral agreement about the missile deployment was announced on 28 October 1959. Acting in speed in the nuclear sharing strategy was important for the Eisenhower administration, Turkey satisfied this condition by concluding political arrangements smoothly.

In 1957, Eisenhower decided to expand the U.S. military aid program towards Turkey to reduce Turkish ground forces more by providing Turkey nuclear weapons. For this purpose, General Norstad was contacted to be involved in the negotiation process with the Turkish government. According to the NSC in March 1957, General Norstad would be consulted about the possibility of achieving a reduction in the NATO approved force level for Turkey, in phase with the availability of advanced weapons to the Turkish Armed Forces.¹⁰⁴

This meant that Eisenhower decided a major shift in U.S. military aid policy to Turkey and combine it with the advanced weapons sharing strategy. Advanced weapons, as the subsequent correspondence carried out by Eisenhower demonstrates, meant nuclear forces. They

¹⁰² Criss, "Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959–1963", 99-100.

¹⁰³ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963*, 67.

¹⁰⁴ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 24, Memorandum of Discussion at the 316th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 17, 1957, 709.

became the issue for the first time into the agenda of U.S.-Turkey relations. The Planning Board, as instructed by Eisenhower, prepared a new draft statement on U.S. policy towards Turkey during the NSC in June 1957. The core of the discussion focused on the statements regarding possible modification of Turkish force levels. The objectives did not change much compared to the ones were declared in 1955. However, Turkey was hoped to reduce its conventional forces and budget spending on them by the initiation of nuclear weapons. Military strategy for the defense of NATO in 1957 was based on the provision by the United States of nuclear weapons to the NATO members for greater retaliatory capabilities. Accordingly, the U.S. was also interested in providing these weapons to Turkey, to deploy more NATO strength in the frontiers of the alliance.¹⁰⁵The policy to nuclearize Turkey with missiles paved the way for the Jupiter deployment in the subsequent years. Two months before the adoption of the NSC in June 1957, Ambassador Warren wrote to the State Department that Turkey was ready to add more military security from stationing U.S. nuclear missiles in its soil.¹⁰⁶

In fact, the Turkish military was evaluating the idea of stationing American nuclear missiles in Turkey for substantially the same reasons that they were receptive to the stationing other American forces they had already hosted. They considered that these missiles would have contributed to the security and survival of Turkey by creating deterrence. Sharing of these missiles can be incorporation with the U.S. authorization if it would the image of Turkey was hosting nuclear missiles, ready to be launched in case of a threat. This deal was convincing for the U.S. as well. In such environment, if the weapons and the equipment brought in by the American force will ultimately be made available to Turkey, as well as the permanent installations developed in support of them, and if the stationing of the American force is utilized

¹⁰⁵ FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. 12, NSC 5708/2-US Policy Toward Turkey, June 29, 1957, 18.

¹⁰⁶ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 24, Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, Ankara, March 26, 1957, 713.

to provide on the job training for Turkish personnel, the attractiveness of the offer for the Turkish Government would, of course, be correspondingly increased said Warren.¹⁰⁷

The logic of the new emphasis by the U.S. to provide nuclear weapons to Turkey was an extension of Eisenhower's nuclear sharing policy with NATO. In a letter that he wrote to General Norstad in 1957, Eisenhower outlined four points to clearly set his conceptual framework for the role of the United States in NATO and collective security, as the following:

1. One of these points is the indispensable element of Western collective security, although it must be supported by those other elements of political and military strength and unity to deter the Communists from attempting to take over Western lands by political action or limited military power.

2. We must ensure that military organization and force programs within each allied nation are properly related to the impact of advanced weapons systems and to the contribution of the whole security apparatus to the security of the individual member nation.

3. We must make certain that each recipient country is technically capable of absorbing, maintaining and exploiting advanced material and new weapon systems, as well as such conventional forces as may be required for the joint strategy and that it carries a fair share of the economic burden of collective defense. I repeat that such force levels must consider the first two facts I have stated above.

4. We must likewise always remember that the resources of the United States are not unlimited; moreover, the sustained economic health and vigor of the United States is important to each one of the NATO nations.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 24, Letter from the President to the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Europe (Norstad), Washington, July 15, 1957, 727-730.

In terms of political and military sharing framework, Eisenhower gave Turkey credit for fulfilling overall security duties provided by NATO and growing alliance's retaliatory capabilities in its region. He also admitted that the military burden of Turkey had increased after the join of NATO and the deployment of these missiles would reduce workload over Turkey.¹⁰⁹In addition to that, the nuclearization of Turkey was in parallel with reducing U.S. conventional forces in the overseas and including the allies to take part in nuclear strategy, as well.¹¹⁰ Turkey, whose economy could not support more conventional forces and the U.S. would not aid it continuously, needed to defend itself naturally by putting more reliance on nuclear deterrence.

In December 1957, IRBMs were introduced to Italy and Turkey, due to the prospective Soviets aggression, who had been adding more destructive weapons and missiles to its arsenal.¹¹¹ In return to this threat, the U.S. had to stockpile nuclear warheads to be made available to the alliance as and when needed. Criss states that the myth of a "missile gap" helped the Eisenhower administration to justify military/defense spending coupled with the more altruistic policy of controlling nuclear proliferation in Europe within the bounds of NATO, as well as strengthening the Atlantic linkage.¹¹²

Nuclear sharing with Turkey was also in parallel with the policy conducting the U.S. military aid program overseas by extending protection under the nuclear umbrella and reducing the number of conventional forces, as well. By September 1958, the State Department approved USAF's development and expansion of the airfield near Izmir, while withdrawing the ground

¹⁰⁹Letter from the President to the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Europe (Norstad), Washington, July 15. 729.

¹¹⁰Letter from the President to the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Europe (Norstad), Washington, July 15. 729-730.

¹¹¹ 'Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy-Subject: Jupiters in Italy and Turkey' in James Grimwood and Frances Strowd (eds.) 'History of the Jupiter Missile System' (US Army Ordnance Missile Command 1962).

¹¹² Criss, "Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959–1963", 103.

troops. SACEUR had designated the USAF as the primary user of that base after the deployment of IRBMs. The ultimate objective was to bring the base up to USAF standards and developing sophisticated weaponry, such as IRBMs.¹¹³

The nuclear sharing policy was on all authors' agendas; still, Trachtenberg discussed it in detail compared to the other two. In his lines, this strategy was believed as a key determinant of the Eisenhower administration's both national and international security plans. According to Trachtenberg, unlike the other authors, the main reason why did the president want to nuclearize NATO was related to pushing his allies to take a part to pursue the Cold War. It means, he believed the U.S. was shouldering the whole military burden of the alliance and Europe needs to come forward to take some responsibilities. For that purpose, deploying nuclear weapons in the allied soil would serve this idea, as well as it would create a self-sufficient nuclear power in Europe, which was his secondary objective. Anything to help Europeans to bring together and consist a unity must be supported, according to Eisenhower.

On the other hand, Roman and Nash support the idea that this policy was related to withdrawing American forces the overseas and strengthen the unity of the alliance. However, the priorities of the president on this issue were different. Roman highlights the economic dimension of burden-sharing and discusses the upkeep cost of the conventional army. In his narrative, the president thought about these consequences more than creating a unified Europe. In fact, sharing responsibilities or a nuclear Europe project would serve to the economic constraints of the U.S. Nash, on the other hand, believed that similar projects would keep Europe secure against a Soviet attack. Taking steps to nuclearize NATO and create a military deterrence would hold the

¹¹³ United States Naval Academy (USNA), Dept of State. RG 59 Box 3740, No.782.5/9-2258, NEA to Acting Sec., 22 Sept. 1958.

Soviets back. In fact, it was a necessity of the nuclear age, especially after 1957 when the missile gap idea emerged.

In consideration of the Turkish case, all of the authors would find some similarities related to their arguments. Nash discusses the nuclear sharing strategy with Turkey in terms of strengthening the alliance's retaliation capability. In summary, he states that the Eisenhower administration deployed Jupiters to Turkey to prevent Soviet aggression towards NATO. In addition to that, he also discusses Turkey's motivations to host these missiles and the political, economic, and military reasons why did the Eisenhower administration share nuclear weapons with them. The economic dimension of the deployment is common in both Nash's and Roman's lines; they both state the Eisenhower administration's priority to reduce foreign aid and conventional forces in the overseas. Roman does not directly involved in the topic about Jupiters in Turkey; however, it can be interpreted that he would evaluate Eisenhower's this decision for the sake of reducing Turkish military spending, as well as reducing the U.S. aid to Turkey.

Trachtenberg would probably approach to the Turkish case in terms of burden-sharing and a unified NATO perspective. In the light of Turkey's frontier position inside the alliance and the political and military assignments it has been tasked, Trachtenberg would approve deploying Jupiters in Turkey in terms of the nuclear sharing policy. According to both arguments, Turkey having these missiles was satisfying the expectations. Turkey was a dedicated NATO member since its join in 1952 and taking political and military responsibilities to pursue NATO strategies in both regional and global missions. In this perspective, Turkey was fitting into Eisenhower's nuclear sharing expectations from the allies. In addition to that, as the bridge between Europe and the Middle-East, strengthening the southeastern flank of the alliance would serve to the creation of greater NATO projects, as well.

Concepts about credibility did not pop up from the middle of anywhere; but it became one of the hot topics of the American foreign policy during the Eisenhower administration in the 1950s. As the leader of one of the sides of the bipolar world, the American image and credibility were significant terms to be considered. Therefore, in each step the president took in the international arena, he had to be cautious not to damage these terms. In the earlier parts of this thesis, it is stated that Eisenhower wanted to replace American conventional forces in Europe with nuclear weapons but could not dare to offend or scare European governments by creating a retreating image. Again, he hoped to create a third nuclear power bloc from NATO by helping them to build up their self-sufficient forces but never wanted Europeans to feel they would be abandoned by the U.S. as the result of this process. In these steps, even he was planning the national security policies, he avoided any decision to damage NATO members' morale in the tense environment of the Cold War. However, after the mid-1950s rather than Eisenhower's cautious plans, continuous Soviet military threats and nuclear advancements started to damage image as an America's trustworthy ally among the NATO members. Firstly, during the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Soviets directly threatened France and Britain with a nuclear attack unless they withdrew from Egypt. Then, the Soviets' launch of Sputnik pushed the nuclear armament race to space which increased the fear among the NATO states. To break the Soviet nuclear threats, the Eisenhower administration's solution was showing that the U.S. is not intimidated and would retaliate against their nuclear developments. For this purpose, Eisenhower proposed nuclearizing NATO countries and offered IRBMs to be deployed in Europe. Specifically, in the late 1950s, Turkey had its nuclear share from this policy, which was also highly related to the credibility and image concerns of the U.S.

It would be no surprise to claim that Khrushchev would probably want to see a weaker NATO in the 1950s. This would definitely allow him to pursue a more active and hostile foreign policy towards the Western Europeans once the alliance was weakened. To conduct such a policy, it would be vital to intimidate the leaders of Europe, like Britain and France, and harm America's image and reliability in the eyes of European states. Such an environment would strengthen the Soviet's hand to break the containment policy of the allies, which have been constructed after WWII by allied, neutral, and non-communist states.

American credibility received a massive blow during the Suez Crisis of 1956. After the joint British-French offensive to Egypt, Khrushchev threatened these countries with nuclear weapons. He urged the withdrawal of British-French forces from the Egyptian soil and the Eisenhower administration decided to remain silent against this threat to its allies. Khrushchev's response to the Anglo-French attack with nuclear missile threat was probably a bluff; however, it helped Soviets to improve its credibility in its bloc. Although that bluff was not only the cause of the Allies' decision to back down, it probably worked. Specifically, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan believed that Eisenhower would back a British operation to topple Soviet's ally, Egyptian President Nasser.¹¹⁴ However, the Eisenhower administration refused to support this intervention, saw it as an imperialistic and colonialist act. The American credibility against a Soviet nuclear threat was damaged in the eyes of NATO members, specifically in British and French perspectives. Leaders of Britain and France publicly expressed their doubts about the credibility of the American guarantee to retaliate for any Soviet aggression in Europe.¹¹⁵ Levine states that Khrushchev enjoyed sowing dissent among the allies because, in the upcoming years,

¹¹⁴ Charles Williams, *Harold Macmillan* (London: Orion Publishing, 2009), 250-252.

¹¹⁵ Hans Speier, "Soviet Atomic Blackmail and the North Atlantic Alliance," *World Politics* 9, (April 1957), 318-319.

he observed and exploited the terms like the “missile gap”, as well as claiming possession of ICBMs to see more problems inside NATO.¹¹⁶

On October 4, 1957, the Eisenhower administration had to face a new military strategic, as well as an image problem when the Soviets announced the launch of the world’s first satellite, the Sputnik. The problem from a military perspective was this satellite might carry an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) to space in its next phases. This possibility was a real threat to the U.S. national security, as well as NATO, because the alliance primarily depended on U.S. nuclear weapons for deterrence. In a case that the Soviet missiles would hit anywhere in the world, even American cities were under threat. This possibility caused two concerns. First, the Soviets gaining the advantage in nuclear development ended the U.S. capability of preemption in a nuclear war. After 1957, this option was off the table because it would be gravely dangerous while the Soviets had a destructive retaliation capability. Secondly, this development has also endangered U.S. retaliatory capability. If the Soviets would hit anywhere in the world, the U.S. forces might be destroyed in case of a Soviet preemptive attack. In such conditions, even the U.S. cities were not safe enough, the NATO members fell into deep concern about U.S. credibility in a nuclear war.

The idea that Soviets sending ICBMs to space prompted U.S. intelligence to start estimating Soviet's ICBMs capacity and range.¹¹⁷ While the intelligence focused on the damage report and how to respond, the panic was increasing while the belief of the U.S. nuclear advantage was diminishing created debates based on hypotheses, such as the “missile gap” myth. The missile gap controversy primarily emerged after the Sputnik incident and occupied western governments' agendas a lot. The debates regarding a disparity between U.S. and Soviet strategic

¹¹⁶ Alan J. Levine, *After Sputnik: America, the World, and Cold War Conflicts* (London: Routledge, 2018), p. 54.

¹¹⁷ Arnold L. Horelick & Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), 2.

forces were heated, which paved the way for the Gaither Report of 1957. This report predicted that the Soviets might have the capability to launch a nuclear attack with their ICBMs throughout the satellites by 1959 and the Strategic Air Command (SAC) would be completely vulnerable to that.¹¹⁸ This scenario horrified the U.S. decision-makers and prompted them to take any action not to shake the administration's domestic and foreign image. As the best thing to do, the Eisenhower administration decided to accelerate nuclear deployment in the NATO states to appease concerns and consolidate both national and international security.

How did the American image and nuclearization of NATO correlate with each other? Moreover, what was the contribution of missile gap debates, Suez Crisis or Sputnik's launch to this policy? Image and credibility issues are abstract terms, difficult to measure their efficiencies but it must be underlined that the Soviet threat started to emerge in the mid-1950s was a real issue. When Stalin died, the Soviets had few nuclear weapons and they were truly far from being a threat to American soil. Early Soviet attempts to develop nuclear missiles were not quite successful compete with the American ones.

In years, instead of adopting complex programs, the Soviets simply built bigger missiles. The success of development the R-5 and R-7 missiles, which had a 700-mile range and carried a five-ton warhead, made these missiles top weapons to rely on, in 1954. They were quite clumsy weapons; however, their military capabilities were significant. Furthermore, their integration to the Soviet space program after the launch of Sputnik became a real threat. Some reports assumed that these weapons made the Soviets nuclear technology more advanced than the U.S. had.¹¹⁹

The Soviets began test firings in May 1957 and launched a successful one on August 21, 1957. The range of these weapons met the expectations; however, they still had serious problems

¹¹⁸ David Snead, *The Gaither Committee: Eisenhower and the Cold War* (Ohio: Ohio State Press, 1998), p. 3.

¹¹⁹ Mark Shanahan, *Eisenhower at the Dawn of the Space Age: Sputnik, Rockets, and Helping Hands* (London: Lexington Books, 2017), 66-73.

in terms of accuracy. Therefore, when the Soviets launched R-7 as the first artificial satellite (Sputnik-I) in 1957 to the orbit where it can hit anywhere in the world. It was a terrible shock for the West. After that date, these clumsy missiles might not be that inaccurate anymore. In fact, two years ago the Soviet Union announced this goal in 1955, but probably none of the NATO governments would have predicted that they would watch the broadcast of this launch in two years.¹²⁰ Threat level evolved to something concerning in two years; therefore, predictions and horrific scenarios for 1959 were not that unrealistic.

The first satellite was a large one, it was far larger than the American Vanguard, which have been launched by an ICBM before. The belief about the Soviets led in the ICBM race, which had eluded the media and public earlier, but Eisenhower tried to downplay it. However, if Sputnik I was not a sufficient shock, Sputnik II, which launched with R-7 attachment, was enough shocking. Levine narrates this shock and the successor fear in the West by underlining that they believed the new satellite was launched with a new nuclear rocket, which was untrue.¹²¹ Still, Khrushchev was delighted with the success of the Soviet aerospace program, as well as he was pleased with such rumors. In fact, these rumors were also abstract but damaging American credibility harshly.

In addition to the shock, this incident included several dangers for the West, as well. First, if the Soviet missiles were suitable for mass-production, their nuclear capabilities might overtake American ones in a couple of years. That would create a real missile gap period in which the Soviets may outnumber the American ICBMs in the upcoming years. This scenario created an even more concerned environment and jeopardized U.S.' preemptive strike

¹²⁰ Steve Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword* (Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002), 12–17.

¹²¹ Levine, *After Sputnik: America, the World, and Cold War Conflicts*, 57.

capabilities.¹²² The second problem was the prospective capabilities of the Sputnik. A nuclear weapon in the space can be more powerful than any American rocket by having the capability to hit anywhere in the world. Therefore, this gap issue bothered both the Eisenhower administration and NATO members. Despite the validity of this idea was controversial, not taking it seriously would not be an option to risk.

Therefore, the worse thing than the launch of Sputnik was the rumors, fear, and predictions of afterward. The rumors and projections had no limits of the imagination; some were suggesting that these missiles might carry chemical fuels by developing nuclear-powered planes or rockets.¹²³ Moreover, it is also widely believed that the Soviet version of the Sanger, an intercontinental rocket bomber that Germans were working on during WWII, was about to be developed in the upcoming years.¹²⁴ There were some articles about the Soviets were testing a 50,000-pound thrust nuclear rocket engine and working on one with 2.2 million pounds of thrust.¹²⁵ Even these rumors sounded somehow unrealistic, the issues of the missile gap and space exploration after the launch of Sputnik, emerged as important crises for the Western governments and their public opinion.

The common sense in the Western world was a panic, at least disturbance to some extent. Newspapers were writing about a transformation in political and social terms and the decision-makers were uttering their concerns by statements. Macmillan remarked that the Soviet communism has never been so great after the launch of Sputniks.¹²⁶ Another perspective among the Europeans was their disappointment about the American military strength and their belief

¹²² Security Resources Panel of the Science Advisory Committee, *Deterrence & Survival in the Nuclear Age*, Washington, November 7, 1957. 5-7.

¹²³ Levine, *After Sputnik: America, the World, and Cold War Conflicts*, 58.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ Nigel J. Ashton, "Harold Macmillan and the "Golden Days" of Anglo-American Relations Revisited, 1957–63". *Diplomatic History*, 29, 4 (2005): 699.

that the Soviets has already overtaken them with Sputnik. Some thought that the U.S. let down the alliance by doing nothing while the Soviets were getting ahead of them.

The American domestic reaction to the Sputniks was very explosive, as well. Prominent American businessmen, scientists, and journalists mostly invoked Pearl Harbor analogy in case of Soviet superiority in the nuclear race. In addition to them, many Democrat senators were attacking the Eisenhower administration consistently about it was not spending enough time, energy, and resources on missile development. For instance, Henry Jackson described the Sputnik incident as a devastating blow to American prestige and underlined it as a signal of the U.S. was losing the nuclear race.¹²⁷ Senator Stuart Symington, an ex-Secretary of the Air Force, has also defined the process as the proof of growing Communist superiority.¹²⁸ Even, the Republican Henry Luce started to print an article in Time's issue of November 18, 1957, titled "The Case for Being Panicky."¹²⁹ In December, another prominent journal, the New Republic, published the well-known political scientist Hans Morgenthau's article entitled "The Decline of America."¹³⁰

The Gaither Report was another factor that alarmed the Eisenhower administration to act. This report required terrifying forecasts about Soviet threat in the early 1960s by underlining prospective Soviet superiority in both military and economic terms. They would be probably ahead in nuclear advancements and the report pointed to serious vulnerabilities of American air defense strategy in case of a surprise attack and loss of retaliatory capability, in the upcoming years.¹³¹ It recommended an immense military buildup, specifically ordering more IRBMs and

¹²⁷ Roger D. Launius, John M. Logsdon, and Robert W. Smith. *Reconsidering Sputnik: Forty Years Since the Soviet Satellite* (London: Routledge, 2014), 338.

¹²⁸ Divine, *The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite*, 48-49.

¹²⁹ Stephen Bates, "Sputnik", *American Heritage*, Vol. 48, No. 6, (1997).

¹³⁰ Jaap W. Nobel, "Morgenthau's Struggle with Power: The Theory of Power Politics and the Cold War." *Review of International Studies* 21:1 (1995): 73.

¹³¹ Deterrence & Survival in the Nuclear Age, Washington, November 7, 1957, 4-5.

ICBMs than the Eisenhower administration had envisioned. This report has discussed in the NSC but was not approved. The council believed that the Gaither Report was underestimating the effectiveness of American bombers and missiles to be developed in the next few years and the advantages of overseas bases they would be deployed; still, they were in favor of accelerating the deployment process.¹³²

Sputnik probably had a major impact on American defense plans because Eisenhower kept approving any recommendations to build up the missile programs after that. The first-generation ICBMs, Atlas, and Titan have already been developed but their production was accelerated in December 1957. The second-generation of ICBMs called Titan II, Minuteman, and Polaris was approved to be developed in February 1958. Furthermore, with the political motivations and the shock of Sputnik, the production of both Thor and Jupiter as IRBMs were accelerated, as well.

Trachtenberg accepts the morale devastating effect of the Sputnik. He states that, at the end of 1957, Europe was concerned with the prospective Soviet ICBM capabilities and feared that the U.S. might withdraw its retaliatory capabilities from Europe to focus more on its national security.¹³³ These fears were taken seriously in Washington. Dulles tried to reassure European leaders by stating that the Soviet ICBMs would not pose a real threat to American nuclear capabilities and change the military balance.¹³⁴ At the same time, in the smoke-filled room, Dulles, Wilson, and Cutler were sharing the idea that European doubt was rational and the threat

¹³² Snead, *The Gaither Committee: Eisenhower and the Cold War*, 4.

¹³³ Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy*, 180-85.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

was real.¹³⁵ Probably, they knew that the allies were expecting a credible strategic retaliation rather than receiving comfort.

The Suez Crisis, the launch of Sputnik, other major disagreements between the U.S. and Britain-France, and domestic and international disappointment/fear probably affected American credibility badly. Nash, at this point, jumps into the discussion and calls the launch of Sputnik as the key factor which represented a major propaganda coup, proof of Soviet technological sophistication, and most importantly confirmation of their ICBM capability.¹³⁶ For most Americans, Sputnik was perceived as a wake-up call. For Eisenhower, it brought more pressure to do more for national and international defense.¹³⁷

In NATO's perspective, Sputnik became a fundamental problem confronting the Atlantic alliance and increased NATO's dependence on nuclear weapons. In the case of a Soviet nuclear threat, the alliance needed to have capabilities to retaliate or deter it. It also increased European members' doubts about the reliability of the U.S. nuclear capabilities. In fact, before than Suez Crisis of 1956 had made matters worse, especially in French and British aspects. Then, Sputnik incident compounded the dilemma further because Soviet nuclear weapons could now threaten anywhere in the world with annihilation. This threat associated with the question of if the Soviets attacked a border state in the alliance, would the United States use its nuclear weapons to save Europe? In such turmoil, existing pressure over the Eisenhower administration had swiftly escalated, the terms as American credibility and the U.S. strategic guarantee through nuclear sharing became vital for the alliance.¹³⁸

¹³⁵ "Memorandum of Conference with Secretary of Defense, Service Secretaries, Joint Chiefs, and Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, 17 June 1958," WHO, OSANSA, Special Assistant Series, Subject Subseries, Box 7, EPL.

¹³⁶ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963*. 13

¹³⁷ Divine, *The Sputnik Challenge*, 34-35.

¹³⁸ David Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas* (Washington: Brookings Inst. Pr., 1983), 35-61.

With all these components, restoration of the U.S. strategic credibility in NATO probably became the hottest topic in Eisenhower's agenda in early 1958. His administration was alarmed by tension in the alliance due to the transatlantic disparity in the nuclearization issue among the member countries and had great concerns about losing the confidence of allies to the U.S. strategic guarantee. Sputnik decisively exacerbated and dramatized their decision-making process. For these reasons, the Eisenhower administration viewed IRBMs for NATO as a prior foreign policy goal to close the credibility gap.¹³⁹

Sputnik was a sensation for both sides of the Cold War; however, one thing it had not changed was Eisenhower's general attitude toward to nuclearize NATO. At the NSC meeting in October 1957, he stated that if the U.S. can fire missiles and destroy the Soviet targets, Sputnik would be completely a secondary issue.¹⁴⁰ Despite mixed reactions about hosting these missiles in the alliance, the Eisenhower administration believed that the IRBM deployment would be the crux of the forthcoming NATO meetings. Primarily, Divine says, this strategy was believed as a key overcoming the psychological effects of the Soviet threats and military advancements. The development of the Jupiter-C missile was a direct result of the original plan for the Army to develop and launch the Project Orbiter satellite.¹⁴¹ To break sensation, the Eisenhower administration offered IRBMs to the NATO states.

Eisenhower called a meeting for the leaders of NATO governments in December 1957, to discuss the future of multilateral principles of the alliance. In this meeting, the president offered two concrete initiatives; a formal resolution to establish a nuclear stockpile throughout the alliance and an offer to extend the range of American IRBMs by deploying them in interested

¹³⁹ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963*. 86.

¹⁴⁰ Eisenhower Papers, 1953-1961, National Security Council, "Discussion at the 339th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, October 10, 1957," 11 October 1957, NSC Series, Box 9.

¹⁴¹ Divine, *The Sputnik Challenge*, 9-10.

states.¹⁴² However, the allies did not show great interest to have these missiles and stockpiles which would be partially controlled by the U.S. The Scandinavian members of the alliance evaluated these missiles as the lightning rods to increase a nuclear threat. France, on the other hand, preferred to have full authority to use them in case of a Soviet attack rather than waiting for a common approval. Only, this idea was not entirely rejected during this meeting.

It would be fair to say that after the launch of Sputnik, even the need for a nuclear deployment in Europe was endlessly debated, the deadlock was broken, and Eisenhower's political demand being fulfilled in the late 1950s. In this period, several European countries, like Italy, Britain, and Turkey, accepted to host American nuclear weapons. The panic and the fears afterward Sputnik might be exaggerated; still, the alliance seemed more convinced to have nuclear weapons despite their horrific potential after that incident. On the other hand, it was a win-win deal, the Eisenhower administration has been long desired to deploy these weapons to the allied soils in political and military terms.

The NATO council agreed on the establishment of new nuclear warheads for alliance's needs. Furthermore, the deployment of these warheads would be decided in conformity with the NATO defense plans and concerns of NATO states.¹⁴³ These decisions were made as a result of offers to deploy nuclear weapons to European states by the Eisenhower administration. This sharing policy, as well as massive retaliation, was the character of the administration; nevertheless, the launch of Sputniks caused President Eisenhower to respond decisively. The decision to place U.S. nuclear missiles in Europe would relieve the pressure over the NATO states.¹⁴⁴ In addition to this offer, the president personally involved in conferences with the

¹⁴² "Heads of Government Meeting in Paris, 18 December 1957," WHO, OSS, ITM, Box 5, EPL.

¹⁴³ Larry Loeb, "Jupiter Missiles in Europe: A Measure of Presidential Power." *World Affairs*, 139: 1 (1976): 28.

¹⁴⁴ Eilene Galloway, *Guided Missiles in Foreign Countries* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 17.

Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy and discussed the details of his nuclear policy with missile experts as Dr. George Kistiakowsky and Dr. James Killian. Thanks to these efforts and Eisenhower's offer, the tension among the NATO members were relatively alleviated by the mid 1958s, compared to December 1957.¹⁴⁵ It was a short description of how the allies accepted to host American IRBMs.

On the other hand, why did the Eisenhower administration insist on deploying the IRBMs to compete with the Soviet ICBMs? Why did the allies accept to get these limitedly functional and medium-range missiles from the U.S.? In fact, the IRBMs did not exist before 1955. Early that year, Killian Committee, Eisenhower's Science Advisory Committee, reported that a ballistic missile with a shorter range can be developed with greater ease and speed compared to the ICBMs. These features were expected to increase the chance to deter a Soviet nuclear attack if the Eisenhower administration would be able to deploy them abroad, in various places. Therefore, the committee recommended developing these handy missiles.¹⁴⁶ Eisenhower approved the IRBM program with doubts about these missiles' international political implications.

In 1955, the Eisenhower administration was still unsure about whether overseas bases for IRBMs would be available in the long term or not. The nuclearization negotiations with the allies were still an ongoing process with uncertainties and there were doubts whether allies would host IRBM bases at all. Still, Eisenhower seemed he was not concerned with the future deployment but the impact of these missiles against the Soviets targets.¹⁴⁷ He stated in December 1955 that the U.S. simply had to achieve such missiles as promptly as possible if only because of their enormous psychological and military significance.¹⁴⁸ Therefore, the president ordered the

¹⁴⁵ Loeb, "Jupiter Missiles in Europe: A Measure of Presidential Power." 33.

¹⁴⁶ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963*, 7.

¹⁴⁷ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 19, Memorandum Conversation, 257th NSC meeting, 4 August 1955.

¹⁴⁸ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963*, 8.

development and research of the IRBM and ICBM programs in the highest priority above all others.

On the other hand, General Norstad and military staff of NATO were sharing concerns of the European leaders about these IRBMs would not be adequate for European defense due to their limited military capabilities. The SACEUR instead asked the deployment of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) under NATO command, as the advanced version of the IRBMs. This plan was a significant one because the MRBMs would provide superiority to the European defense in comparison to the Soviet Union's nuclear threats. At least, the MRBMs were more reliable in terms of their military capabilities in comparison with the IRBMs. Only this deployment would take a longer time. Therefore, the Eisenhower administration came up with a new proposal that would accelerate Thor and Jupiter's supply with their dual keys. After their full deployment, they would be replaced by the new MRBMs as soon as possible.¹⁴⁹ In this transition process, the IRBMs would serve the global security while reassuring American credibility in the eyes of the alliance leaders.

The Eisenhower administration's decision to deploy IRBMs in Turkey in terms of credibility topics should be evaluated in a two-sided perspective. In the first place, Eisenhower and his subordinates had three credibility reasons to put these missiles into Turkish soil; showing that the U.S. is not intimidated by the Soviet technological advancement, retrieving psychological superiority by adopting an active military strategy in the NATO borders, and avoiding to harm American-Turkish relations by creating an untrustworthy environment. On the other hand, this credibility issue was a significant term for the Turks, as well. They showed a great interest to host these missiles because the Turkish government wanted to prove its worth to

¹⁴⁹ John D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimension of Political Analysis* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002), 176-77.

the alliance, increase the national prestige, and quell fears of communism/Soviet threats domestically and internationally.

Firstly, when the Eisenhower administration decided to take the risk of deploying the IRBMs in Turkey, General Norstad predicted that there would be a strong opposition to this strategy. Specifically, this opposition would come from the Soviet Union. The Eisenhower administration agreed on that prediction; installing IRBMs in the southern borders of the Soviet Union might trigger a fierce response. This response, probably, would contain another Soviet threat, might increase anxiety and tension throughout the alliance, as well. On the other hand, deferring a Turkish deployment would allow the Soviets to become accustomed to less provocative IRBMs first.¹⁵⁰

Besides the Soviet reactions, there were concerns about Turkey having the IRBMs inside NATO, as well. Specifically, Scandinavian countries thought that Turks were very warlike and if they receive the missiles, they would start a nuclear war. This concern was valid for several Americans, as well. Turkish temperament would risk a war with an irresponsible missile launch.¹⁵¹ In fact, this concern was shared by in some circles of the State Department, as well. In February 1959, Dulles told General Norstad that some people in the Department were opposed to IRBMs for Turkey. The opposition was regarding Turkey might have stemmed from the aggressive stance similar it displayed in the aftermath of the coup d'état in Iraq in 1958. Specifically, the Turkish government wanted to take military action and eliminate the leftist coup-makers in Iraq but the Eisenhower administration thought it would be a provocative act and stopped Turkey.

¹⁵⁰ FRUS 1958-60, Memorandum Conversation, 18 January 1958.

¹⁵¹ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963*, 45.

Bernstein remarks that it was a serious dilemma that what would happen if Turkey decided to launch the missiles. How would the complex legal and custodial arrangements-with their checks and balances-actually operate? Could American officials stop the Turkish government, or even panicky Turkish troops, from acting unilaterally? What would happen if the Turks seized control of the weapons and warheads during a local crisis with the Soviets and launched the nuclear missiles, despite American objections? Such questions undoubtedly added to the fears of the U.S. decision-makers and other allies, for the missiles would be close to the border. Could the Soviets trust the Turks? Should the United States?¹⁵²

General Norstad was aware of the concerns and stated that NATO could drag out indefinitely arrangements under which the alliance would have to keep U.S. personnel present and eliminate thereby such theoretical risk. The Turks might not be ready to move into any situation of full control over the IRBMs immediately but trained American officials were.¹⁵³ In 1960, USAF sent five officials to the IRBM base in Turkey, to fill the whole launching positions until 1962. While these personnel would have custody of the nuclear warheads, Turkish Air Force personnel were schooled in the operation of the IRBMs in preparation for turning them over to the host country.¹⁵⁴ In this case, the Eisenhower administration overcame the concerns about custody sharing and the Turkish government retrieved the nuclear missiles which would prevent a Soviet attack.

After considering the whole concerns, General Norstad did not want to push the NATO allies in a plan they objected strongly.¹⁵⁵ Therefore, he stated that after the procedure had become normalized through the conclusion of agreements with France and Italy in six months,

¹⁵² Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey.", 99.

¹⁵³ USNA, Dept of State, RG 59, Box 3742, No.782.5-MSP/5-2959, 'Memorandum of Conversation', 4 Feb. 1959.

¹⁵⁴ Criss, "Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959-1963." 113-114.

¹⁵⁵FRUS 1958-60, Memorandum Conversation, 18 January 1958.

talks could begin with Turkey. In fact, the Eisenhower administration hoped that the major allies as France and Italy would receive IRBMs and they would not need to include Turkey to the list.¹⁵⁶ However, France's reluctance about furthering the negotiations due to the dual key, which is a custody sharing allows the host nation to be able to deliver the weapon, made the Eisenhower administration to consider Turkey hosting these missiles, once more. Clearly, Turkey was not the first choice for the reasons introduced above. However, after his administration started the negotiations with Turkey, Eisenhower did not want to back down from his decision.

This entangled situation embodied the American foreign policy, especially after the Sputnik incident, a paradox. On the one hand, the Eisenhower administration was hesitant to do something that would offend the Soviets; as deploying the IRBMs to their border states (Turkey and West Germany). On the other hand, they did not attempt to abandon the nuclearization of NATO strategy for the sake of the alliance's future. Caught off guard, Eisenhower worried about the effects of Sputnik and thought that he needed to restore the American credibility once more to hold the alliance together. Withdrawing from the IRBM program or nuclearization strategy would only encourage the Soviets to overrun Europe. More appeasement would merely spur them toward more ambitious undertakings. Probably, even though Eisenhower knew that there were serious doubts about the IRBMs, it would be logical to deploy them overseas as long as they would keep the Soviets away from Europe. Without any nuclear retaliation, Europe would have no chance to deter a Soviet attack. Therefore, this credibility issue was not a one-sided policy towards the European states but also included the American credibility, in terms of their capability to respond or retaliate, in the Soviets' perspective. Therefore, even it meant deploying

¹⁵⁶FRUS 1958-60, Department of State Memorandum Conversation, 25 March 1958.

these missiles in Turkish soil, he probably believed it would be a risk to take despite the inner and outer protests from the alliance.

In fact, these hard times struck the IRBM deployment process in Turkey and stalled the process due to several restrictions. For instance, throughout 1959, completion of the project was stalled because Turkey failed to meet its financial commitments for cost-sharing. NATO budgetary covered a great part of the expenses but the project did not have enough funds to build an operational system or a fully completed airfield. In such a disappointing situation, the U.S. officials recommended to the Secretary of State that the Eisenhower administration should maintain reservations until it received a satisfactory memorandum from Turkey.¹⁵⁷ However, the IRBM issue remained alive with the U.S. State Department and USAF, who were trying to make necessary budgetary adjustments.

At some point, even the president had started to question the presence and functionality of bases in Turkey. The nuclear escalation in the late 1950s reached a frightening point, which would annihilate both sides in case of a nuclear war. This balance of terror coined a new military doctrine called "Mutual Assured Destruction" (MAD), which obligated a complete nuclear deterrence.¹⁵⁸ Therefore, after some point, the president evaluated such bases as a political, economic, and military drain and a constant burden for the U.S. foreign affairs. However, the Undersecretary of State, Douglas Dillon, reminded the President that it would be a very serious matter to back down on the current plans at the moment, apparently under threat from Khrushchev. Also, if the U.S. cancels IRBM deployment to Turkey, it would have to encounter a

¹⁵⁷ USNA Dept of State. RG 59, Box 3743, No.782.5-MSP/5-2959, Paris to Sec. of State, 29 May 1959.

¹⁵⁸ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 111.

political crisis in the U.S.-Turkey relations.¹⁵⁹ It seems the U.S. military-civilian bureaucracy, was keen on upholding their credibility and commitments, followed the course of deployment IRBMs in Turkey.

The credibility issue did not vanish even after Eisenhower left the presidency. The Kennedy administration, which was quite skeptical towards the deployment of nuclear weapons overseas due to the MAD concept, had troubles canceling agreements due to such concerns. Kennedy's Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated that when he told the Foreign Minister of Turkey the U.S. intentions to withdraw the Jupiters from Turkey, he expressed considerable concern on two grounds. First, he said that the Turkish government had just gotten approval in its Parliament of the Jupiter missiles and that it would be very embarrassing for them to go right back and tell the Parliament that the Jupiters were being withdrawn.¹⁶⁰ Moreover, such an action would be demoralizing the future of nuclearization plans. In fact, the Kennedy administration was planning to launch the nuclear Polaris submarines to the Mediterranean, before 1963. In addition to that, McGhee sent a definitive memorandum stating that cancellation of this project in the aftermath of Khrushchev's hard posture at Vienna, might seem a sign of weakness.¹⁶¹ After Rusk and McGhee's briefings, the President, on these points, agreed to delay giving a hasty decision. His concern about looking weak in Soviet eyes was clearly enhanced by the Turkish attitude.

Garthoff approaches the credibility issue in terms of psychological warfare and its contribution to the American military strategy. In his lines, deployment of the missiles to Turkey did not only show that the U.S. would take the bold steps to defend Europe but also it wanted to maintain the psychological superiority of the West against the Soviets. Before the Sputnik and

¹⁵⁹ Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Courtesy of H.E. Raymond Garthoff, 'Memorandum of Conference with the President', 17 June 1959, by A.J. Goodpaster, Brig. Gen., USA.

¹⁶⁰ USNSA, Cuban Missile Crisis Box, Dean Rusk to James G. Blight, 25 Feb. 1987.

¹⁶¹ USNSA, Cuban Missile Crisis Box, 'Memorandum, Mr. George Bundy', 22 June 1961.

Suez Crisis, the Soviet threat was real but not unbearable. The common belief was that the American military capabilities would defeat the Soviet forces in case of a war. Only, this idea was damaged after 1957. At this point, Garthoff argues that the nuclearization of Turkey caused worry the Soviet decision-makers about a new wave of American containment policy. By deploying these missiles, from the Soviet perspective, the U.S. aimed to encircle the southern borders of the Soviet Union and hoped to retrieve psychological superiority once more.¹⁶²

In addition to the general credibility concerns inside the alliance, the Eisenhower administration favored pursuing good relations with Turkey, who was an important strategic partner of the alliance. Geographically, it was connecting the Balkans to the Middle-East and deterring the Soviet influence in these regions. On the other hand, Turkey's economic stability was fragile and deeply in need of American economic and military aids. The Eisenhower administration probably knew that if the American credibility in Turkey was damaged it would cause the loss of a significant partner of NATO.

Therefore, the American Ambassadors to Turkey in the 1950s, George McGhee and Avra Warren, have always advised the Eisenhower administration to sustain military aids that U.S. provided to the other NATO states and not let Turks lose their faith on American credibility for the sake U.S. policies in Balkans and the Middle East.¹⁶³ Their reports were explaining that U.S. needs to step up to meet Turkish demands on military and economic assistance aspects since it was a trusted ally of NATO who took every risk, including forming regional pacts and allowing U.S. military forces to use its bases, to deter Soviet threat in the region.¹⁶⁴ In addition to them, the State Department as the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) argued that deployment

¹⁶² Raymond L. Garthoff, *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Washington, D.C.: The Brooking Institution, 1989), s.24.

¹⁶³ FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 8, Ambassador McGhee to the Department of State, June 12nd 1953, 931-933.

¹⁶⁴FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. 8, Ambassador Warren to the Department of State, January 21, 1954, 940-941.

promised some benefits and a withdrawal of the IRBM offer would harm relations with the motivated Turks. On the other hand, it would also lead the Soviet Union to put more pressure on Turkey and cause shortages to the U.S. military aids to Turkey. Still, the political and economic costs might be negligible when the military advantages of deployment were considered.

Therefore, NEA recommended the Eisenhower administration to consider placing the IRBMs in Turkey.¹⁶⁵ Dulles was on the same page with the ambassadors and the NEA and he believed that the Turkish efforts in the military field should not be underestimated as a nation that has steadfastly resisted Soviet pressures and become an outpost of NATO in a disturbed area.

For these reasons, the Eisenhower administration included Turkey to the list candidates who would host IRBMs, in 1959. General Norstad informed Turkish representatives at NATO that the U.S. was ready for formal discussions on IRBM deployments. From the very beginning, Turkey has always been enthusiastic about having the IRBMs. During the previous NATO Council summits, where most of the European governments avoided any specific reference to the U.S. missile offer. However, Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes has always defended that IRBMs and other nuclear weapons should be stationed in the NATO countries to use them effectively and satisfactorily.

At this point, it must be noted that there were three reasons why did the Turkish government want to host these missiles in terms of the credibility issue, as well. First, both domestically and internationally, the Turkish government believed that obtaining these weapons would enhance the national prestige of Turkey and their government. In related to this argument, they hoped to prove their worth to the alliance by taking this huge responsibility and show how credible Turkey was to count on both American and NATO strategies. Lastly, Turkey had deep security concerns as being surrounded by the Soviet Union and its satellite states in the Middle-

¹⁶⁵FRUS, 1958-60, Rountree to Murphy, 2 February 1959.

East, like Syria. By hosting nuclear weapons, the Turkish government would comfort the public opinion to some extent. In fact, after the shock of Sputnik, having these missiles and being under the security umbrella of NATO became much more important for the Turkish government.

Firstly, Nash believes that Turkish officials would be in favor of any policy that would increase the national prestige of the country. For instance, he states that Turks were well aware of the IRBMs' weaknesses but they thought the missiles would bring them greater international prestige, counteract Soviet ICBMs, not render Turkey any more a military target than it already was, and increase Turkey's security.¹⁶⁶ In September 1959, when the agreement was proposed to Turkey, it accepted the accords without change in less than a week and signed it on 19 September 1959.

Indeed, the functionality of the Jupiters was low and they were far from being reliable as deterrent nuclear weapons. It was taking hours to fire them, they were quite inaccurate, very vulnerable. Hence only useful militarily for a first strike but this attack would carry risks of being provocative. It is known that the plating of a missile was too thin that a sniper's bullet could puncture it. According to a congressional report, the Soviets with its ballistic missile capability could be expected to take out the IRBM bases on the first attack.¹⁶⁷

Then, why then did the Turkish government and the public want these weapons? Bernstein, on the same page with Nash, stated that it is believed that they would add prestige and emphasize Turkey's key role in NATO, in the first place. In addition to them, these missiles were political assets abroad and possibly at home. Being a greater part of NATO and having these so-called "modern" weapons might bring more popular and nationalistic votes to the government. Lastly, Turkey's military leaders believed that the Jupiters would add more deterrence against the

¹⁶⁶ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963*, 65.

¹⁶⁷Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on the Military Posture, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 30 January 1963, 277-81.

Soviet threats.¹⁶⁸ Probably, it would be fair to say that Turkish officials did not interested in the strategic liabilities and military capabilities of these missiles.

In parallel with the national prestige argument, Turkey was looking for a chance to prove its worth to the alliance and hosting the IRBMs while other NATO members could not there was a bold decision to make. In fact, the Turkish government had the same motivation while sending troops to the Korean War, which certainly contributed its join to NATO in 1952. Furthermore, Turkey's primary mission, since the foundation of the republic in 1923, was the integration with the West. This mission became being part of a NATO afterward its organization. This policy was believed as the only way to strengthen the country's position through economic and military stances; so that Turkey would emerge as the leading regional power.¹⁶⁹ Acting as a bulwark against communism as a staunch NATO ally was one of the foreign policy dynamics of Turkey and very similar to the Eisenhower's mindset about the strategy that he tried to integrate NATO with. To prove their worth and dedication to NATO, accepting IRBMs in Turkey was a task to be done.

The ruling party in Turkey was zealous about fighting international communism at any cost and ready to practice assertive policies for NATO at any cost. Even, there were several counter-arguments appeared from the military wing about the IRBM deployment, the government tended to ignore them. Furthermore, the Turkish Chief of the General Staff was a general with a reputation of being a pro-Democratic Party and worked in harmony with the cabinet. This fact mostly silenced any objections to the deployment of these missiles from the lower-ranked officers. Criss states that several army officers of that time admitted that they had sent numerous reports to the Chief of the General Staff about the strategic and political liabilities

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Criss, "Strategic nuclear missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter affair, 1959–1963." 102.

of the missiles, but any negative reports were ignored and destroyed.¹⁷⁰ It seems any opposition to missile deployment was expressed symbolically. Among the opposition, the missiles were given the codename "Ibrahim II" in black humor, because there had been only one Ibrahim among the Ottoman Sultans and he had the reputation of a lunatic. These missiles and the entire project were his successor in madness. Still, the government and chief generals did not care about these concerns, if they believed they were tasked by NATO. If there would be a duty to take responsibility for serving NATO, Turkey would take it to prove its worth.

Lastly, the fear of communism and the feeling of encirclement by this threat were other significant aspects of the Turkish government to accept these missiles without hesitation. The government consistently ignored any friendly overtures from the Soviets and deliberately held back from establishing closer relations with them. Any tie with the northern neighbor and their satellites in the Middle-East would automatically result in Soviet leverage to reshape Turkey from a communist perspective. In fact, if Khrushchev's statements towards Turkey were considered, Turkey would be right in its concerns. For instance, at a time when Turkey felt vulnerable with increased Soviet influence in the Middle East, and radio propaganda from East Germany broadcast by (Bizim Radyo- Our Radio) addressed to potential subversive elements in the country, coupled with Khrushchev's bombastic language against Turkey because of its NATO membership.¹⁷¹ In addition to that, Khrushchev continuously declared that the Soviet Union would support any socialist movements that would result in "national liberation" that was perceived as an address towards the pro-American government of Turkey. The administration in Turkey was on alert against any person and group who might be suspected of leftist tendencies and keeping out the Soviet Union from Turkish domestic affairs would need a strong deterrence

¹⁷⁰ Criss, "Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959–1963." 102-103.

¹⁷¹ Criss, "Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959–1963.", 100.

factor, like the IRBMs. These psychological perspectives urging the U.S. decision-makers to give some comfort to Turkey, in addition to their responsibility taking concrete steps as providing aids.

According to Ambassador Warren's memorandum, the Turkish government and military staff would be receptive to the idea of hosting atomic weapons in Turkey. They considered that an atomic capability is required for the survival of Turkey against the continuous Soviet threats and this capability would greatly enhance their defense.¹⁷² Therefore, when Norstad and the Eisenhower administration signaled their readiness to begin talks with Turkey in early 1959, Turkish decision-makers were understandably anxious about the delay and telephoned almost every day about getting the talks underway.¹⁷³

Probably these concerns of Turkey also explain their stance as being the most attracted host about receiving the IRBMs among the other NATO states. Turkish decision-makers continuously expressed their unmatched enthusiasm adopting the IRBMs with minimum political conflicts in every political platform. They also stated that having the IRBMs were in good match with Turkish national objectives and domestic impediments, as well. They wanted the latest weaponry for their armed forces "as soon as possible" and were willing to accept the U.S. proposed control arrangements. It must be underlined that settling on the agreement terms was a complicated issue for the Eisenhower administration until they started to seek a deal with Turkey. In many other European states' point of view, being interested in obtaining the missiles was not enough; hosting them would be a serious matter. There would be political and military risks with more responsibilities. For that reason, French and Italian governments sought to gain primary control over the missiles and asked aid to their own nuclear program from the U.S. In

¹⁷²Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, Ankara, March 26, 1957, 713.

¹⁷³ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963*, 66.

addition to them, they asked to receive more conventional military aid, a larger role in great-power diplomacy, and a reduction of its share of the costs. For instance, the never-ending requests of France broke the IRBM deal. Besides them, Turkey has already accepted U.S. terms without modifications. Lastly, the ruling party in Turkey had no coalition partners or powerful opposition to be challenged in the IRBM decision. In fact, the public opinion and main opposition party were supporting strengthening Turkish military capabilities. Nash underlines that all these advantages made for an IRBM deployment deal that, once the negotiations began, was completed with relative swiftness.¹⁷⁴

The credibility issue and its close relation to the psychological warfare were discussed by the many authors in terms of sustaining the Cold War with the nuclearization of NATO during the Eisenhower administration. Among them, only Nash tries to explain the deployment of nuclear missiles to Turkey. Still, more other interpretations can be derived from the other authors, on this issue. For example, Roman does not directly comment on credibility concerns of the Eisenhower administration; however, he states that the administration acted under the influence of intelligence reports, which mostly described worst-case scenarios. The "missile gap" myth and the concerns that brought to the American political and military capabilities urged the president to act to secure American credibility. Probably, he would have evaluated the deployment of the Jupiters in the same direction, as well.

On the other hand, Trachtenberg does not include any psychological reasons to explain why the Eisenhower administration decided to nuclearize NATO. Instead, he focuses on more concrete political and military reasons as forward defense and nuclear sharing. For this purpose, it can be interpreted that Trachtenberg would refuse to consider American image concerns in the eyes of the Turkish decision-makers made a real impact on Jupiter deployment. On the other

¹⁷⁴ Nash, *The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1967*, 67.

hand, if he considers the Turkish military concerns in a highly hostile region or Turkey's efforts to be part of the alliance and prove its worth its allies, Trachtenberg would also relate these abstract concepts with the security strategies. Even these terms are immeasurable, still, they might sound valid to construct a forward defense in Turkey and share nuclear weapons.

As the missile gap issue was highly discussed in both Nash's and Roman's lines, predicting they consider credibility issues in the Turkish case is not an unacceptable idea. Both of the authors believe that credibility and image are important elements to pursue trustworthy political and military relations, even though Nash rejects the functionality of the Jupiters in such a case. He criticizes the president's approach and evaluates IRBM deployments as a hasty and an ill-considered decision. On the other hand, he also underlines that the post-Sputnik and Suez Crises period was a dangerous era, which beclouded the decision-making mechanism.

Roman, on the same page with Nash, accepts the missile gap period and evaluates it as a limited time to do something to relieve the alliance. He, like Trachtenberg, does not directly discuss the Jupiter deployment in Turkey. Still, he would consider evaluating the Turkish case in this framework. On the other hand, he also would join Nash in criticizing acting before thinking issues, as well.

In addition to them, Criss approaches the credibility issue by evaluating U.S.-Turkey political relations, in general, the Turkish perspective. She underlines the significance of Turkey's eagerness to host these missiles for the Eisenhower administration's decision to deploy Jupiters in Turkey. She explains this eagerness in mostly the psychological dimension rather than the military deterrence of the missiles. Turkey, intentionally or not, did not interested in the military capabilities of these missiles; however, the Turkish government believed obtaining them would enhance national prestige, strengthen Turkey's position inside the alliance, and cause a

psychological deterrence for the Soviet Union, who would not dare to attack a NATO member. Probably, Roman and Trachtenberg would be skeptic about Turkey's reasons for obtaining these missiles due to the limited military functionality. In fact, Nash also underlines his concerns. Still, these reasons convinced the Eisenhower administration and contributed his decision to give these missiles to Turkey in the end.

CONCLUSION

The nuclearization of Turkey process started in 1957 and completed 1962, with the release of the warheads for Jupiter missiles in 1962. On the other hand, the whole process took a much longer time if it is considered a part of the nuclearization of NATO. The Eisenhower administration, also believed in the significance of massive retaliation as the Truman administration did, was motivated to deploy nuclear weapons in NATO soils for three main reasons.

First, the administration believed that nuclearizing the allies were key to construct a forward defense against the possible Soviet attack in the early 1950s. The main idea about this defense strategy was gaining an upper hand in launching a preemptive attack, which would cripple the Soviet nuclear arsenal before it poses a threat. To conduct such a strategy, being accurate and speedy were significant. Then, after the mid-1950s, due to the rise of Soviet nuclear capabilities, forward defense strategy's aim evolved into deterring a possible Soviet attack by increasing the retaliation capabilities of NATO states. For both cases, the Eisenhower administration negotiated with its European allies about deploying nuclear weapons to their soil, throughout the 1950s. In the end, the U.S. deployed missiles to Britain, Italy, and Turkey. In this strategy, Turkey was not the first choice of the administration to construct a forward defense, which could be a highly provocative act. Building a nuclear base in the southern neighbor of the Soviet Union was risky; however, it brought along a couple of advantages in terms of forward defense strategy, as well. As the southern neighbor of the adversary, any missile to be fired from Turkey would destroy its targets quickly and accurately. After the Sputnik case in 1957, this deployment focused on deterring a Soviet nuclear attack.

Another motivation to nuclearize NATO in terms of the forward defense was preventing Europe to be overrun by the Soviet Union. Massive numbers of the Soviet forces were a great threat to the militarily exhausted and weakened western Europe democracies. A couple of intelligence reports estimated that the Soviets might attack Europe and this attack would have capability knock down whole NATO states. Regarding such concerns, the administration believed that building a nuclear defense in Europe would also reduce the Soviet threat. This nuclear forward defense can be used in case a Soviet attack and save Europe to be overrun. Turkey, in this perspective, was among the NATO states which can be attacked by the Soviet Union. The Soviet governments starting from Stalin have been threatening Turkey and its territorial integrity since the post-WWII period. The Soviet demands about annexing the northeastern cities of Turkey and pressures to gain bases in the Bosphorus region were known facts. Therefore, Turkey was in danger of the Soviet invasion. The Eisenhower administration believed building a nuclear defense in Turkey was crucial for its survival.

Secondly, nuclearization of NATO was a part of the nuclear sharing policy of the Eisenhower administration. This policy was aiming to create a nuclear deterrence, which would involve member countries to develop their nuclear weapon facilities and use these weapons in terms of NATO strategies. As part of the nuclear sharing policy, the participating countries carry out consultations and make common decisions on these weapons and host nuclear weapons on their territory. The administration had three main reasons to introduce this strategy to the NATO states.

Initially, Eisenhower was planning to reduce conventional forces, which would be very vulnerable in a nuclear attack, and replace them with nuclear weapons. In this context, the president hoped to withdraw American conventional forces in European soil, as well. However,

this withdrawal idea concerned America's European allies in security terms. Therefore, the president decided to introduce a nuclear sharing program to maintain security inside the alliance, as well. Along with West Germany, Turkey was hosting numerous American troops inside in territories. These forces were placed in either Incirlik (Adana) base, close to the Syrian border or Cigili (Izmir) base, close to the western part of Turkey and the Aegean Sea. To withdraw these forces to some extent, the Eisenhower administration decided to convert the Cigili base into a USAF directed nuclear facility. As the American Jupiters arrived in this base, the American ground forces gave way to the USAF personnel and the nuclear weapons. In addition to that, the nuclear sharing policy was aiming to reduce economic, political, and military burden on the shoulders of the U.S. President believed that the US was shouldering nearly the whole responsibilities of the alliance, which was unfair. To conduct a less limited economic and political policies, he was determined to share the burden with his allies. From this perspective, he decided to share the nuclear weapons that the U.S. had and supported nuclear projects that would be developed in allied states. This sharing would not only allow the Eisenhower administration to conduct less limited economic and military policies but also reduce the dependence of the alliance to the U.S. Turkey, who needed American economic and military aid, was consuming a significant part of the American aid to NATO states. As the frontier of the alliance, it was surrounded by the Soviet Union and its satellite states in the Middle-East and Balkans, the Eisenhower administration understood Turkey's focus on military spending and increment in its conventional forces. To reduce these costs, they thought deploying nuclear weapons in Turkey would solve the problem.

Nuclear sharing was a promising term in theory; however, meeting both the U.S. and the host states' criteria was complicated. Throughout the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration either

faced with challenges from his allies about this policy or the negotiations with some members remained inconclusive. On the contrary to the opponent states of this policy and the members who dragged their feet while discussing custody issues, Turkey gave its support to the nuclear sharing strategy as soon as Eisenhower announced it. Since it joins NATO, Turkey had been serving to alliance's regional missions by forming pacts with its neighbors and hosting NATO forces who were conducting regional military operations. In addition to that, the Turkish government was ready to take the responsibility of having nuclear weapons and had no problem with the dual-key sharing approach. Turkey's sense of responsibility towards the NATO policies included it in the nuclear sharing program.

Lastly in this strategy, the Eisenhower administration hoped to create third nuclear power from NATO to have an edge over the Soviet Union. For this purpose, the administration supported any common initiative of the allies, like forming EDC or EURATOM, which would serve to this cause. Another key to create such an entity was helping self-sufficient NATO military capabilities empowered by American nuclear weapons. Until they would develop theirs, these weapons would create a common defense for the alliance and keep the military integrity. In this perspective, even the president thought about nuclearizing West Germany, the former enemy of the Allies in WWII. As the southern-flanked frontier of the alliance, nuclearizing Turkey would be an important part of this strategy.

The third and the last reason to nuclearize NATO decision was based on a more abstract concept compared to the first two. After the incidents like the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the launch of Sputnik in 1957, the Soviet Union seemed to capture psychological superiority while the U.S. was facing losing credibility. President, who considered the American image as valuable as having the capability to secure deterrence, intensified the nuclearization process to regain the

upper hand in the psychological dimension of the Cold War. In these manners, the Eisenhower administration deployed nuclear weapons to the NATO states for three reasons; securing American image and credibility once more after concerning courses of events, avoiding harming its relations with the allies, and retrieving psychological superiority which started to diminish in the late 1950s.

In the first place, the president deployed the Thors in Britain and negotiated with French to provide some more to them, as well. He was planning to fix the shaken relations after the U.S. remained silent over the Soviet nuclear threats towards the British and French governments due to their intervention to the Suez Crisis. In addition to that, the Soviets' success of launching a satellite to the orbit advanced the nuclear armament race to space caused great fear and panic among the allies. Along with the missile gap myth, the belief in Soviets' nuclear capability surpassed American ones critically damaged American capability in the eyes of the allies and increased Soviets' prestige. To address these concerns, the president looked for a quick and effective solution - deploying the IRBMs came up as the most feasible solution. In this aspect, Turkey, who was already ready to host some nuclear missiles, was chosen to deploy them. Furthermore, the Turkish government also saw hosting the nuclear weapons as the ways of enhancing national prestige, deterring a possible Soviet offensive, and proving its worth to the alliance. In brief, they thought Turkey would show off its credibility to the world.

In parallel to the credibility issue, the one thing that the Eisenhower administration would not want to do in these hectic times was harming U.S. foreign relations with the allies. Tense and unreliable relations might dissolve the alliance and leave the U.S. alone in its struggle against communism. Turkey, as the bridge between the Balkans and the Middle-East, was constituting a significant dimension of the alliance. Therefore, the administration did not want to alienate an

important ally, who believed the IRBMs would be key for its survival, by not giving the military support it needed even it would be a risky decision to make.

Lastly, fear and panic among the allies were threatening the integrity of the alliance gravely; several states, specifically Scandinavian members of the alliance, started to voice lowering arms and begin negotiations with the Soviet Union for peaceful coexistence. The Eisenhower administration believed that such demands can be seen as a weakness and they must be resolved. On the other hand, the Turkish government has never challenged military escalation to fight against communism until the late 1950s. However, after 1959, even Turkey started to form a basis for reducing the tension between the Soviet Union and Turkey. Bilateral talks between the Soviet and Turkish governments were welcomed by the Soviets and increased their hopes to separate Turkey from NATO. Eisenhower, to quell fears and panic inside the alliance and consolidate the integrity in political and military dimensions, decided to nuclearize NATO states. Therefore, Turkey had its share from that policy in 1962.

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