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NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS AND SUBSTANTIVE DEMOCRACY

JALAL FETRATI

50 Pages

Does the mode of transition to democracy account for the depth of democracy in the post-transition democratic regimes? Whereas previous research has primarily focused on the effects of nonviolent resistance campaigns on improving formal dimensions of democracy, the present study examines whether or not democracies that come into existence as the result of nonviolent resistance campaigns are more successful in deepening democracy than democracies that emerge following violent conflicts or elite-led top-down liberalizations. This paper analyzes all democratic transitions that took place from 1946 to 2010, and relies on V-Dem High-Level Democracy Indices for measuring formal and substantive dimensions of democracy including (1) electoral democracy, (2) liberal democracy, (3) participatory democracy, (4) deliberative democracy, and (5) egalitarian democracy. Using difference-in-difference estimation, I find that there is a significant difference in the depth of democracy between democratic regimes following nonviolent resistance campaigns and those that are born as the result of violent revolutions and elite-led liberalizations. This effect is statistically significant for up to ten years following the democratic transition. I argue that the engagement and improvement of civil society before and during the transition to democracy is a factor that explains why NVR-induced transitions to democracy are more successful in deepening democracy.

KEYWORDS: Nonviolent resistance, formal democracy, substantive democracy, violent conflicts, elite-led top-down liberalizations

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JALAL FETRATI

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Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

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NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS AND SUBSTANTIVE DEMOCRACY

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CONTENTS

| | Page |
|--|------|
| ACKNOWLEDGMENTS | i |
| TABLES | iii |
| FIGURES | iv |
| CHAPTER I: NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS AND SUBSTANTIVE DEMOCRACY | 1 |
| Introduction | 1 |
| Literature Review | 4 |
| Elite-Led Transitions and Democracy | 4 |
| Non-Violent Transitions and Democracy | 8 |
| Nonviolent Civil Resistance and Civil Society | 16 |
| Data and Methods | 18 |
| Empirical Results | 25 |
| Conclusion | 33 |
| REFERENCES | 37 |
| APPENDIX: TABLES | 46 |

TABLES

| Table | Page |
|--|------|
| 1. The distribution of modes of transitions to democracy | 20 |
| 2. In-Sample Descriptive Statistics | 25 |
| 3. Regression models for the five-year period | 28 |
| 4. Regression models for the ten-year period | 31 |
| 5. Regression models for sub-population of only countries that never had a democratic breakdown | 32 |

FIGURES

| Figure | Page |
|--|------|
| 1. The average level of formal and substantive dimensions of democracy | 26 |

CHAPTER I: NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS AND SUBSTANTIVE DEMOCRACY

Introduction

Out of pro-democratic civil resistance campaigns that took place in the second half of the twentieth century, the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa is the epitome. Although long years of civil resistance, initiated by the African National Congress (ANC) that launched the Defiance Campaign in 1950 (McKinley 1997), against systematic racial discrimination succeeded in defying the government in the 1950s and 1960s, it did not turn into a sustained and well-organized opposition campaign. In the 1980s, however, the coalescence of civic associations into an “umbrella organization” (Kadivar 2018), the United Democratic Front (UDF), and the alliance of labor unions (e.g., the Congress of South African Trade Unions) promoted the status and expedited the pace of non-violent resistance campaign against the apartheid regime (van Kessel 2000; Marx 1992; Seekings 2000). The liberation movement and the government ultimately entered into a prolonged negotiation. The negotiations between the government and the opposition from 1990 to 1994 resulted in transformations in the South African constitution including universal suffrage, a Bill of Rights, an independent judiciary, and a new Constitutional Court. South Africa eventually experienced its first-ever democratic election in 1994 (Kadivar 2018).

On the other hand, around the final years that South African opposition was organizing and expanding its resources and demands, Pakistan underwent a democratic transition in 1988. The death of Pakistan’s dictator in the August of 1988, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, led to a series of negotiations between the Pakistani military commanders and the opposition groups, led by Benazir Bhutto, in the absence of any type of mass mobilization for democratization. The

negotiations between political elites resulted in a democratic election in November 1988. This top-down transition to democracy, however, did not last long (Wilkinson 2007) and was broken down by a military coup in 1999 (Samad 2007).

Why are some new democracies able to deepen the ideals of democracy while others fail to strengthen the ideal of self-rule or are even susceptible to democratic breakdown? Although the literature on democratization is extensive and suggestive, there is a salient chasm in the literature that divides scholars into two fronts; while the elitist approach to democratization suggests that democracies that have been instituted by elite pacts are more stable and stronger (Huntington 1984; Karl 1990; and Munck and Leff 1997), a growing body of scholars argue that new democracies followed by non-violent resistance movements not only are more successful in ousting dictatorships (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011) and consolidating more durable democratic regimes (Bayer et al. 2016; Kadivar 2018), but also show higher levels of civil liberties and electoral democracy compared to those democracies that experience democratic transition through violent conflicts and top-down elite-led liberalizations (Ackerman and Karatnycky 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Whereas the literature on democratization has paid adequate attention to the effects of modes of transitions on survival and formal dimensions of democracy, it has remained unresolved whether or not democratic regimes resulting from nonviolent resistance campaigns, both before and during the transition, are more successful in deepening democracy than top-down and violent transitions to democracy.

It is increasingly acknowledged that not only are nonviolent resistance movements more successful in ousting autocracies and consolidating democracies than are violent and top-down liberalization, but they also improve the quality of post-transition democratic regimes more significantly than other modes of transition. Chenoweth and Cunningham (2013) define nonviolent

resistance “as the application of unarmed civilian power using nonviolent methods such as protests, strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations, without using or threatening physical harm against the opponent” (2013:271). Civilians who defy the government through nonviolent struggle employ irregular political tactics and work outside the defined and accepted channels for political participation determined by the government. A final principal characteristic of civil resistance is its organization, coordination, and purposeful consistency, in which civilians carry those tactics toward a common political, social, or economic objective. In this regard, civil resistance is distinct from evanescent and minimalist contentious actions like occasional protests for a policy change. Civil resistance movements tend to be more coordinated and sustained. Contrary to violent conflicts, nonviolent resistance campaigns in nature are more participatory and less hierarchical, and hence are more conducive to the diffusion of power (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013; Randle 1994).

In this paper, my goal is to advance the existing literature by examining the effects of non-violent resistance (NVR) movements on formal dimensions of democracy—electoral and liberal—along with substantive democratization—participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian—after World War II, compared with other modes of transition to democracy. Using the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation technique, which advances the causal association of NVR and substantive democracy, I make the following contributions: first, I created a dataset using the first and most comprehensive data set on substantive democracy provided by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, and the updated version of VANCO 2 Data, which is the most reliable database for studying violent and non-violent resistance campaigns. Second, previous research has examined the relationship between the modes of regime transition and formal democracy. This paper is the first to investigate the relationship between the modes of regime transition and substantive

democracy up to ten years following a democratic transition.

The statistical results of this paper demonstrate that democracy in those democratic regimes that come into existence following nonviolent resistance is substantially deeper than post-transition democratic regimes that result from violent revolutions and elite pacts. My interpretation of this finding is that the organizational culture that is established and developed by and within nonviolent resistance campaigns not only diffuses power more fairly but empowers all citizens to participate in the political system actively. My findings imply that a strong contentious civil society that is developed during the transition to democracy enhances the prospects for a democratic regime that has room for the participation of all citizens, develops a public sphere in which people can ponder major issues of the society, and that treats all its citizens equally.

Literature Review

Elite-Led Transitions and Democracy

A substantial body of scholarship on democratization has engaged with this question of how modes of transitions to democracy affect its ensuing outcomes. In this regard, whether the transition to democracy is instigated by elites or masses shapes the survival and quality of that democracy (For example, see Haggard and Kaufman 2016).

One approach to democratization suggests that democracies set in motion by the political elites result in more durable democracies that distribute power through democratically-established participatory institutions in the long-run. Samuel P. Huntington (1984), the renowned scholar in this tradition, building on his earlier seminal work on order and stability in the developing world (Huntington 1968), argues that:

It is often assumed that since democracy, to a greater degree than other forms

of government, involves rule by the people, the people therefore play a greater role in bringing it into existence than they do with other forms of government. In fact, however, democratic regimes that last have seldom, if ever, been instituted by mass popular action. Almost always, democracy has come as much from the top-down as from the bottom up; it is as likely to be the product of oligarchy as of protest against oligarchy. (Pp. 211-2)

Unlike the bottom-up transitions, Huntington argues that democratic regimes have often been introduced through one or some combination of two processes;¹ first, replacement occurs resulting from the authoritarian regime collapse or overthrow (e.g., military coup, economic disaster, withdrawal of support) where the transition leaders, who have been active outside of the regime, reach an agreement and compromise, often quickly, among themselves to institute a democratic system. Second, transformation takes place when the elites within the authoritarian regime come to this conclusion that the political system that they have ruled over no longer meets their ends or those of their society. They thus launch gradual steps to modify the existing political system and transmute it into a democratic one. ²Transformation, again, is initiated by the ruler, even if a variety of internal and external forces pressure the government into a fundamental change. Whereas the replacement process requires agreement among elites who have not been part of the authoritarian regime, the transformation process needs adept leadership from, and agreement among, the elites who have been active within the regime. Huntington notes, however, that in neither case is the agreement necessarily achieved between elites within the regime and those outside of the regime, as reaching an agreement between in-groups and out-groups is too difficult.

¹ He revised his typology later introducing *transplacement* as the third mode of transition to democracy which is the combination of *replacement* and *transformation*, meaning both the regime and opposition groups take the lead of democratization (Huntington 1993).

² As Juan Linz puts, transformation involves “change through *reforma* rather than *rupture*” (Linz 1978:35).

Contesting Barrington Moore (Moore 1966:508), who argues that “as long as powerful vested interests oppose changes that lead toward a less oppressive world, no commitment to a free society can dispense with some conception of revolutionary coercion,” Huntington proposes that no violent revolution in the world history has produced a stable democratic regime in an independent state. Similar to Dahl, who believes that “stable polyarchies and near-polyarchies are more likely to result from rather slow evolutionary processes than from revolutionary overthrow of existing hegemonies” (Dahl 1972:45), Huntington asserts that a democratic succession oftentimes requires minimum violence. This part of his work has been overlooked in the existing literature. Although he indeed underscores the role of political elites in the transition to democracy, he does not reject the role of nonviolent resistance campaigns in bringing about the transition to a stable democracy, especially at the time he was writing, neither South Africa’s anti-apartheid movement³ nor, the Post-Cold War wave of democratization in Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa had transpired. Notwithstanding, as it is evident, democratic transitions and even de-democratization that are the results of elite pacts and mass mobilization alone have no part in democratization in his theoretical framework. Rather, mass mobilization can be threatening to the stability of the newly-formed political order by spurring authoritarian elites to reverse the newly-initiated democratic regime when they sense a threat to their interests (Huntington 1993).

In accordance with the main lines of Huntington’s argument, Higley and Burton (1989) argue that understanding democratic transitions and breakdowns requires studying “basic continuities and changes in the internal relations of national elites” (1989:17). They find that while a “consensually unified” national elite creates a stable democracy that may evolve into a modern

³ It is interesting to note that Huntington was very optimistic about the triumph of anti-apartheid liberation movement in South Africa. “At present, the one notable case where contestation has clearly developed in advance of participation is South Africa. Hence, according to the Dahl thesis, the prospects for democratic development should be greater in South Africa than elsewhere in Africa” (Huntington 1984:21).

democracy, a disunified national elite threatens the stability of the political system, oscillating between authoritarianism and democracy. Moreover, as O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argue that transitions from the authoritarian rule are the product of historically contingent elite choices, Higley and Burton posit that democratic transitions and breakdowns are the functions of, as Huntington put once (1984), elite transformations; from disunity to consensual unity, which leads to democratic transition, and vice versa (1986:18).⁴ The main reason that O'Donnell and Schmitter emphasize the role of elite dispositions, calculations, and pacts in democratization “is because they largely determine whether or not an opening will occur at all because they set important parameters on the extent of possible liberalization and eventual democratization (1986: 48). Once the moderates have prevailed over the hard-liners and begun to expand some rights of contestation and individual liberties, a generalized mobilization is likely to occur, which they describe as the “resurrection of civil society” (1986: 48). However, they argue that when political institutions of the post-transition democratic regime are fragile, a rebellious civil society with overburden demands can jeopardize the stability of democracy (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986).

In a comparative study of Latin America and Eastern Europe, Munck and Leff (1997) argue that in transitions from below (e.g., Chile), since the strong incumbent elites are able to impose constraints on elite contestation, the emerging regime becomes a “restricted democracy.” By contrast, in the transitions through the transaction (e.g., Poland and Brazil), because the incumbent elites acquiesce in the regime change, it engenders a wider, prolific space for elite competition including both the old and new. The political regime emerging from this mode of transition is less restricted than the society-led transitions.

The most recent work in this tradition, conducted by Guo and Stradiotto (2014), identifies

⁴ For more study about this line of research, see Baloyra 1987; Karl 1990; Karl and Schmitter 1991; Lopez-Pintor 1987; Malloy 1985; Malloy and Seligson 1987; and Przeworski 2010.

four modes of transition to democracy. Conversion—which denotes “regime-initiated liberalization” or “change from above.” Cooperative—which is the result of the joint action and negotiations between government and opposition groups. Collapse—when the opposition groups take the lead in bringing about democracy, it is also indicated as “change from below” or “opposition-led overthrow.” Foreign Intervention—when the external force brings down the authoritarian regime. Guo and Stradiotto find that when the transition to democracy is the result of peaceful cooperative pacts, characterized by opposition groups and incumbents agreeing to relinquish the capacity to harm each other in the interest of transitioning the state, not only does the ensuing democratic regime last longer, but it performs at higher levels of democracy than do produce other modes of transition. This study demonstrates an appreciable shift in this tradition which opens a space for the effectiveness of transitions to democracy through negotiations in which the civil resistance movements have a voice, although their categorization does not specifically identify civil resistance campaigning as a mode of transition to democracy.

It is important to note that all of the works done within this tradition have relied on the minimal definition of democracy, that is, “a political system,” as Huntington puts, “that its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote” (1984:195). Compared to procedural democracy, no scholarly work in this approach has examined the effects of elite-led transitions on substantive democracy.

Non-Violent Transitions and Democracy

A growing body of scholarship on democratization, on the other hand, has focused on the effects of nonviolent civil resistance on the transition to democracy in terms of the degree of

success in ousting dictatorships, the durability, and quality of democracies resulting from nonviolent resistance movements.⁵ Inspired by South Africa's liberation movement and mostly peaceful democratic transitions in Post-Cold War Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, an increasing number of scholars started writing about the nonviolent conflicts, its onset, dynamics, and outcomes (See, e.g., Adler and Webster 1995; Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Beissinger 2002; Binnendijk and Marovic 2006; Hadjar 2003). For example, Bratton and van de Walle (1997) discuss that while economic conditions and foreign aid explain little about democratic transitions in 41 Sub-Saharan African countries between 1989 to 1994, mass direct actions (e.g., mass protests) explain more comprehensively why democratic transition transpired in this region. Contesting the elitist approach to democratic transition, Ekiert and Kubik (1998) in the study of four post-communist countries—East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia—argue that not only does protest not jeopardize democratic consolidation, but it facilitates this process under certain circumstance. They show that if collective protest becomes an institutionalized way of participating in politics, as in Poland (Ekiert and Kubik 2000), nonviolent collective action strengthens democratic consolidation. Employing a collective action model, Oberschall (2000) points out that without mass movements against communism, the Eastern European communist party-states would have lasted longer until the Soviet Union itself collapsed (2000:43).⁶ He also suggests that mass participation in these bottom-up movements increases the odds of democratic consolidation after transitioning since the dissidents of these movements become political leaders, media experts, academics, and civil society activists. Similarly, Ulfelder

⁵ There is also a quite large, yet inconclusive, body of research on the impacts that violent insurgencies have on the transition to and consolidating democracies (Collier et al. 2008; Elbawadi et al. 2008; Fortna and Huang 2012; Hegre et al. 2001; and Wantchekon and Neeman 2002).

⁶ For example, Poland would have remained a military authoritarian regime without the “Solidarity Movement” and mass strikes (Oberschall 2000).

(2005) finds that single-party and military regimes are more vulnerable to breakdown because of nonviolent collective action in comparison with violent conflict.

Although Sharp's influential trilogy on the politics of nonviolent action (1973) is the first attempt that theorizes the essence of political power, and the methods and dynamics of nonviolent struggle, Ackerman and Karatnycky's work (2005) is the first large-scale comparative analysis of the relationship between NVR and democratization. Examining 67 democratic transitions from the 1970s through the 1990s, they reached four principal findings; first, since nonviolent civic forces are a major source of leverage for a decisive change in most transitions, "people power" movements matter. Second, the positive effect on freedom in "top-down" transitions that were initiated or led by elites is comparatively lower than transitions with strong civic drivers. Third, the presence of strong, broad-based nonviolent popular fronts or civic coalitions is the most important factor out of other examined factors that contributed to freedom. Fourth, the prospects for freedom in those post-transition democracies in which its opposition groups did not use violence during the transition are higher than those that the opposition resorted to violence. Although Johnstad (2010) replicated their study using different measures of democracy and corroborated their findings, neither study went beyond political rights and civil liberties for measuring the level of freedom in post-transition democracies.

Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) made a significant contribution to the growing literature by introducing the Non-Violent and Violent Conflict Outcome (NAVCO) dataset which collects data on 323 resistance campaigns. In their seminal work, first published in 2008 (Chenoweth and Stephan 2008), they find that nonviolent resistance campaigns have been historically more successful in achieving their objectives than violent resistance campaigns since they facilitate participation by curtailing the physical, moral, and communicational barriers. Higher participation

means a higher degree of diverse membership in nonviolent campaigns, which in turn affects the outcomes of resistance campaigns positively (2011:220).⁷ Furthermore, they show that the transitions that take place in the wake of successful nonviolent resistance movements lead to more durable and internally peaceful democracies (2011:10). Regarding the quality of democracy, they also suggest that successful nonviolent campaigns establish democratic regimes that are less susceptible to the recurrence of civil war five years after the end of the conflict (2011:202). Acknowledging the high significance of Chenoweth and Stephan's work, they omit successful elite-led transitions from their analysis since they just make a comparison between violent and nonviolent transitions to democracy. Their analysis includes resistance campaigns in democratic contexts, which in turn are more amenable to the emergence and expansion of nonviolent resistance campaigns. In addition, since they merely focus on the level of democracy, they do not measure the risk of authoritarian backsliding following successful—violent or nonviolent—resistance campaigns.

Addressing these issues, Celestino and Gleditsch (2013) argue that protest and direct action play a significant role in destabilizing and undermining autocracies. They demonstrate that there is a significant difference between nonviolent direct actions and violent conflicts in terms of the likelihood of democratization. Using Polity data over the period 1900—2004, they find that democratization is substantially more likely to happen in the aftermath of nonviolent campaigns.

⁷ The diversity of membership in NVR campaigns, as Chenoweth and Stephan put, shapes the outcomes of resistance in five key ways. First, through higher levels of civic disruption, mass, diverse participation causes former regime supporters to reassess their interests and preferences, and even possibly become inclined to shift loyalties to the resistance campaign. Second, the probability that regime repression against the large, nonviolent campaigns to backfire against itself is higher comparing with violent campaigns. Third, large-scale civilian resistance campaigns are more likely to win the support of international community, and to defame their opponents, leading their opponents to lose support among principal regional and international powers. Fourth, large nonviolent campaigns tend to remain resilient in the face of regime repression. Fifth, the development of tactical innovations make large nonviolent campaigns more flexible at adepting to different circumstances (2011:220-1).

In contrast, they show that violent conflicts, like what is happening in Syria, have been historically less successful in overthrowing dictatorships, and even if the dissident succeed in bringing down the autocracies through violence (as in Libya), “the historical record suggests that new autocracies have been relatively more likely to follow” (2013:397). Besides, the odds of transition to democracy after nonviolent campaigns increase when the given authoritarian rule is surrounded by a high proportion of democratic neighbors. Although their analysis is the first study examining the effects of different types of direct action (i.e., nonviolent and violent) on democratization, their analysis does not address democratic transitions that emerged in the absence of any type of direct action, that is—transitions to democracy from above.

In explaining why and under what circumstances nonviolent struggle emerges, several studies pointed out different structural factors. Nepstad (2011) argues that out of (1) economic decline, (2) moral shock or new political opportunity, (3) divided elites, and (4) the existence of free space, the first and fourth reasons are more pivotal in the onset of nonviolent resistance. She also finds that a divided resistance, the inability to remain nonviolent, and the backfiring of external sanctions result in the failure of nonviolent movements. She indicates that none of the mentioned factors have been observed in successful nonviolent revolutions while at least two of these factors have been present in unsuccessful nonviolent revolutions in the twentieth century (2011:131). In the study of causes and outcomes of the Arab uprisings in 2011, Lawson (2015) argues that, first, international dynamics were the precipitant causes of the Arab Spring; second, because the region’s “neo-patrimonial” regimes were particularly vulnerable to shifts in state-military relations, the hold of elites over state coercive apparatuses played a key role in determining the outcomes of the revolutions; third, while the organizational form employed by the protest movements, including their use of information and communication technologies, helped to

increase the degree of participation, it limited their capacity to bring about major transformations (2015:454).

In order to understand how and why nonviolent tactics sometimes turn into a highly potent movement against authoritarian rule, Ritter (2015), propounded a new insight. Identifying the mechanism that connects friendly democracy-autocracy relations to unarmed revolutions, he asserts that amicable, high-profile relations between authoritarian regimes and their Western partners explain the onset of successful nonviolent resistance campaigns and revolutions in authoritarian regimes, like in Iran, Turkey, and Egypt. Since the friendly relations between a democratic state and an autocratic regime based on mutual economic and geopolitical benefits constrain both governments by holding them hostages to the liberal rhetoric, nonviolent civil resistance becomes significantly mighty in autocracies due to its compatibility with Western core principles such as democracy, rule of law, individual freedom, and human rights. Accordingly, suppressing nonviolent civil resistance movements becomes politically very costly to the authoritarian regime and its patron. “In short, the liberal discourse that surrounds democracy-autocracy relationship makes nonviolent protest an indisputable right and its repression an inexcusable violation” (2015:18). Inspired by Max Weber’s notion of the “iron cage of rationality” (Weber 1968), he calls this constraining mechanism the “iron cage of liberalism.”

Other works have focused on the effects of NVR campaigns on consolidating new democracies. Criticizing Chenoweth and Stephan’s work (2011), who examined the survival of democracies following NVR campaigns in the short-run, Bayer et al. (2016) demonstrate that those democratic regimes that come into existence following nonviolent resistance campaigns survive substantially longer than regimes without this characteristic, reducing the hazard of democratic breakdown by more than 50 percent. The main mechanism, they argue, that produces this effect is

the result of organizational culture established within the NVR campaigns during the transition phase that spills over to the ensuing democratic regime and results in longer life. Doing survival analysis of 112 young democracies in 80 countries from 1960 to 2010, Kadivar (2018) shows that new democracies growing out of mass mobilization last longer than new democracies that were born amid quiescence. Furthermore, he argues that longer periods of unarmed mass mobilization associate with more likelihood of survival. Sustained unarmed mobilization under authoritarian regimes, he argues, requires an organizational structure that provides a leadership cadre for the new regime, strengthens and maintains the link between the new state and society, and that develops checks on the power of the post-transition regime. To illustrate this mechanism, he analyzes South Africa as a problematic case for studies of bottom-up transitions to democracy.

Several studies have advanced the literature by examining the quality of post-transition democracies following NVR campaigns. Cervellati et al. (2014) argue that the level of violence during the transition affects the quality of civil liberties in emerging democracies. Their findings suggest that violent conflicts during the transition have persistent negative effects on the institutional quality of the subsequent democracies comparing with nonviolent transitions. However, since their analysis combines NVR-induced transitions with elite-led transitions, it does not make a comparison between top-down and bottom-up transitions in terms of their effects on civil liberties. Not to mention they use civil liberties to measure the quality of democracy. In a seminal work, Haggard and Kaufman (2016) demonstrate that the “distributive conflict” transitions to democracy had higher Polity and Freedom House political rights scores than elite-based transitions in the years immediately and even in the medium-term following the transition. In contrast to the elite-led transitions, they argue that the distributive conflict transitions not only sustain free and competitive electoral politics, but also put more restrictions on the residual power

of authoritarian elites, strengthen horizontal checks on executives, and uphold political rights and civil liberties more strongly (2016:214). Acknowledging the significance of their results, their analysis does not distinguish violent transitions to democracy from nonviolent ones. Nor their study examines substantive aspects of democracy, even though it captures the quality of democracy more comprehensive than previous studies.

Advancing the literature, Kadivar et al. (2020) find that sustained unarmed pro-democratic mobilization prior to the democratic transition increases the levels of both procedural and substantive democracies. Building on the case study of Brazil, they argue that sustained mass mobilization advances substantive democracy in three ways: first, they engage individuals in the practice of self-organizing, which provides a foundation for the deepening of democratic institutions. Second, these movements make new political elites committed to devising government institutions participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian. Third, they strengthen the capacity of civil society in order to make the demand for the continuous deepening of democracy. However, they do not examine whether the mode of transition, per se, affects procedural and substantive democratization. Moreover, since they focus on the effect of the length of mass mobilization on substantive democratization, their work does not provide a comparative analysis of different modes of transitions to democracy. Filling the gaps in the literature on the effects of NVR campaigns on the quality of democracy, Bethke and Pinckney (2016) indicate that NVR-induced democracies improve democratic quality significantly relative to cases without this characteristic, including violent and elite-led liberalizations. For measuring the quality of democracy, they rely on the Polyarchy index, conducted by the Varieties of Democracy project, which is the aggregate of (1) elected executive; (2) free and fair elections; (3) freedom of expression; (4) associational autonomy; and (5) inclusive citizenship. Their disaggregate analysis

of the Polyarchy index reveals that the positive effects of NVR transitions on the quality of democracy result primarily from improvements in freedom of expression and associational autonomy. Although their work provides the most direct answer to the puzzle of NVR and the quality of democracy, it fails to examine the effects of NVR-induced transitions on substantive democracy. In this article, I attempt to address this puzzle.

Nonviolent Civil Resistance and Civil Society

As the large body of literature suggests, the organizational structure that is established and developed within and by nonviolent resistance campaigns during the transition phase is one of the factors of improvements in deepening of democracy in post-transition democracies, making it superior to other modes of transition (i.e., violent and elite-led transitions). One of the main mechanisms through which NVR movements facilitate democracy deepening after a successful transition to democracy is the substitution of authoritarian incumbents with pro-democracy campaign leaders and activists who play a critical role in the advancement and success of resistance movements. These movement actors, who have practiced and instilled cooperation, reciprocity, and deliberative decision-making during the transition phase, are more liable to and adept at establishing democratic institutions that involve—directly or indirectly—individuals and social groups in politics. Furthermore, the experience of building broad coalitions and alliances with individuals and social groups during the transition, what we seldom observe in violent conflict and elite-based liberalization, makes NVR movement veterans more capable of establishing participatory institutions *accessible* to all the citizens (Gutmann and Thompson 2004), and of including all disadvantaged groups in public debates and decision-making processes (Brber 2004; Roberts 1998). Those political activists who continue their active involvement in politics in post-

transition democracy, play as leverage who keep surveilling newly-elected leaders who take the leadership of nascent democratic institutions. These activists not only keep monitoring democratic procedures (i.e., clean elections, freedom of expression, and civil liberties), but call for more participation of all groups, especially the underprivileged, in politics in a way that distributes power fairly (Fung and Wright 2003).

Moreover, it is frequently discussed in the literature that NVR-induced transitions to democracy develop civil society. An active and potent civil society that is developed during the transition, in turn, shapes the depth of prospective democracy (Ekiert and Kubik 2001). Civil society enhances democracy in various ways: through the intrinsic value of associative life, inculcating civic virtues of (i.e., cooperation, toleration, respect for the rule of law, participation in the public sphere, and efficacy) and teaching civic skills (i.e., organizing campaigns, running meetings, and making speeches), offering resistance to anti-democratic power and concentrated interests and checking governance, promoting the quality and equality of political representation, facilitating public deliberation, and opening opportunities for individuals and groups to involve directly in governance (Fung 2003:518-29). According to Klein and Lee's (2019) theory of the "politics of forward infiltration," civil society may shape the state and the economy in three ways: first, *the politics of influence* refers to attempts by civil society activists to influence formal political and economic decision-makers through contentious action, such as advocacy, protest, or through lobbying, providing information, and other forms of cooperative interaction. Second, *the politics of substitution* refers to establishing parallel institutions that bring some key functions of the state or the economy back into civil society. In this case, "civil society infiltrates the state (state functions), not by seeking its inclusion in the state but by shrinking the state sector through civil society's capacity for self-organization and voluntarism" (2019:70). Third, *the politics of*

occupation comes about through two pathways: the systematic entrance of official representatives of civil society organizations into key political and economic institutions, and the institutionalized and active participation of civil society actors in the implementation of state policy-making procedures (participatory and deliberative democracy). Drawing on my arguments, I suggest the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The difference between democracies that come into existence through NVR and without NVR is significant in terms of procedural democracy (electoral and liberal democracy).

Hypothesis 2: The level of substantive democracy (participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian) in those democracies that come about through NVR is significantly better than those that come into existence without NVR.

Data and Methods

Combining Geddes et al. (2014) dataset on the autocratic breakdown and regime transitions, and data on violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns from Chenoweth and Lewis (2013), I created a dataset that determines regime transitions from autocracy to democracy and the predominant mode of transition to democracy.⁸ My dataset covers all of the democratic transitions that took place between 1946 to 2010. Although the updated version of Chenoweth and Lewis's (2013) dataset covers all of the resistance campaigns from 1946 to 2013, the Geddes et al. (2014) dataset measures regime transitions until 2010. Thus, my dataset includes all of the democratic

⁸ I also created a dataset using Boix et al (2013) dataset on democratic transitions rather than Geddes et al (2014) dataset for doing the robustness check.

transitions from 1946 to 2010.⁹ My dataset finally comprises 101 democratic transitions between 1946 to 2010.¹⁰

For coding the democratic transitions and the predominant mode of transitioning, I went through the following process: first, after selecting the democratic transitions from Geddes et al (2014) dataset, I checked the categorization of the mode of transitions by this dataset. They coded the principal cause of an autocratic regime ends as (1) regime insiders change rules of regime, (2) incumbent loses elections, (3) no incumbent runs in a competitive election won by the opponent, (4) popular uprising, (5) military coup, (6) insurgents, revolutionaries, or combatants fighting a civil war, (7) foreign imposition or invasion, (8) new autocratic leader selected, changes rules, and remains in power, (9) state ceases to exist ends or government fails to control most of the country's territory. This categorization is quite broad. Hence, I looked at the NAVCO to specify the predominant mode of transition and determine the type of resistance campaigns. The criterion for determining the campaign as relevant was whether the campaign was active in the year of transition or at least one year before transitioning. It is noteworthy that I coded campaigns as relevant if the NAVCO coded the aim of the campaign as "regime change," "significant institutional reform," or even "policy change." Subsequently, I did not take the following campaign goals that NAVCO coded as relevant: "territorial secession," "greater autonomy," or "anti-occupation." In the third step, I compared NAVCO coding with Bethke and Pinckney's (2016) coding since for creating the dataset on resistance campaigns, they relied on the NAVCO coding.

⁹ I had to remove two transitions to democracy for two countries—Antigua and Grenada—from my dataset since V-Dem has not collected any data for these two countries.

¹⁰ It is important to note that six post-transition democratic regimes in my sample did not survive until the end fifth year after transition. Also, 32 of them broke down until the end of the study period (i.e., ten years after transition). In these cases of democratic breakdown, I coded the variables measuring formal and substantive dimensions of democracy after this point as missing. Nonetheless, scant cases of democratic breakdown will not render this study biased.

Finally, I compared these coding to know the discrepancies and to attain a refined and valid dataset. In each case that I found a difference between NAVCO and Bethke and Pinckney’s (2016) coding, I determined the principal mode of transition based on valid sources. For instance, both NAVCO and Bethke & Pinckney (2016) coded the main mode of transition for South Africa as nonviolent. Hence, I coded the mode of transition for South Africa as nonviolent. In another example, NAVCO coded the chief mode of transition for the Dominican Republic in 1966 as violent, while Bethke & Pinckney (2016) coded it as an elite-led transition. As I checked, however, holding the election in 1966 was the result of a civil war initiated by civilian and military supporters of former President Juan Bosch to bring down the incumbent president Donald Reid Cabral. The civil war finally was ended with US intervention (Nohlen 2005). In another case, NAVCO coded the resistance campaign in Bolivia that resulted in a democratic transition in 1979 as nonviolent. However, as Bethke & Pinckney (2016) coded the transition as a top-down liberalization, this democratic transition took place because of a military coup (Nohlen 2005).

Table 1. The distribution of modes of transitions to democracy

| Mode of Transition | Frequency | Percentage |
|---------------------------------|-----------|------------|
| Non-violent resistance campaign | 40 | 39.7 |
| Violent resistance campaign | 7 | 6.9 |
| No resistance campaign | 54 | 53.4 |
| Total | 101 | 100 |

I primarily distinguish between three types of post-transition democracies; first, democratic regimes that emerged in absence of any type of organized, constant resistance campaigns (i.e., top-

down elite-led transitions). Second, regimes that came into existence as the result of violent resistance campaigns. And third, democratic regimes that their transitions process was induced by a nonviolent resistance campaign. Table 1 illustrates the frequency and percentage of each type of transition to democracy. It is important to note that since the number of violent transitions to democracy is slight, I combine the first and second categories into one, as the democratic transitions “*without nonviolent resistance*” campaigns. On the other hand, the third category, as the treatment indicator, is called democratic transitions “*with nonviolent resistance*” campaigns. This combination facilitates the statistical analysis I am going to use in this paper.

My dependent variables are five high-level democracy indices conducted by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al. 2020). The first two variables measure the formal dimensions of democracy: electoral democracy and liberal democracy. *Electoral democracy* answers this question that to what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved? This variable captures the core value of making rulers accountable to citizens. Electoral democracy is the aggregate of indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x_frassoc_thick), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_altinf), elected officials (v2x_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x_suffr). It is important to note that according to the V-Dem conceptualization, “electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of representative democracy—liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other” (Coppedge et al. 2020: 42). *Liberal democracy* measures the institutions and rules that protect individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. It is achieved “by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power” (Coppedge et al. 2020: 43).

The other three variables measure the substantive dimensions of democracy; participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian democracy. The *participatory* dimension of democracy underscores the role of active participation in all political processes—electoral and non-electoral—by citizens. “It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives” (Coppedge et al. 2020:43). This measure takes suffrage for granted as well as engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies. The *deliberative* principle of democracy examines the quality of the process by which decisions are made in a polity. “A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion” (Coppedge et al. 2020: 43). This variable is an aggregate of *v2x_polyarchy*, *v2x_delib*, *v2x_polyarchy*, and *v2x_delib*. Finally, the *egalitarian democracy* index measures the material and immaterial inequalities that stymie the exercise of formal rights and liberties, and that curtail the ability of citizens from all social groups to participate in politics. “Egalitarian democracy is achieved when (1) rights and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups; (2) resources are distributed equally across all social groups, and (3) groups and individuals enjoy equal access to power” (Coppedge et al. 2020:44). All dependent variables range from zero to one, with higher values indicating a higher quality of democracy.

I also account for some confounding factors—identified by previous, relevant studies, that may affect the relationship between the mode of transition and the quality of democracy. Using an updated version of the “Expanded Trade and GDP Data” conducted by Gleditsch (2002),¹¹ I take logged *GDP per capita* into consideration. According to modernization theory, economic

¹¹ In a handful of cases that *GDP per capita* was not collected for one or two years for a given country by Gleditsch’s dataset, I used Maddison’s (2010) dataset on GDP and *GDP per capita*.

development is a strong predictor of democratization (Boix and Stokes 2003; Lipset 1959).¹² Economic development may increase demands for accountability, participation in politics, and equity before the law. Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) also suggest that the onset of nonviolent resistance is more likely in wealthier countries where conditions for organizing resistance campaigns (i.e., communication technologies) are readily provided. On the other hand, the emergence of civil wars is more likely in poorer countries (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Using Geddes et al. (2014) dataset on the types of previous authoritarian regimes, I also control for the effects of *military legacy*. This binary variable indicates whether the pre-transition authoritarian regime was a military authoritarian regime or not. According to previous studies, democratic regimes that are preceded by military regimes are more vulnerable to political instability, and hence the quality of democracy—formal and substantive forms—is at higher risk of erosion in these post-transition regimes (Cheibub 2007). I also measure the *population* as another control variable using the National Material Capabilities dataset version 4.0 (Singer 1987). As previous studies demonstrate, the larger the population, the more difficult for the government to control all citizens. Larger populations may also provide more opportunities to establish alternative institutions and to organize resistance campaigns (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013; and Sutton et al. 2014). *Urbanization* is another control variable that measures the percentage of the population living in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. For measuring urbanization, I employ the National Material Capabilities dataset version 4.0 (Singer 1987).¹³ Taking urbanization into account is important since the

¹² It is noteworthy that using GDP per capita as an indicator of economic development has notable limitations. For instance, GDP per capita does not take informal economies into account, which is the case in developing countries. It also does not measure foreign exchange markets. More importantly, neither GDP per capita nor economic growth does not reveal how widespread the economic development is. Therefore, it is better to measure income inequality using the Gini coefficient to measure economic development comprehensively.

¹³ I also used Maddison's (2010) dataset on total and urban population in too few cases of missing data in Singer's dataset.

mobilization of resistance campaigns is more convenient in urban environments rather than in rural areas. The physical spaces that urban areas provide for citizens to participate in social movements facilitate mass mobilization against authoritarian regimes. Moreover, as modernization theory suggests, urbanization is considered a social requisite for democracy (Lipset 1959), demonstrating that city dwellers are more inclined to practice and uphold liberal beliefs and values.

To analyze the effects of nonviolent transition on formal and substantive dimensions of democracy in post-transition democracies, I utilize the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation technique. In the DiD system, I examine the outcomes of two groups; the treatment group, which in this case, is the democratic regimes preceded by NVR campaigns, and the control group, which includes democratic transitions without NVR campaigns. It is important to note that I examine the effects of the modes of transitions on the quality of democracy at two points in time; one year before the transition to democracy and ten years after the transition. In other words, I create indicators for each outcome variable that measure the difference between its level before the transition and up to ten years after the transition. To obtain the DiD effect, we should subtract the mean change from pre- to post-transition democratic quality in the non-NVR group from the mean change in the NVR group. By using DiD estimation, I examine the outcome, here the quality of democracy in both formal and substantive aspects, for two groups (i.e., democratic transitions “without NVR” and “with NVR”) at two points in time. This technique is widely used in econometrics and policy analysis for measuring the effects of a policy or treatment on the outcomes in both experiment and control groups before and after introducing the treatment. It is noteworthy that all the assumptions of the OLS model apply to DiD estimation. The statistical model that I am employing to address research questions is the same as what Bethke and Pinckney used in their study. They combined kernel matching with DiD to make a causal inference. With kernel

matching, they take observable heterogeneity across countries/regimes into account. They also use DiD to account for unobserved heterogeneity. However, DiD estimation plays a key role in their study comparing to kernel matching as it explains variation in democratic predisposition across countries (Bethke and Pinckney 2016).

Empirical Results

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the dependent and control variables that have been used in this paper. Also, Table A1 lists all of the democratic transitions that took place between 1946 to 2010, along with the predominant mode of transition, the year of transition, and the year of democratic breakdown. Countries/transitions that did not experience democratic breakdown up to 2010 have no number under the column of end year.

Figure 1 also provides a descriptive comparison between transitions with NVR and transitions without NVR based on the average scores of each dimension of democracy one year before the transition and up to ten years after the transition. This ten-year period measures the outcomes of democratization in the medium-run. Future studies can delve into the differences between NVR-induced democratization and elite-led democratization in the long-term.

Table 2. In-Sample Descriptive Statistics

| Variables | N | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
|-------------------------|-------|--------|--------|-------|---------|
| Electoral Democracy | 1,154 | 0.488 | 0.228 | 0.070 | 0.891 |
| Liberal Democracy | 1,154 | 0.357 | 0.216 | 0.013 | 0.813 |
| Participatory Democracy | 1,154 | 0.295 | 0.163 | 0.027 | 0.754 |
| Deliberative Democracy | 1,154 | 0.369 | 0.218 | 0.007 | 0.822 |
| Egalitarian Democracy | 1,154 | 0.335 | 0.199 | 0.028 | 0.805 |
| GDP per capita | 1,115 | 2,892 | 3,489 | 87.56 | 28,309 |
| Population | 1,112 | 23,836 | 35,866 | 115 | 237,487 |
| Urban Population | 1,122 | 5,601 | 10,701 | 0.100 | 76,120 |




Figure 1. The average level of formal and substantive dimensions of democracy

As is shown in Figure 1, the average scores of NVR-induced transitions to democracy in all five dimensions are substantially better than transitions without NVR. For example, in the first year after the transition, the average difference in the Electoral Democracy Index between the two groups was 1.8. In 2019, a 1.8 difference in this index's level represents the difference in the quality of electoral democracy between South Africa and Nigeria, or Mexico and Bolivia, or Argentina and El Salvador. The first cases of each pair are democracies that came into existence as a result of nonviolent resistance campaigns. On the contrary, the second side of each pair are examples of either violent or top-down democratization.

While the quality of democracy between the treatment group and control group one year before the transition is almost the same, the gap between these two categories becomes substantially larger one year after the transition. As illustrated in Figure 1, this substantive improvement in the quality of democracy remains steady throughout the ten years after the transition in all five dimensions. It is noteworthy that while the improvement of electoral democracy, as a formal dimension of democracy, is noticeably higher than other dimensions, the participatory dimension does not experience a remarkable improvement. One plausible implication might be that developing participatory institutions is a long process that can emerge in well-consolidated democracies like the Western European and Northern American democracies, not in young democracies. Although the mean longevity of the third-wave democracies (1974-2012), which are included in my sample, was only 10.6 years (Mainwaring and Bizzarro 2019:103), some elite-led or violent transitions to democracy failed in the short-term. Thus, one of the reasons for the salient difference between these two types of transitions to democracy is the higher number of democratic breakdowns within the ten years after the transition.

The results of DiD estimation demonstrate strong support for the hypotheses I raised in this paper. According to Table 3, the depth of democracy in democratic regimes with NVR is substantially different from democratic regimes without NVR for up to five years.¹⁴ This means that the mode of transition accounts for the depth of democracy in the short-term. The difference for all of the five indices is significant at the 0.001 level. For instance, we can expect a .145 difference in the mean scores of the Electoral Democracy Index throughout ten years after the transition between the two major modes of transition to democracy. We can illustrate a .145

¹⁴ It is important to note that dependent variables have been tested for multicollinearity using variance inflation factors (VIF).

difference by searching for such cases in our dataset. For instance, while Argentina became a democracy due to the pro-democracy movement in 1983 and recorded a 0.811 score in the Electoral Democracy Index five years after the transition, Cyprus recorded a 0.673 score in EDI five years after its transition to democracy in 1977.

Table 3. Regression models for the five-year period

| | (1) <i>Electoral</i> | (2) <i>Liberal</i> | (3) <i>Participatory</i> | (4) <i>Deliberative</i> | (5) <i>Egalitarian</i> |
|------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Time | 0.147*** (7.10) | 0.116*** (6.87) | 0.0811*** (6.22) | 0.109*** (6.15) | 0.0815*** (5.47) |
| Treated | -0.0418 (-1.23) | -0.0324 (-1.13) | -0.0443 (-1.85) | -0.0498 (-1.53) | -0.0000515 (-0.00) |
| DiD | 0.145*** (4.02) | 0.143*** (4.63) | 0.109*** (4.30) | 0.151*** (4.32) | 0.110*** (3.98) |
| Population (Log) | -0.0135* (-2.28) | -0.00989 (-1.78) | -0.0103* (-2.34) | -0.00534 (-0.88) | -0.0162*** (-3.35) |
| Urban Population (Log) | -0.00306 (-1.00) | -0.00442 (-1.44) | -0.00182 (-0.83) | -0.00284 (-0.87) | -0.00297 (-1.13) |
| GDP per capita (Log) | 0.0982*** (17.74) | 0.0912*** (18.26) | 0.0764*** (20.21) | 0.0906*** (16.36) | 0.0868*** (19.70) |
| Military Legacy | -0.0681*** (-5.23) | -0.0661*** (-5.81) | -0.0370*** (-4.20) | -0.0787*** (-6.22) | -0.0661*** (-6.41) |
| _cons | -0.238*** (-3.98) | -0.319*** (-5.83) | -0.251*** (-5.83) | -0.337*** (-5.55) | -0.230*** (-4.58) |
| <i>N</i> | 694 | 694 | 694 | 694 | 694 |

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The difference is a little less for the Participatory Democracy Index, even though it is still significant at the .001 level. I also found strong support for the relationship between GDP per capita and the quality of democracy. More specifically, the level of economic development is in a positive, significant association with formal and substantive dimensions of democracy. Moreover, the relationship between military legacy and the quality of democracy is significantly negative, meaning that experiencing military authoritarian rule can destabilize and diminish the post-transition democratic regime. On the other hand, I found no significant relationship between urbanization and the quality of democracy. This is the same for the total population, although it is negatively significant for the egalitarian dimension of democracy at the 0.01 level and electoral and participatory democracy at the 0.05 level.

Along with the regression models for the short-term, I ran regression analyses for the medium-term—ten years after the transition to democracy. The statistical results still provide very strong support for the study's hypotheses. Table 4 presents regression models for up to ten years after the transition to democracy. Not only have the coefficients stayed strong at the .001 level, but they have also increased appreciably for all of the five indices. For example, we can expect a .164 difference between NVR-induced democracies and without NVR democracies in terms of the electoral dimension for up to ten years after the transition. These regression outputs reaffirm our hypotheses that the new democracies are deeper in both formal and substantive dimensions in the medium-run if they result from nonviolent resistance campaigns. In accordance with our findings in Table 3, the relationship between economic development and the quality of democracy is significant, meaning that higher levels of economic development lead to a deeper democracy. In addition, the relationship between military legacy and the depth of democracy is significantly negative in all five dimensions, implying that those democracies that had a history of military

authoritarian rule show lower levels of a formal and substantive democracy. Regression outputs provide no or partial support for population and urbanization. Contrary to our expectations, I found no significant relationship between the depth of democracy and either higher total population and urbanization. Having said that, the relationship between electoral, participatory, and egalitarian democracy and the total population is negatively significant at the .05 and .01 levels, respectively. By contrast, the relationship between urban population and liberal and egalitarian democracy is positively significant at the .05 level.

To achieve valid, comprehensive findings, I ran a series of regression models that take different scenarios into account. To account for the effects of democratic breakdowns in our sample, I tried running different regression models that exclude or include new democracies that break down within the ten years after the transition. It is very important to note that of the 32 democratic breakdowns in the data set, 26 were elite-led democratizations and only 6 were NVR-induced democracies. Since V-Dem's five high-level indices do not specify a cut-off point for democratic erosion and breakdown, we cannot find out what country undergoes democratic breakdown if it falls below a given score. Two countries that are considered autocratic have different scores in V-Dem's data set, although their difference is certainly not salient. For example, while Guatemala, which was an autocratic country in 1964, had an Electoral Democracy score of .091, Panama was an autocratic country in 1952 with an Electoral Democracy score of .269. To take this methodological issue into consideration, I ran regression models that treat all democratic breakdowns equally. In this case, I used a dummy variable to zero out all of the V-Dem scores in the year(s) that a country is considered as autocratic. Table A2 in the Appendix shows regression outputs. Still, the statistical results are very strong in supporting my hypotheses even if we control the effects of democratic breakdowns.

Table 4. Regression models for the ten-year period

| | (6) <i>Electoral</i> | (7) <i>Liberal</i> | (8) <i>Participatory</i> | (9) <i>Deliberative</i> | (10) <i>Egalitarian</i> |
|------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Time | 0.155*** (7.39) | 0.125*** (7.07) | 0.0911*** (6.59) | 0.117*** (6.38) | 0.0920*** (5.76) |
| Treated | -0.0616 (-1.88) | -0.0492 (-1.69) | -0.0588* (-2.55) | -0.0708* (-2.26) | -0.0133 (-0.53) |
| DiD | 0.164*** (4.83) | 0.160*** (5.26) | 0.126*** (5.27) | 0.167*** (5.14) | 0.121*** (4.64) |
| Population (Log) | -0.0104* (-2.26) | -0.00678 (-1.48) | -0.00872* (-2.47) | -0.00160 (-0.33) | -0.0126** (-3.23) |
| Urban Population (Log) | -0.00496 (-1.90) | -0.00700* (-2.53) | -0.00243 (-1.29) | -0.00500 (-1.69) | -0.00526* (-2.27) |
| GDP per capita (Log) | 0.118*** (29.39) | 0.113*** (29.57) | 0.0899*** (31.23) | 0.111*** (27.08) | 0.104*** (30.28) |
| Military Legacy | -0.0739*** (-7.32) | -0.0690*** (-7.61) | -0.0441*** (-6.30) | -0.0824*** (-8.54) | -0.0700*** (-8.66) |
| _cons | -0.396*** (-8.47) | -0.487*** (-10.93) | -0.359*** (-10.53) | -0.509*** (-10.57) | -0.378*** (-9.13) |
| <i>N</i> | 1103 | 1103 | 1103 | 1103 | 1103 |

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Furthermore, I ran regression models for two in-sample cases. The first in-sample regression models examine the DiD for only those countries that never had a democratic breakdown. These models help us to find out that does the mode of transition to democracy explains the differences in the depth of democracy even if we confine our sample to those cases that never had an experience of democratic breakdown? In this case, I have subjected my hypotheses to harder tests since all of the cases in this sample are above a certain point in V-Dem scores. To put it another way, all of the countries in this sample are more stable and closer and

relatively closer to each other. Surprisingly, the statistical results are still very significant. Table 5 presents regression outputs. This means the mode of transition to democracy still makes a significant difference in the depth of democracy even among stable democracies. I also ran regression models for only countries that had a democratic breakdown. Unsurprisingly, none of the differences in all five indices were significantly different than zero, meaning that the mode of transition cannot make a difference in fragile democracies that break down soon after the transition to democracy. Table A3 in the Appendix shows regression outputs.

Table 5. Regression models for sub-population of only countries that never had a democratic breakdown

| | (16) <i>Electoral</i> | (17) <i>Liberal</i> | (18) <i>Participatory</i> | (19) <i>Deliberative</i> | (20) <i>Egalitarian</i> |
|------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Time | 0.199*** (7.37) | 0.164*** (7.35) | 0.116*** (6.96) | 0.148*** (6.61) | 0.116*** (6.09) |
| Treated | -0.0624 (-1.69) | -0.0404 (-1.24) | -0.0587* (-2.32) | -0.0721* (-2.11) | -0.00337 (-0.13) |
| DiD | 0.165*** (4.32) | 0.163*** (4.80) | 0.132*** (5.03) | 0.179*** (5.03) | 0.126*** (4.54) |
| Population (Log) | -0.0167*** (-3.31) | -0.0184*** (-3.51) | -0.0146*** (-3.66) | -0.00988 (-1.72) | -0.0241*** (-5.51) |
| Urban Population (Log) | -0.00260 (-0.96) | -0.00413 (-1.39) | -0.000581 (-0.29) | -0.00289 (-0.89) | -0.00428 (-1.74) |
| GDP per capita (Log) | 0.102*** (22.86) | 0.108*** (23.42) | 0.0845*** (24.56) | 0.104*** (20.07) | 0.110*** (27.24) |
| Military Legacy | -0.0444*** (-3.90) | -0.0507*** (-4.68) | -0.0334*** (-3.89) | -0.0677*** (-5.82) | -0.0625*** (-6.25) |
| _cons | -0.262*** (-4.83) | -0.393*** (-7.33) | -0.291*** (-7.36) | -0.413*** (-6.88) | -0.349*** (-7.15) |
| <i>N</i> | 777 | 777 | 777 | 777 | 777 |

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Conclusion

According to the statistical results, I found very strong support for the positive effects of NVR-induced transitions to democracy on the quality of democracy in both formal and substantive dimensions. As the data show, each aspect of democracy—formal and substantive—is improved significantly after the transition to democracy when it is induced by a nonviolent resistance movement. This finding is robust regardless of whether we examine the time period five years or ten years after the democratic transition. Furthermore, the data show that the difference between NVR-induced transitions, on one hand, and violent and top-down transitions, on the other, in terms of deepening democracy is substantial. The findings of this paper also corroborate the empirical findings of the nonviolent resistance literature (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Democracy is expected to be deeper if it emerges as the result of a well-organized and sustained nonviolent resistance campaign. On the contrary, the prospects for the genesis of a substantive democracy would be significantly lower if it is succeeded by violent revolutions or elite pacts.

The findings imply that there is a significant difference between a political system that is founded through the active engagement of all of its people and the one that restrains ordinary citizens from participating in bringing about democracy. When an active civil society not only defies the status quo and overthrows the incumbent autocratic regime, but also champions democratic distribution of power, it is more likely that the ensuing political system to uphold equal rights for everybody and establish participatory institutions accessible to all citizens who can debate major issues in a free and dynamic public sphere (Baiocchi et al. 2011).

Although this paper demonstrates that NVR-induced transitions to democracy are more successful in deepening democracy than violent and top-down transitions, it does not explain the causal mechanism underlying this process that makes this type of transition superior. Furthermore,

although this paper assumes the mode of transition is an exogenous phenomenon that happens to a political system, we should not forget that the mode of transition is partly determined by the regime type, socio-economic situation, and the legacy of civic engagement. Further research hence can delve into causal mechanisms in which NVR-induced transitions deepen democracy. This type of research, mostly evidence-based case studies, should also examine the long-run effects of NVR-induced transitions on the depth of democracy since my study covers short- and medium-term effects. It is noteworthy that V-Dem's five high-level indices are actually the aggregates of various indices. Future research may and should disaggregate indices to address more specific issues.

Moreover, the present study has not taken some significant exogenous factors into account. For instance, I have not examined the role of neighboring countries in democracy deepening as a confounding factor. Previous studies have demonstrated that regional diffusion puts an autocratic regime into more vulnerability to nonviolent resistance movements (Bayer et al. 2016; Celestino and Gleditsch 2013). Also, as I mentioned in the literature review, Daniel Ritter (2015) argues that those autocratic regimes that have bilateral, friendly relationships with Western liberal democracies are more susceptible to civil resistance campaigns. This study has not quantified this argument. Future research should delve into exogenous factors that are increasingly important in the success of nonviolent resistance movements in a globalized world.

Another avenue for future research is to investigate the socio-economic atmosphere prior to transitioning to democracy. This research examined only the GDP per capita as an indicator of economic development. Future research should take other indicators into account when it studies the economic environment before and during the transition to democracy. For example, measuring economic inequality using the Gini coefficient would fill this gap. While some scholars believe that democratization is likelier when the economic inequality is low (Boix 2003), some suggest

that the prospects for democratization are higher when the inequality is at middling levels (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005). The third approach to democratization, which is drawn on contractarian political theory, argues that land and income inequality affect democratization in different ways; while equal land distribution increases the chance of democratization, income inequality increases the odds for democratization (Ansell and Samuels 2010). Also, “relative deprivation” theories of social movements suggest that economic growth is a factor that increases/decreases the chance of uprisings and unrest, especially in rentier states where the economic performance of the patron has a tremendous effect on the emergence of social movements.

Regarding the policy implications, this research encourages policymakers and human rights organizations to not underestimate the positive effects of nonviolent resistance campaigns on democratization and democracy deepening. According to V-Dem’s Democracy Report 2020, “the share of countries with substantial pro-democracy mass protests rose from 27% in 2009 to 44% in 2019” (Lührmann et al. 2020). The rise of pro-democracy mass mobilization in the recent decade while we are experiencing the third wave of autocratization (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019), is a sign of hope for the prospects of democracy in the world. However, leaving people helpless in front of autocratic rulers might have a reverse effect as people who have been brutally repressed by the government are less likely to resist. To aid democratization efforts, it is imperative that international organizations and Western democracies, especially the United States, provide financial and rhetorical support for nonviolent resistance campaigns.

It is important to note that while the statistical results of this study argue for the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance campaigns, we have notable empirical examples that argue otherwise. The Arab Spring is par excellence in this regard. The peaceful protests in some

countries, like Syria, did not put an end to dictatorships. Rather, they were repressed brutally and turned into a civil war. Even in those countries (e.g., Egypt, Yemen, and Libya) that succeeded in overthrowing long-lasting dictatorships, the results were not promising. Libya and Yemen are suffering from civil wars, and Egypt is under the subjugation of a military regime that took power through coup d'état. These examples show that nonviolent resistance is not a panacea for democratic deepening. Further research can delve into factors that explain why nonviolent movements fail and what campaign strategies are less efficacious.

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APPENDIX: TABLES

Table A1. Countries' mode of transition, year of democratic transitions, and breakdowns

| Country | Mode of Transition | Transition Year | End Year |
|--------------------------|--------------------|-----------------|----------|
| Albania | Nonviolent | 1992 | 1996 |
| Albania | Violent | 1997 | - |
| Argentina | Elite-led | 1958 | 1962 |
| Argentina | Elite-led | 1963 | 1966 |
| Argentina | Elite-led | 1973 | 1976 |
| Argentina | Nonviolent | 1983 | - |
| Bangladesh | Nonviolent | 1991 | 2007 |
| Benin | Nonviolent | 1991 | - |
| Bolivia | Elite-led | 1979 | 1980 |
| Bolivia | Nonviolent | 1982 | - |
| Brazil | Elite-led | 1946 | 1964 |
| Brazil | Nonviolent | 1985 | - |
| Bulgaria | Nonviolent | 1990 | - |
| Burundi | Elite-led | 2005 | - |
| Cape Verde | Elite-led | 1991 | - |
| Central African Republic | Nonviolent | 1993 | 2003 |
| Chile | Nonviolent | 1990 | - |
| Colombia | Elite-led | 1958 | - |
| Comoros | Elite-led | 2006 | - |
| Costa Rica | Violent | 1949 | - |
| Croatia | Nonviolent | 2000 | - |
| Cyprus | Elite-led | 1977 | - |
| Czechoslovakia | Nonviolent | 1990 | - |
| Dominican Republic | Violent | 1966 | - |
| Ecuador | Elite-led | 1948 | 1963 |
| Ecuador | Elite-led | 1979 | 2000 |
| Ecuador | Elite-led | 2003 | - |
| El Salvador | Violent | 1984 | - |
| Gambia | Elite-led | 1972 | 1994 |
| Georgia | Nonviolent | 2004 | - |
| Ghana | Elite-led | 1970 | 1972 |
| Ghana | Elite-led | 1979 | 1981 |
| Ghana | Elite-led | 1997 | - |
| Greece | Nonviolent | 1974 | - |
| Guatemala | Nonviolent | 1945 | 1954 |
| Guatemala | Elite-led | 1958 | 1963 |
| Guatemala | Violent | 1966 | 1982 |
| Guatemala | Violent | 1986 | - |

| | | | |
|---------------|------------|------|------|
| Guinea-Bissau | Elite-led | 1994 | 1998 |
| Guyana | Nonviolent | 1992 | - |
| Honduras | Elite-led | 1957 | 1963 |
| Honduras | Elite-led | 1971 | 1972 |
| Honduras | Elite-led | 1982 | 2009 |
| Hungary | Nonviolent | 1990 | - |
| Indonesia | Elite-led | 1955 | 1957 |
| Indonesia | Nonviolent | 1999 | - |
| Kenya | Elite-led | 2002 | - |
| Korea, South | Nonviolent | 1960 | 1961 |
| Korea, South | Nonviolent | 1988 | - |
| Latvia | Nonviolent | 1993 | - |
| Lebanon | Elite-led | 1971 | 1976 |
| Lesotho | Nonviolent | 2002 | - |
| Liberia | Nonviolent | 2006 | - |
| Lithuania | Nonviolent | 1992 | - |
| Madagascar | Nonviolent | 1993 | 2009 |
| Malawi | Nonviolent | 1994 | - |
| Mali | Nonviolent | 1992 | - |
| Mexico | Nonviolent | 2000 | - |
| Mongolia | Nonviolent | 1990 | - |
| Mozambique | Elite-led | 1994 | 2004 |
| Myanmar | Elite-led | 1960 | 1962 |
| Nepal | Nonviolent | 1991 | 2002 |
| Nicaragua | Elite-led | 1984 | - |
| Niger | Nonviolent | 1993 | 1996 |
| Niger | Elite-led | 1999 | 2009 |
| Nigeria | Elite-led | 1979 | 1983 |
| Pakistan | Elite-led | 1950 | 1956 |
| Pakistan | Elite-led | 1988 | 1999 |
| Panama | Elite-led | 1950 | 1951 |
| Panama | Elite-led | 1952 | 1968 |
| Panama | Elite-led | 1991 | - |
| Paraguay | Elite-led | 2003 | - |
| Peru | Elite-led | 1956 | 1962 |
| Peru | Elite-led | 1963 | 1968 |
| Peru | Elite-led | 1980 | 1990 |
| Peru | Nonviolent | 2001 | - |
| Philippines | Nonviolent | 1986 | - |
| Poland | Nonviolent | 1989 | - |
| Portugal | Nonviolent | 1976 | - |
| Romania | Violent | 1991 | - |
| Sao Tome | Elite-led | 1991 | - |
| Senegal | Elite-led | 2000 | - |
| Sierra Leone | Elite-led | 2002 | - |

| | | | |
|-----------------|------------|------|------|
| Solomon Islands | Elite-led | 2006 | - |
| South Africa | Nonviolent | 1994 | - |
| Spain | Elite-led | 1977 | - |
| Sri Lanka | Elite-led | 1991 | 2010 |
| Sudan | Elite-led | 1965 | 1969 |
| Sudan | Nonviolent | 1986 | 1989 |
| Suriname | Elite-led | 1988 | 1990 |
| Suriname | Elite-led | 1991 | - |
| Taiwan | Elite-led | 1996 | - |
| Thailand | Elite-led | 1975 | 1976 |
| Thailand | Elite-led | 1983 | 1991 |
| Thailand | Nonviolent | 1992 | 2006 |
| Turkey | Elite-led | 1961 | 1980 |
| Turkey | Elite-led | 1983 | - |
| Uganda | Elite-led | 1980 | 1985 |
| Uruguay | Nonviolent | 1985 | - |
| Venezuela | Nonviolent | 1959 | 2005 |
| Yugoslavia | Nonviolent | 2000 | - |

Table A2. Regression models using a dummy variable

| | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) |
|------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | <i>Electoral</i> | <i>Liberal</i> | <i>Participatory</i> | <i>Deliberative</i> | <i>Egalitarian</i> |
| Time | 0.390*** (19.08) | 0.273*** (15.02) | 0.228*** (15.73) | 0.283*** (15.52) | 0.245*** (13.77) |
| Treated | -0.0696* (-2.34) | -0.0621* (-2.31) | -0.0533* (-2.46) | -0.0677* (-2.50) | -0.0587* (-2.23) |
| DiD | 0.187*** (5.89) | 0.182*** (6.42) | 0.132*** (5.80) | 0.178*** (6.20) | 0.176*** (6.38) |
| Population (Log) | -0.00739 (-1.24) | -0.00577 (-1.12) | -0.00538 (-1.32) | -0.000855 (-0.16) | -0.00938* (-2.08) |
| Urban Population (Log) | -0.00918** (-2.84) | -0.00897** (-2.96) | -0.00501* (-2.32) | -0.00727* (-2.25) | -0.00863** (-3.29) |
| GDP per capita (Log) | 0.135*** (26.50) | 0.121*** (28.05) | 0.0979*** (29.25) | 0.120*** (26.57) | 0.116*** (29.03) |
| Military Legacy | -0.0618*** (-4.99) | -0.0604*** (-6.00) | -0.0469*** (-5.81) | -0.0722*** (-6.80) | -0.0674*** (-7.33) |
| _cons | -0.797*** (-13.88) | -0.714*** (-14.45) | -0.587*** (-15.04) | -0.759*** (-14.47) | -0.646*** (-13.90) |
| <i>N</i> | 1103 | 1103 | 1103 | 1103 | 1103 |

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A3. Regression models for the sub-population of only countries that have had a democratic breakdown

| | (21) | (22) | (23) | (24) | (25) |
|------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | <i>Electoral</i> | <i>Liberal</i> | <i>Participatory</i> | <i>Deliberative</i> | <i>Egalitarian</i> |
| Time | 0.066** (2.59) | 0.045** (2.59) | 0.038** (2.72) | 0.050* (2.27) | 0.030 (1.83) |
| Treated | 0.0161 (0.30) | 0.0102 (0.27) | -0.0105 (-0.38) | 0.013 (0.26) | 0.0202 (0.48) |
| DiD | 0.0135 (0.23) | 0.0019 (0.05) | 0.0018 (0.06) | -0.0035 (-0.07) | -0.0025 (-0.06) |
| Population (Log) | -0.0232* (-2.31) | -0.0086 (-1.30) | -0.0175** (-2.74) | -0.0082 (-1.05) | -0.0190** (-2.69) |
| Urban Population (Log) | 0.0177* (2.27) | 0.0094* (2.10) | 0.0103* (2.21) | 0.0132** (2.65) | 0.0179*** (3.60) |
| GDP per capita (Log) | 0.053*** (4.74) | 0.040*** (5.08) | 0.027*** (3.87) | 0.053*** (5.87) | 0.028*** (4.15) |
| Military Legacy | -0.0672*** (-4.26) | -0.0415*** (-3.48) | -0.0107 (-1.08) | -0.059*** (-4.34) | -0.0332** (-2.99) |
| _cons | 0.0008 (0.01) | -0.0915 (-1.22) | 0.0403 (0.65) | -0.182* (-2.10) | 0.0307 (0.46) |
| <i>N</i> | 326 | 326 | 326 | 326 | 326 |

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$