Terrorism Preparedness: A Law Enforcement Perspective

Cayla Comens
Illinois State University, clcomen@ilstu.edu

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Since September 11, 2001, the environments in which law enforcement agencies operate have been changing. Contingency theory hypothesizes that an organization adapts to their environment through organizational structure and contingencies to accomplish a state of fit or higher performance. Utilizing contingency theory, the study addressed two research questions: (1) Do municipal and county police agencies believe they have the necessary resources and training to prevent and/or respond to the next terrorist attack? (2) How does agency size, structure, funding, and perceived risk influence terrorism preparedness? A sample of 902 county and municipal law enforcement agencies from the East Central region of the United States was surveyed. A total of 522 electronic surveys were sent to municipal and county agencies across 5 states. The remaining 380 agencies were sent physical survey copies.

The study found that law enforcement agencies believe they have the necessary resources and training to respond to and/or prevent a terrorist attack. Perceived terrorist risk was found to be a weak but negative predictor of preparedness. The study concluded that funding, risk, and structure did influence an agency’s level of terrorism preparedness.
Overall, the contingency theory framework helped explain terrorism preparedness among law enforcement agencies.

KEYWORDS: Contingency Theory, Law Enforcement, Preparedness, Terrorism
TERRORISM PREPAREDNESS: A LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVE

CAYLA L. COMENS

COMMITTEE MEMBERS:

Cara Rabe-Hemp, Chair
Ralph Weisheit
Jason Ingram
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C. L. C.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

Since the tragic day of September 11th 2001, law enforcement agencies have been tasked with the new role of terrorism preparedness. As the probability of a terrorist attack increases, so does the pressure for law enforcement to be prepared. This is evident with the sharp upsurge of terrorist attacks around the world (University of Maryland, 2014). Acts of terrorism have been around for centuries, dating back to the assassination of Julius Caesar. However, terrorist attacks have occurred more frequently in the 21st century. In 2013, there were 12,000 terrorist attacks worldwide (University of Maryland, 2014). Due to the increase of terrorist attacks over recent years, it has become vital for law enforcement to understand what is considered as an act of terrorism.

However, terrorism is hard to define. There are multiple definitions and interpretations conceptualizing the subject. Research suggests the definition of terrorism is vague at best (Schmid & Jongman, 1988; Riley & Hoffman, 1995; Ganor, 2002). Schmid and Jongman (1988) found that survey respondents’ answers generated over 109 different definitions of terrorism. The lack of a universal, agreed upon definition, leaves police agencies operating under a definition that fits their role in terrorism prevention and preparedness. A perceived increase in the severity and frequency of attacks, coupled with a loose interpretation of the term terrorism, has made it difficult to assess whether police agencies are ready for future attacks. This became evident when police communication
and cooperation came under scrutiny after September 11th. There were “turf battles and the need for jurisdictional supremacy at all levels of the U.S. law enforcement community”; (Downing, 2009, p.3) which ultimately led to a failure in key law enforcement functions.

Historically, the role of terrorism prevention and preparedness fell to the United States government. It was not until the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 was passed that state and local law enforcement began to play a vital role in terrorism preparedness (Combating Terrorism, 2002). By recognizing the need for state and local law enforcement to assist federal law enforcement, it has become necessary for police agencies to be trained and equipped with the tools to combat terrorism at the local level.

State and local law enforcement agencies have recently been propelled into the media limelight due to the military type of weaponry they have been seen using during recent altercations between police and the public. It has brought forth many questions regarding how police agencies were able to obtain such military equipment. The Department of Defense’s 1033 Program has provided many law enforcement agencies across the United States with military equipment at little to no cost to the local agency (Else, 2014). Even though the 1033 Program has been the main source for military equipment for law enforcement, there has been other federal funding available for agencies to help them comply with their role in counterterrorism. At the end of 2011, the Department of Homeland Security paid out more than $2 billion dollars in anti-terror grants (Becker & Shulz, 2011). To properly acquire and distribute these grants, plans and policies must be in place for terrorism preparedness to be effective.
Planning is an essential part of terrorism preparedness. Riley and Hoffman (1995) looked at state and local law enforcement and their level of preparedness. The study found that only 38 percent of state law enforcement had some type of contingency plan for dealing with the threat of terrorism. Of the local law enforcement agencies surveyed, Riley and Hoffman (1995) found that 52 percent had a contingency plan to deal with a terrorist event within their jurisdiction.

Theoretical Framework

The purpose of this study was to confirm and expand upon recent research on terrorism preparedness through the lens of contingency theory. Specifically, the current study determined if the contingency theory framework helped explain the extent to which law enforcement agencies were prepared for the next terrorist attack. By drawing from contingency theory, the study helped identify trends within the region and helped understand how law enforcement agencies prepared for a terrorist attack within their community.

Contingency theory posits that an organization must adapt to their environment to survive and achieve high performance (Woodward, 1965; Donaldson, 2001). There are three core elements that make up contingency theory: (1) contingencies, (2) organizational structure, and (3) a proper fit between contingencies and organizational structure (Donaldson, 2001). A balance between contingencies and organizational structure will lead to a proper fit or high performance. It is important for law enforcement agencies to maintain a high level of performance to keep the community they serve safe. When there is a poor fit between organizational structure and contingencies within an agency, it leads to poor performance which, in turn, could cause confusion or even failure.
of the agency. In other words, when a law enforcement agency is unable to maintain a high level of performance, it can lead to confusion, misconduct, and poor public support. There have been many studies that have taken the idea of contingency theory and have applied it to policing (Langworthy, 1985; Crank & Wells, 1991; Maguire, 2003; Davis et al., 2004; Davis, Mariano, Pace, Cotton, & Steinberg, 2006; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010; Zhao, Ren, Lovrich, 2010; Giblin, Burruss, & Schafer, 2014).

Crank and Wells (1991) and Maguire (2003) found that organizational size was a significant predictor of organizational structure within police departments. Haynes and Giblin (2014) expounded on contingency theory to explain how police agencies respond to homeland security risks within their environment. Haynes and Giblin (2014) found there was a positive relationship between risk and preparedness. The study also found that the threat significantly predicted the preparedness level of the police departments (Haynes & Giblin, 2014).

The current study looked to confirm past research on the association between perceived risk and preparedness, while determining whether the contingency theory framework helped explain whether law enforcement agencies were prepared for a terrorist attack. The current thesis evaluated the definition of terrorism, role of the police in terrorism prevention, contingency planning, police policies and regulations, police training, police equipment, and the importance of public support and communication between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.
Study Objectives

Surveying law enforcement agencies in the United States about their agencies’ perceptions of terrorism preparedness will provide law enforcement administrators data on what is needed to better prepare for a terrorist attack. A sample of 902 local and county law enforcement agencies was chosen from 5 states within the United States. Police administrators of the selected agencies were surveyed during the fall of 2015. The survey addressed the following questions: (a) Do municipal and county police agencies believe they have the necessary resources and training to prevent and or respond to the next terrorist attack? (b) How does agency size, structure, funding, and perceived risk influence terrorism preparedness?

Contributions to the Field

This research provides vital information in understanding whether local and county police agencies are prepared for the next terrorist attack. This research allows law enforcement administrators to identify shortfalls within their counterterrorism preparedness measures. This research also identifies whether contingency theory helps predict law enforcement’s terrorism preparedness, as well as, any trends within the region.

Thesis Overview

In the next chapter (II), a literature review summarized existing research on police preparedness. Chapter III outlined contingency theory and how past studies have used the theory to explain police preparedness. Sample, sample size, variables, and analytic plans were discussed in chapter IV. In Chapter V, the results of the study were discussed. In the
final chapter, Chapter VI, discussion of the results, and limitations and implications of the
study were presented.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Police emergency response preparedness is an essential element of the police mandate. It is necessary that police have a grasp of appropriate procedures in the event of an emergency. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, rather one that has become more frequent. Acts of terrorism can be traced back to the Greek and Roman republics. Some individuals believe the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 B.C could be categorized as an act of terrorism (Combs, 2013). As acts of terrorism have become more common in the 21st century, the importance of police preparedness has increased. In 2000, according to the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database (2014), there were just under 3,000 terrorist attacks around the world. As of 2013, there were 12,000 terrorist attacks across the world, resulting in a sharp increase (University of Maryland, 2014). This finding means the likelihood of a terrorist attack has grown over time.

As the probability of an attack rises, the need for state and local police to be prepared for a terrorist attack intensifies. Davis (2004) found that “few local law enforcement agencies had experience with responding to or investigating terrorist-related incidents” (p.13) prior to September 11, 2001. Federal law enforcement agencies were seen as the main element in terrorism prevention. Following the attacks of September 11th, state and local law enforcement agencies took a more active role in counterterrorism. State and local law enforcement were tasked with fielding calls and
responding to reports of possible terrorist activity in their jurisdiction (Davis, 2004). Federal law enforcement agencies recognized that cooperation between state and local law enforcement agencies was a key element in terrorism prevention. However, the question lingers about the preparedness of the police in the event of a future attack. The purpose of this thesis was to assess whether municipal and county police were prepared for the next terrorist attack. Each of these elements is essential for police preventing another terrorist attack within their jurisdiction.

**Definition of Terrorism**

The definition of terrorism is nebulous at best. According to Riley and Hoffman (1995) “there exists no precise or widely accepted definition of terrorism” (p.2). There are some definitions that “focus on the terrorist organizations’ mode of operation” (Ganor, 2002, p. 290) and others that focus on motivations and characteristics. Schmid and Jongman (1988) conducted a survey of the field’s leading academics to see their definitions of terrorism. Their survey produced over “…109 different definitions of terrorism” (Schmid & Jongman, 1988, p. 5) and 20 different elements that affect the definition of terrorism (Schmid & Jongman, 1988). If there is no precise definition of terrorism, then how can the police be prepared for such a threat? Not all law enforcement agencies operate under a universal definition of terrorism. One definition of terrorism is “violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm” (Riley & Hoffman, 1995, p.3).

The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines terrorism as “The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social
objectives” (Federal Bureau of Investigations, n.d., n.p.). However, for legal purposes, the FBI uses the terrorism definition from the United States Code. The United States Code breaks the definition into 3 different sections: international terrorism, domestic terrorism, and the federal crime of terrorism. All of these sections have certain criteria and characteristics that have to be met to be considered to be terrorism. Riley and Hoffman (1995) surveyed 52 law enforcement agencies about terrorism preparedness. A key finding of their study was that surveyed law enforcement agencies did not follow the official FBI definition (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). Agencies were not aware of the FBI’s guidelines or how the FBI came to their rationale for defining actions of terrorism (Riley & Hoffman, 1995).

The lack of a universal definition of terrorism can be problematic in police terrorism preparedness. For example, when a law enforcement agency perceives what they believe to be an act of terrorism, the information is then forwarded to the FBI. However, upon further investigation by the FBI, the case is usually “reclassified as ordinary crime” (Riley & Hoffman, 1995, p. 4). For the purpose of this study, the FBI’s definition of terrorism will be used because it comes from the United States Code.

The Role of Police

Local, state and federal law enforcement agencies’ roles were altered to concentrate on counterterrorism due to the events of September 11th. Before the attacks of September 11th, the roles of the police were to protect the public along with fulfilling their mandate of policing the dangerous class (Rabe-Hemp, 2014). In addition to these previous roles, law enforcement agencies are now responsible for preventing terrorist attacks in their communities, states, and nation. When President George W. Bush referred
to combating terrorism, he called it the “War on Terrorism.” Many believed that the “War on Terrorism” was solely going to be a military campaign (Brooks, 2010). Within the last 10 years, law enforcement agencies have increasingly possessed a military appearance while conducting their policing roles alongside their terrorism prevention roles. Many agencies have been recipients of military equipment in the name terrorism prevention and the “War on Terrorism.” Hill and Beger (2009) attributed the militarization of law enforcement agencies to the “tendency of the state to treat all CTAs [clandestine transnational actors] as a threat to national security” (p. 28), therefore altering agencies’ roles in terrorism prevention. Today, many law enforcement agencies’ roles are encompassed under the counterterrorism umbrella.

However, military forces are not always the best choice for preventing a terrorist attack. Terrorists are becoming more involved in criminal-type activity. This is partially due to the terrorist organization’s assets being frozen in other countries (Brooks, 2010). When their financial funds are no longer available, they look to other means to locate funding for their mission. For example, terrorists regularly utilize black market trade in the areas of drug smuggling, human trafficking, and arms trade among other ways to raise funds. Terrorists have also been involved in money laundering and ATM fraud to gather the necessary financial backing is needed for their terrorist plots (Brooks, 2010).

The increase in criminal activity by terrorists results in “…an increase in police actions” (Brooks, 2010, p. 115). Law enforcement agencies not only have homeland security roles now, but they still have their original responsibilities and roles to perform. For example, police are still responsible for, “…fighting new synthetic drug epidemics (methamphetamines), managing and helping to enforce sex offenders registries, fighting
identity theft and computer crimes, and assisting federal officials with immigration enforcement and investigations” (Council of State Governments & Eastern Kentucky University, 2006, p. 10). Always having contact and interactions with the community, local police departments are more likely than federal agencies to gather a greater amount of intelligence on terrorist activities within their communities. Henry (2002) envisioned a system that allowed law enforcement agencies to become more attuned to intelligence gathering. Henry (2002) noted:

Two key elements in successfully exploiting the vast repository of intelligence information resides in American police agencies, then, are shifting the police mindset to include the notion of fighting terrorism and educating police officers about terrorist practices, methods and activities (p. 325).

Law enforcement agencies are essentially being used to gather intelligence on terrorist activities. Using local and state law enforcement agencies to gather intelligence on suspected terrorist or terrorist activity allows the agencies to be out in the community creating relationships. When the police are able to make relationships with the community they serve, it opens the possibility that more valuable intelligence can be gathered. It is important, besides gathering intelligence, that police officers receive adequate educational training to fulfill their new role in the 21st century. Training on what to expect and respond to when a terrorist attack happens allows law enforcement agencies to have an understanding of how to fulfill their new role of terrorism prevention in their communities. Also, local law enforcement agencies are “expected to develop and implement their own response plans” (Pelfrey, 2007, p. 314) in the event of a terrorist attack in their communities.

To create a terrorism contingency plan, law enforcement agencies must determine the different types of possible terrorist attacks that could happen within their
communities. Law enforcement agencies plan for terrorist attacks such as mass causality, nuclear, chemical and biological, cyber, and power grid attacks within their communities. Although law enforcement agencies now have the role of terrorism prevention, they still need to coordinate with other agencies to fulfill their role. Agencies such as emergency services (fire departments and EMT services), public works, and local offices of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are essential for creating a comprehensive and collaborative terrorism contingency plan.

**Planning**

Planning is a key element for preventing another terrorist attack in the United States. Many police departments have contingency plans in place as a result of the events of September 11th. Contingency plans can serve as an adequate way to determine a department’s preparedness against a terrorist attack. The purpose of a contingency plan is “to identify available resources and identify ways those resources can be formed into an operational plan” (Riley & Hoffman, 1995, p. 26). One element of a contingency plan is “determining which organizations will bear responsibility for various aspects of addressing a terrorist attack” (Riley & Hoffman, 1995, p. 26). Another important element of contingency planning is having coordination and a liaison with other law enforcement agencies that have other terrorism prevention responsibilities (Riley & Hoffman, 1995).

Riley and Hoffman (1995) conducted a study of state and local law enforcement agencies about their level of terrorism preparedness. They found that 38 percent of state law enforcement agencies had some type of contingency plan in place to deal with the threat of terrorism (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). In contrast, they found that 52 percent of local law enforcement agencies and nearly 56 percent of state emergency management
organizations had some type of contingency plan in place in the event of a terrorist attack (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). Agencies based in an area with a large population were more likely to have a contingency plan (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). This is understandable as a terrorist attack is more likely to happen in an urban area where the number of possible causalities is the greatest. So it is essential that urban law enforcement agencies have a plan in place in case of an attack.

Agencies are also more likely to develop a contingency plan if the agencies’ jurisdiction houses a sensitive facility or a high-risk target (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). A sensitive facility is any building that could cause more damage to the surrounding areas. These sensitive facilities are usually buildings such as nuclear power plants, weapon facilities, military installations, and energy facilities (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). Riley and Hoffman (1995) surprisingly found that if there was a nuclear power plant located in an agency’s jurisdiction, then the agency was likely to have a contingency plan only 50 percent of the time. It is also not uncommon for law enforcement agencies that have a contingency plan in place to have other agencies review the plan. Some agencies have more than one agency review the plan to help identify possible problems within the plan.

The most common agency that reviews other law enforcement agencies’ contingency plans is the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). The FBI reviews more than 70 percent of state law enforcement agencies’ plans (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). However, the FBI only reviews 47 percent of municipalities’ and counties’ plans (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). This emphasizes a potential weakness in developing a solid contingency plan against the threat of terrorism. The lack of review from the FBI, the leading entity of the preventing terrorism in the United States, on municipalities’ and
counties’ contingency plans does not set a good tone when it comes to cooperation. State police have jurisdiction throughout their entire state, but many state law enforcement agencies are spaced few and far between and have more area to patrol. Once the contingency plan is in place, then the law enforcement agencies can focus more on their training. However, for training to occur, there is a need for counterterrorism policies to be in place.

Policy

Counterterrorism policy for local, state and federal law enforcement agencies are intertwined. The United States has been developing its counterterrorism policy for over 30 years (Combating Terrorism, 2001). Over the past 30 years, the United States’ strategy for combating terrorism has been the idea of using crisis and consequence management (Combating Terrorism, 2001). Crisis management is preventing and deterring a terrorist attack, to protect public health and safety, to arrest terrorists, and to gather evidence for criminal prosecution. Consequence management on the other hand is slightly different. Consequence management provides medical treatment and emergency services to anyone in the affected area. They also evacuate anyone in the dangerous areas as well as attempting to restore any government services that were disrupted by a terrorist attack (Combating Terrorism, 2001). This strategy is available to local and state law enforcement agencies if the agencies are in need of assistance. Local and state law enforcement agencies have primary responsibility for managing the result of a domestic terrorist attack. These agencies also serve a role in ordering restorative efforts after an attack occurs (Randol, 2013; Shernock, 2009).
Pelfrey (2010) conducted a study of law enforcement agencies’ terrorism prevention efforts. He looked at law enforcement agencies in North Carolina. Surveys were given to law enforcement agencies with questions about formal policies being drafted about the standard operating procedure when responding to a terrorist threat. Pelfrey (2010) found that 25 percent of the responding law enforcement agencies had developed a formal policy on defining the standard operating procedure in an event of a terrorist attack. It is important for law enforcement agencies to have effective training procedures that allow officers to operate within the terrorism policy the agency has in place.

Training

Training has become an essential part of law enforcement’s role in preventing terrorism. Many law enforcement agencies have incorporated training focused on the prevention of terrorism. Law enforcement agencies have conducted scenario training to give officers a real-life experience similar to what they could expect in a terrorist attack. These hypothetical scenarios help law enforcement agencies pinpoint weaknesses and possible overlaps in their response plans (Pelfrey, 2010). Pelfrey (2010) asked law enforcement agencies about their training and whether they have conducted scenario training before. He found that 37 percent of the agencies had participated in that type of training (Pelfrey, 2010). He noted that law enforcement agencies were not the only agencies that conducted this type of training. Fire departments and emergency medical services (EMS), also took part in this type training. The New York Police Department (NYPD) developed a training program for their officers that consisted of one day of tactical role-playing scenarios (Henry, 2002). Following the tactical role-playing, there
was one day of classroom instruction for the officers (Henry, 2002). In the classroom portion, the officers were informed about the history and various activities of terrorist groups. They were also provided with the tactical and cognitive knowledge they would need to recognize and prevent terrorist plots, like bombings and any type of weapons of mass destruction (Henry, 2002). The NYPD program is just one program that has been implemented since September 11th to help prevent terrorism.

Before practical training can begin, there must be an educational foundation. There are organizations that offer education classes on homeland security, which are available to law enforcement agencies across the nation. Security Solutions International (SSI) offers a wide range of homeland security courses and seminars strictly for law enforcement agencies. The mission statement of SSI is to further “the highest degree of emergency preparedness for ground, air and sea” (Schreiber, 2008, p. 51). Besides providing educational background on terrorism, the organization also places great emphasis on case studies and hands-on training (Schreiber, 2008). Examining case studies encourages law enforcement officers to figure out and recognize the mistakes that were made and how they can prevent those mistakes in the future.

Some of the practical hands-on training included conducting searches and assaults on other possible transportation that could be used in a terrorist attack. Many units have looked to practice on assaulting aircrafts and trains. By conducting their training on these types of transportation vehicles, law enforcement officers have a better understanding how to handle a terrorist situation. For the law enforcement agency to use aircrafts and trains for training purposes, they are usually in contact with other organizations that have access to decommissioned vehicles that the agencies can use for the purpose of training.
The different types of training offered to law enforcement agencies all require some type of funding.

After September 11th there was a large amount of federal funding available for law enforcement agencies to use toward terrorism prevention training. Recently, federal funding has been harder to obtain. An officer in Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office in Tampa, Florida mentioned that the funding is “still there, but it’s much more difficult to secure” (Schreiber, 2008, p. 53). Without federal funding for training, law enforcement agencies would have a harder time conducting the necessary training for terrorism prevention.

**Equipment**

In recent years, law enforcement agencies have come into contact with many different types of tactical equipment. Much of the new tactical equipment has come from the federal government through government programs that allow transfers of unused Department of Defense property. One of the most notable Department of Defense programs is the 1033 Program. The 1033 Program is also known as the Excessive Property Program. The program was named after a section in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 1997 (Else, 2014). The section in which the 1033 program was named after states:

> Granted permanent authority to the secretary of Defense to transfer defense material to federal and state agencies for use in law enforcement, particularly those associated with counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities (Else, 2014, n.p.).

The program allowed local and state law enforcement agencies to apply to the 1033 program to receive military equipment at no cost to the receiving agency. The only cost the receiving agency would incur was transportation fees (Elise, 2014). This means the
agency receiving the equipment would only have to fund the cost of having the items transported to their location. Before the NDAA of 1997 was passed, it was preceded by legislation in 1988 that allowed the Department of Defense’s role to expand in banning illegal drug trafficking. Following the terrorist attacks around the world and the domestic terrorist attack in the United States in 1995 of the Oklahoma City bombing; it was deemed the 1988 legislation was not adequate for the current times. When the NDAA of 1997 was passed, a counterterrorism element was added, as well as making the act permanent (Elise, 2014).

The different types of equipment that law enforcement agencies are able to receive through the 1033 program varies. Law enforcement agencies can request anything from office furniture to tactical vehicles. To receive the equipment the law enforcement agency only needs to complete a form stating why the specific equipment was necessary for terrorism prevention or drug prevention.

Other programs allow law enforcement units to purchase the equipment needed for preventing a terrorist attack. The State Domestic Preparedness Program was designed to help “prepare law enforcement agencies to respond to incidents of terrorism” (Vardalis & Waters, 2010, p. 4). Grant funding can help the agency with their counterterrorism responsibilities (Newman & Clarke, 2008). According to the Center for Investigative Reporting (CIR) at the end of 2011 “Homeland Security had given out at least $34 billion in anti-terror grants since September 11, 2001” (Becker & Schulz, 2011). The CIR also reported that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) “awarded more than $2 billion in grants” (Becker & Schulz, 2011) in 2011 for terrorism prevention. However, “the federal government doesn’t keep close track” (Becker & Schulz, 2011) of how the
agencies use the grant money. Law enforcement agencies seem to most commonly purchase “gas masks and chemical protective clothing” (Vardalis & Water, 2010, p. 5) for their terrorism prevention measures. However, law enforcement agencies have purchased surveillance drones and heavy armored vehicles for their departments with the money from anti-terror grants from the DHS (Balko, 2013).

Counterterrorism Units

The Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) program in the FBI has been around for 35 years. The first JTTF was created in 1980 in New York City and had 11 NYPD officers and 11 FBI special agents (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003). It was not until recently the JTTF was expanded to include communication with local and state agencies with federal law enforcement (Ortiz, Hendricks & Sugie, 2007). Before the communication expansion, sharing information with commanders was problematic because of security clearance issues (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003). Before September 11th, there were only 35 JTTF’s in the United States (Ortiz, Hendricks & Sugie, 2007). Following September 11th, the number of JTTF’s increased to over 70 operating in the United States (Ortiz, Hendricks & Sugie, 2007). This increase of participation in the JTTF’s could have been a result of the lack of communication before September 11th. A study by Ortiz, Hendricks and Sugie (2007) found that of the surveyed law enforcement agencies, 88 percent of the agencies participated in the FBI’s JTTF program.

Terrorism can affect anyone on a catastrophic scale at any time. The average law enforcement officer does not receive all of the training that specialized units do. Many specialized units receive training from other law enforcement agencies as well as the
military. Counterterrorism units are among the most highly trained to handle terrorist situations. These units solely deal with terrorist activities and gathering intelligence for other law enforcement agencies. However, many law enforcement agencies are unable to participate in the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), due to the lack of resources and funding.

Although Ortiz, Hendricks, and Sugie (2007) found there were a large number of agencies that participated in the JTTF program within their sample, it is understandable why some agencies, specifically smaller agencies, would not be able to participate in a counterterrorism unit. Participating in the program requires the law enforcement agency to have one or more officers solely devoted to the JTTF. This is difficult for some agencies because of the small number of sworn officers they have in their department. It also could be that the agency lacks the resources needed to participate in the program. There are also some criticisms on how the JTTF operates. In Protecting Your Community from Terrorism (2003), it is mentioned that JTTF’s “involve too few law enforcement officers and do not draw on the full capabilities that local law enforcement can bring to the table” (p. 32). It was believed that the JTTF should work closer with local law enforcement to locate officers who could work in the JTTF for investigation purposes on an as need basis (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003).

Public Support

Public support has become a key part in terrorism prevention. If the public does not have confidence in law enforcement agencies to prevent a terrorist attack, it could undermine law enforcement’s prevention efforts. Apart from the main goal of terrorists, causing destruction of key targets, they are also looking to undermine the public’s morale
and confidence (Baldwin, Ramaprasad, & Samsa, 2008). Public support and confidence is important to the way law enforcement agencies operate. Terrorism prevention requires a “balance and precision that inspires the support and trust of the U.S. population so that local residents will partner with the police in the pursuit of their lawful mission” (Downing, 2009, n.p.). If law enforcement agencies are able get the communities’ support and have them understand that the agency is operating within the communities’ best interest, there is a better chance the agency can gather more intelligence. This is important, especially if the community has become a breeding ground for suspected terrorists. Once the police are able to gain the communities’ support in their terrorism prevention efforts, it would be more likely that residents of the community would report suspicious activity in their neighborhoods.

**Communication and Cooperation**

Besides having a contingency plan, communication and cooperation with other law enforcement agencies is important for preventing terrorism in the United States. In 1995, when there was a terrorist attack in Tokyo and the bombing in Oklahoma City, the United States started to recognize there was a need to combat terrorism and that communication and cooperation between agencies was necessary. These terrorist attacks allowed the federal government to realize there was an escalating concern and a lack of terrorism prevention. In June of 1995, Presidential Decision Directive 39 was issued. This directive gave the responsibilities to federal law enforcement agencies to combat terrorism, including domestic terrorism (Combating Terrorism, 2002). It was quickly recognized that communication and cooperation between federal and state law enforcement was needed. Not only was communication and cooperation needed but it
was also realized that federal law enforcement agencies were not capable of effectively preventing terrorism across the United States. In order to address this gap, Congress passed the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (Combating Terrorism, 2002). This act allowed local and state law enforcement agencies and emergency services to be equipped and trained in case there was a terrorist attack. They were trained and equipped because it was highly likely that they would be the first responders in the event of a domestic terrorist attack (Combating Terrorism, 2002). In 2001, the Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001 was passed, which allowed the federal government to “enhance the capabilities of state and local emergency preparedness and response” (Combating Terrorism, 2002, p. 4).

Ever since the events of September 11th, police communication and cooperation with other agencies has come under scrutiny. For example, there were “turf battles and the need for jurisdictional supremacy at all levels of the U.S. law enforcement community,” (Downing, 2009, p. 3) which led to a failure in key intelligence gathering. Now, local, state, and even tribal police are working with federal law enforcement agencies in preventing terrorism (Wager, 2012). They are now considered “integral players in terrorism prevention” (Wager, 2012, p. 20). It is essential that “all levels of government and the private sector communicate and cooperate effectively with one another” (Combating Terrorism, 2002, p.6).

As a result of inter-agency cooperation, information sharing with one another increases. It is important that all levels of law enforcement agencies communicate with each other on the intelligence they gather on suspected terrorist activities. After the intelligence is gathered it is essential that the information be verified and determined if it
is usable for other law enforcement agencies. The information holds little value until it is subject to an analysis and evaluated (Henry, 2002). If the intelligence is considered of value then the information is passed onto other law enforcement agencies so the officers can make use of the information. Only then, when information is disseminated to the officers, “can their talents at intelligence gathering be fully utilized” (Henry, 2002, p. 326). Another type of communication among law enforcement agencies across the nation is terrorism awareness bulletins. These bulletins are usually read in roll call for officers preparing to start their patrols. The bulletins provide law enforcement officers with information to help them recognize possible terrorist activities, as well as current threats (Henry, 2002). The bulletins also provide information about certain descriptions of odors that would indicate a possible airborne chemical agent in an area (Henry, 2002).

Terrorism awareness bulletins are not the only approach law enforcement agencies use to pass along information. There are other approaches that are used to help information sharing among jurisdictional lines in different states. One program is called Hampton Roads CRIMES. This program allows law enforcement officers from seven different jurisdictions to access criminal justice information systems from participating agencies to view existing records of individuals suspected of criminal activity (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003). Another information sharing system is the Chicago Citizen and Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting (CLEAR) program. Chicago CLEAR provides information to the users in real time (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003). Officers can see analyses of beat-level crime problems and “online information on offenders, victims, arrests, evidence/property and similar cases” (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003, p. 62). There are more
than 120 agencies in the state of Illinois that contribute information to the CLEAR program (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003). Fusion Centers also allow agencies to exchange information and intelligence with other law enforcement agencies in the United States (Lambert, 2010). The growth of fusion centers in the United States shows that “no one police or public safety organization has all of the information it needs to effectively address crime problems” (Lambert, 2010, p. 2). Counter-terrorism Training and Resources for Law Enforcement Web site is another tool that allows agencies to share information (Counter-Terrorism Training Coordination Working Group, 2003). These programs are allowing law enforcement to share information within their states.

There is a federal law enforcement program currently open to all state and local law enforcement agencies. The program is called Law Enforcement On-line (LEO). LEO is a “virtual privacy network that contains significant sensitive but unclassified information” (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003, p. 63). The program is free to all law enforcement agencies. The FBI administers the information provided on LEO. In 2003, at the time Protecting Your Community from Terrorism was published, the FBI was conducting a pilot test on a new information-sharing program. The program was called the JTTF Information Sharing Initiative. The program being tested in St. Louis, San Diego, Spokane, Norfolk, and Baltimore (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003). The JTTF Information-Sharing Initiative is a program where, for the first time, the FBI is adding investigative case files (up to a Secret classification) to an information sharing system where local and state law enforcement agencies have access to them (Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 2003). Communication,
intelligence sharing, and cooperation between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies are essential to preventing terrorism within the community and the nation.

**Conclusion**

Law enforcement’s role is ever changing and it now encompasses terrorism prevention. Many law enforcement agencies are in need of terrorism prevention policies. Once policies are in place, law enforcement agencies can become more effective in preventing terrorism in their communities and states. Classroom and scenario training have proven effective in correcting past mistakes. Equipment for law enforcement agencies’ terrorism prevention measures is necessary. State and local law enforcement agencies need to be equipped with the necessary tools to keep their communities safe from acts of terrorism. It is also important that law enforcement interacts with and creates relationships with their communities. By doing so, it allows for intelligence and information to be gathered through members of the community, who are more likely to witness suspicious activity. As long as the public trusts the police, intelligence and information will continue to flow. When a police department can adapt to their ever-changing environment, the police can better serve the public they swore to protect.
CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

Contingency theory has been around since the 1950s. This theory posits that an organization must adapt to its environment in order to survive and be effective. The heart of contingency theory is that a state of fit, described as equilibrium between structure and contingency, leads to a high performing organization (Woodward, 1965). This framework was applied to the perception of preparedness of police agencies to handle the next terrorist attack. Since the dreadful day of September 11\textsuperscript{th}, law enforcement agencies have taken a vital role in counterterrorism efforts. This chapter will discuss contingency theory, how it has been applied to criminal justice research, including past studies, and how it was applied to the current study.

Contingency Theory

Contingency theory posits that an organization rationally adapts to their environment to accomplish a fit between structure and contingencies. In this model, organizations that are fit enjoy higher performance, which generates resources and growth including size, innovation, and diversification. Organizational structure such as formalization and decentralization are related to contingencies such as size and diversification. The variations in organizational structure and agency contingencies, defined as fit, impact organizational performance. Lex Donaldson (2001), author of \textit{The Contingency Theory of Organizations}, contended that organizations strive to be fit
because when an organization is fit, it enjoys high performance, defined as the structural adaptation to regain fit model (SARFIT). Therefore, organizations need to find a state of fit between structure and contingency. When organizations are unable to find a state of fit (i.e., due to the inability to adapt structurally) it is seen as a state of misfit (Donaldson, 2001). Organizations often only stay in a state of misfit temporarily until an increase in contingency variables, such as new hires or innovations, lead the organization back into a state of fit with its structure. In this model, organizations are seen as seeking a state of equilibrium adjusting their structures to the needs of the ever-changing environment. In other words, organizations have to be able to adapt to “new organizational characteristics that fit the new levels of the contingencies” (Donaldson, 2001, p.2).

**Core Elements**

Contingency theory consists of three core elements. The first core element is the association between the contingencies (i.e., size and diversification) and the structure (i.e., formalization and decentralization) of the organization. Essentially, when the contingency variables increase, the organizational structure variables should increase as well (Donaldson, 2001). For example, an agency in fit performs better which leads to increased legitimacy and growth, but eventually this increase in growth would require a change in the existing structure. In this way the structure has to directly relate to the organization in which it is being applied, leading to the second core element, which is that the contingency determines the structure of the organization. When a contingency changes, it causes the organization to change its structure. Changing the structure to adapt with the change in the contingency allows the organization to operate at a higher performance level (Donaldson, 2001). For example, typically the United States Coast
Guard operates under the jurisdiction of the Department of Homeland Security. However, it is a contingency that in wartime, the Coast Guard may be reassigned to the Department of the Navy, which falls under the Department of Defense. This is in place to increase the effectiveness of military strategy.

The final element of the core paradigm deals with whether there is a proper fit between the contingency and organizational structure. When an organization’s structure has a good fit with the contingency, it leads to higher performance. If the organization has a misfit, it will lead to a poorer performance (Donaldson, 2001). An example of this would be a contingency that was in place in an agency prior to a restructure. The contingency may call for one department to complete a certain task but the department may not exist anymore due to the restructuring of the agency. This may lead to confusion, poor performance, and possibly failure of the agency. A well thought out contingency will allow an agency to continue to operate, regardless of obstacles they may face, which will lead to better performance compared to their less prepared counterpart.

Fundamentally, contingency theory speculates that an organization will strive to remain fit to increase performance when there is a change in the agency’s internal contingencies and organizational structure.

**Application to Policing**

Contingency theory has been applied to a few policing studies in the past. Jihong Zhao, Ling Ren, and Nicholas Lovrich (2010) applied contingency theory to organizational structures of police agencies during the 1990s to determine if contingency theory explained the adoption of community policing innovations. They measured contingency theory through two hypothesized variables: environmental complexity and
organizational size. The authors collected their data from six principal sources. Their first source of data was from the Division of Governmental Studies and Services (DGSS) at Washington State University. The DGSS surveyed municipal police departments in 1993, 1996, and in 2000. Following the data from the DGSS, subsequent sources of data were collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics covering municipal unemployment data from 1993 to 2000, Census Reports from 1990 to 2000, and annual finance surveys of city government, which was conducted by the Census as well. The last two sources of data in their study came from emails or phone calls of the cities that were in their sample already, and the amount of money that was awarded to law enforcement agencies through Making Officers Redeployment Effective grants (Zhao, Ren, & Lovrich, 2010).

The authors’ primary finding was that there had been a very limited change in the organizational structure of the agencies (Zhao, Ren, & Lovrich, 2010). They did see a few independent variables associated with the adoption of structural change during the 1990s, such as a 15 percent increase in the number of daytime patrol beats. This increase was seen in 195 agencies that were surveyed continually over the course of the 1990s. The study found that the Making Officers Redeployment Effective grant funds and the indicator for implementation of innovative programs did not show a consistent effect on structural change in police departments. The researchers found that “contingency relating to environmental complexity has a key place in research on police organizations” (Zhao, Ren, & Lovrich, 2010, p.223).

Zhao, Ren, & Lovrich’s (2010) research built upon early police organization research that explored the ability of organizational size and environmental complexity to predict structural arrangements in police agencies. For example, Langworthy (1985)
explored the impact of organizational size and population diversity on structural arrangements within 176 police departments. Organizational size was an important predictor of the number of patrol beats, the number of ranks, proportion of civilians and, proportion of supervisors. Other early studies, including Crank and Wells (1991) and Maguire (2003) confirmed that organizational size was a significant predictor of organizational structure in police departments.

Melissa Haynes and Matthew Giblin (2014) expanded the contingency theory perspective by applying it to how police organizations responded to risks in their environment to prepare for homeland security incidents. Their research built upon previous studies that confirmed that police agencies faced with higher levels of risk, a key external contingency (i.e., risk or crime), are more likely to take steps to be prepared (Davis et al., 2004; Davis et al., 2006; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010; Burruss, & Schafer, 2014).

While contingency theory has not received much empirical support when applied to community policing innovations, it has received significant support in explaining homeland security preparedness (Davis et al., 2004; Davis et al., 2006, Schafer, Burruss, & Giblin, 2009; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010). This support has been demonstrated in national surveys, which have addressed terrorism preparedness among local police departments across the United States (Davis et al., 2004; Davis et al., 2006) as well as small and large municipal police agencies across Illinois (Schafer, Burruss, & Giblin, 2009; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010) and in a national sample of small municipal police departments (Giblin, Burruss, & Schafer, 2014).
Haynes and Giblin (2014) explored the relationship between subjective and objective risk factors and organizational preparedness utilizing a contingency framework. They collected data from a 2011 national survey of 350 small (i.e., consisted of fewer than 25 sworn officers) law enforcement agencies. The findings of this study suggest a negative relationship between risk and preparedness. The contingency theory framework was supported as an explanation for the different levels of homeland security preparedness in police agencies. Threat was the only factor that significantly predicted preparedness level within police departments. The study also found that the objective factors of vulnerability and consequences were not associated with preparedness levels within police agencies. Objective risks were also found to not be associated with subjective perceptions. In other words, the preparedness level of the department was not influenced by the actual risks within the police department’s jurisdiction (Haynes, & Giblin, 2014). Burruss, Giblin, and Schafer, (2010) found that institutional pressures (i.e., organizations conforming to what is supported in the larger environment) were more prominent than perceived risk measures. That being said, Haynes and Giblin (2014) believed that objective risk factors could prove irrelevant because all police agencies face some type of pressure to address and incorporate homeland security functions into their department. Past criminal justice research has proven that risk is related to how prepared an agency is. Research has also found that organizational size is an important predictor of organizational structure.

**Application to Current Study**

The driving force behind structural arrangements is the external environment within which organizations operate. The events of September 11th have prompted police
agencies to adapt to this new threat by being the front line in anti-terrorist efforts. Their role is predicated upon their close ties to their community members and the ability to identify suspicious activities, which may preempt an attack. The pressure for agencies to adopt this front line role, which comes from the public, as well as federal law enforcement agencies increasingly rely on local law enforcement to identify, report, and respond to potential terrorist threats. Agencies have adapted in several different structural ways, including: the creation and implementation of specialized units designed to gather intelligence and assess risk, training for line officers in how to identify and respond to attacks, and participation in joint-terrorist task forces and fusion centers. The federal government recognized the vital role of the police in homeland security preparedness and provided the departments with support through the form of external grants. Individual states also provided grants to police departments for homeland security preparedness purposes. Agencies could obtain state and federal grants for homeland security preparedness, but they would also use their own internal resources to increase their preparedness.

Evidence from contingency theory suggests these structural responses to terrorism, such as units and specialized training, or participation in joint terrorism task forces could be attempts to move into a state of fit, which in turn will increase performance. Many aspects of organizational structure, including environmental complexity are related to contingencies such as organizational size. Contingency theory research reveals considerable variations across organization in structure, even for organizations in the same industry (Blau & Schoenherr, 1971). In other words, we would have expected considerable variability among agencies and how they structure their
response to terrorist threats. However, a lack of fit between an agency or organizational structure and their contingencies (i.e., organizational size) may have implications for the perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of the agencies’ plans for responding to terrorism. The goal of this research was to assess the state of fit within the law enforcement agencies surveyed and to identify trends within the region.
CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Law enforcement terrorism preparedness has become more important now than ever. Past research has shown that terrorism preparedness is essential to police operations. For example, in a study conducted by Ortiz, Hendricks, and Sugie (2007), 88 percent of the agencies surveyed actively participated in the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force. With the passing of the Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001, local agencies became more involved in terrorism preparedness with the help of the federal government (Combating Terrorism, 2002). Sharing information with other agencies has become important, not only in regular law enforcement duties, but as well in terrorism preparedness. Based on contingency theory, the present study draws upon past research on police structure and terrorism preparedness, to determine if there is an association between an agency’s terrorism preparedness in order to remain in a state of fit. A survey was distributed to county and municipal law enforcement agencies across 5 states, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin. The sample for this study was 902 agencies consisting of 435 county sheriff agencies and 467 municipalities. The following research questions were addressed in this study:

1) Do municipal and county police agencies believe they have the necessary resources and training to prevent and/or respond to the next terrorist attack?
2) How does agency size, structure, funding, and perceived risk influence terrorism preparedness?

Data for the current study came from a survey sent to county and municipal law enforcement administrators asking about their agency’s terrorism preparedness. Previous research provides empirical support for the relationship between risk and law enforcement homeland security activities (Davis et al., 2004; Davis et al., 2006; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010; Giblin, Burruss, & Schafer, 2014). The current study looked to confirm and extend past research by exploring how police agencies prepare for terrorist incidents using the contingency theory framework. The current study looked at law enforcement terrorism preparedness on a broader scale than previous research.

**Setting**

The states chosen for this study were Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin. These states were selected based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s map regions. The 5 states listed above fall into the East North Central region of the U.S. Census Bureau (U.S. Census, 2015). Due to the recent publicity of the police shooting of Michael Brown in the state of Missouri, at the time of this study, the state was excluded from being used in the sample for fear that it could skew the data. Illinois was of particular interest as it was the location of the where the study was being conducted from. In order to exclude the state of Missouri from the sample pool, the East North Central Region of the U.S. Census Bureau was chosen. This allowed Illinois to be included in the sample pool while precluding Missouri.

The state of Illinois is home to a population of 12,880,580 with approximately 231.1 persons per a square mile (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). Indiana has a population of
6,596,855 with approximately 181.0 persons per square mile. The state of Michigan is home to 9,909,877 people with roughly 174.8 persons per a square mile. As of the 2014 U.S. Census, the state of Ohio has a population of 11,594,163 with nearly 282.3 persons per a square mile. Finally the state of Wisconsin is home to 5,757,564 with around 105.0 persons per a square mile (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). Currently, there are nearly 2,800 municipal police departments operating within Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin combined (National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators, 2014).

**Selection Criteria**

All of the agencies in the study were chosen from the 2015 National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators. All municipal law enforcement agencies from all 5 states were entered into the sample pool. All county sheriff agencies from all 5 states were included in the sample pool. However, all municipal agencies were not chosen for inclusion due to the sheer number of agencies. Time constraints also played a role in deciding to randomly select 93 municipality agencies from each state to make up a sample size of 902 agencies. State law enforcement agencies were not included in the current study because it was assumed that much of the counterterrorism funding would be earmarked for the state police. Therefore, they would have the necessary tools to have an adequate terrorism preparedness plan in place. Also, their inclusion could have skewed any findings of the study.

**Sample**

There were a total of 2,791 municipal law enforcement agencies in the sample pool from the 5 predetermined states. The sample size of 902 was desired and therefore the sample pool was narrowed down using random sampling. The sample size was
narrowed down to 902 agencies from 2,791 due to the sheer size of the original sample. A sample of 902 agencies would give a better overall picture of the issue being studied. Therefore, by choosing a large sample size, there would be a large enough return rate to improve generalizability of the findings. There were 437 county sheriff agencies and 465 municipal law enforcement agencies selected. The number of county sheriff agencies (n=437) reflected the total number of counties in the 5 states. All county sheriff agencies were sampled. For municipal agencies, each state produced 93 municipal law enforcement agencies through random sampling of each state’s municipal sample pool. After subtracting all of the county agencies (n=437) there were 465 municipal agencies left. In order to ensure that each state had an even number of municipality agencies chosen for the sample, the number had to be divisible by 5. Therefore, by dividing 465 agencies across 5 states, that provided a sample of 93 municipal agencies per a state. The original sampling pool for municipal and county agencies contained duplicates. These duplicates were removed from the sample before random sampling was conducted. Following distribution of the survey, a response rate of 12.74 percent was achieved with 115 useable cases.

**Variables**

**Dependent Variable**

In this study, the dependent variable was preparedness. The variable preparedness was defined as any step taken to prevent or respond to a terrorist act. Schafer, Burruss, and Giblin (2009) measured preparedness by providing descriptions of steps or activities that enhanced preparedness and asked the respondents to mark the steps or activities that were being implemented at their agency and their level of preparedness. Burruss, Giblin,
and Schafer (2010) measured preparedness by asking the agencies to indicate the common actions their agencies had taken after September 11, 2001. For the purpose of this study, preparedness was measured through a series of questions regarding actions taken to increase terrorism preparedness. The surveyed agencies were asked a range of questions from whether their agency had implemented any specialized units, scheduled counterterrorism training, and the agency’s perceived level of preparedness on different resources. The dependent variable was coded by creating two summed indexes of preparedness, resources (Schafer, Burruss, & Giblin, 2009) and training (Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010), of the responses received from the agencies. The resources index included questions about the agency’s level of preparedness on the following: partnership with other local responders, ability to communicate with other agencies, written emergency response plan, training to respond to emergencies, level of preparedness for large-scale incidents, knowledge and expertise about emergency response, equipment to respond to emergencies, and budget to support emergency operations. The training index asked participants if they implemented the following since September 11th: created specialized units, created an internal task force, assigned individuals to address emergency preparedness, increased number of staff dedicated to emergency preparedness, scheduled training for terrorism related incidents, trained personnel on emergency response, identified training opportunities, participated in field training exercises, and participated in table-top exercises.

Independent Variable(s)

The first measure, for state of fit, was organizational structure, which was defined as a hierarchical system that creates lines of authority, communication and duties within
the organization. For the purpose of this study, organizational structure was measured by two variables, structural complexity and formalization. Structural complexity was made up of two components, horizontal differentiation, and vertical differentiation (Wells, Falcone, & Rabe-Hemp, 2003). In the present study, the horizontal differentiation variable was measured by the number of divisions or bureaus the police agency has created. The number of ranks within the police agency measured the variable vertical differentiation. The variable structural complexity was coded by coding vertical and horizontal differentiation variable separately. Vertical differentiation was coded as the number of ranks. The higher the number of ranks, the higher assumed complexity. Horizontal differentiation was coded as 0-3 divisions/bureaus = 1, 4-7 divisions/bureaus = 2, and 8 or more divisions = 3. The higher number of established divisions/bureaus, the higher implied complexity of the agency. The two variables could have been combined to code for structural complexity together but in order to ensure the measures are truly measuring the same concept; the variables were coded separately.

Formalization is the existence of policies that control operations and procedures within an organization. These policies control multiple aspects of law enforcement agencies in assisting and constraining an officer’s actions during the course of duty. In the survey, respondents were asked to identify, of the four policies listed, if they have formally implemented them within their agency. The respondents were asked if they have formal policies on the following: hostage situations, use of force, racial profiling, and citizen complaints. These four formalization variables were chosen using items from a Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2007). The variable formalization was coded as 0=No, and 1=Yes of
whether the agencies had these policies in place. These variables were combined into a single index for analysis.

The second independent variable was police population ratio. For the purpose of this study, police population ratio was used to address the measure of the organizational size component of the contingency theory framework. Police population ratio was defined as the ratio of sworn full time officers to the population. For the purpose of this study, the number of sworn full time officers divided by the population multiplied by one thousand was assessed to measure the variable police population ratio. Police agency administrators were asked on the survey to provide their agency’s demographics in terms of the number of full time sworn officers and citizen population in which they serve.

The third independent variable that was assessed in the study was risk. Risk was defined as the likelihood of a perceived terrorist threat. The risk variable was measured by asking law enforcement administrators whether their agency perceived the likelihood of a terrorist threat occurring within their jurisdiction. Administrators were asked to answer the survey question that pertained to the variable risk was answered through yes or no option.

Finally, the last independent variable was funding. Funding has become a vital part in assisting law enforcement agencies in terrorism prevention (Newman & Clarke, 2008). The Department of Homeland Security has awarded billions of dollars in grants to law enforcement agencies for terrorism prevention (Becker & Schulz, 2011). For the purpose of this study, funding was defined as monetary income from internal or external sources. Funding was measured by asking police administrators to indicate how much
their agency received for terrorism preparedness. The funding variable was then coded as 0 = no funding, and 1 = yes funding.

**Data Collection**

This study was a cross-sectional, non-experimental design. Nine hundred and two law enforcement agencies were surveyed about terrorism preparedness and police technologies across 5 states. The study looked at information at one point in time. The law enforcement agencies were surveyed using Illinois State University’s in-house survey software, Select Survey. The agencies received a postcard asking for their participation in the survey. The postcard had the unique survey website listed. Within days, an email was sent to the agencies’ email addresses reminding them to take the survey. The link to the survey was listed in the email as well. In the present study, the responses were confidential meaning that every attempt was made to ensure that survey responses could not be linked to the agencies. In order to ensure a decent return rate on the surveys, the 380 law enforcement agencies that did not have readily available email addresses were sent a physical copy of the survey.

Research has shown that preparedness is important to law enforcement agencies across the United States. Henry (2002) mentioned that the law enforcement mindset was shifting to include “the notion of fighting and educating police officers about terrorist practices, methods, and activities” (p. 325). However, not all law enforcement agencies were shifting the resources to become better prepared for a terrorist attack. Riley and Hoffman (1995) found that 38 percent of their surveyed law enforcement agencies had some type of terrorism contingency plan in place. Pelfrey (2010) found that only 37 percent of police agencies actually conducted scenario training. Was this because of the
lack of funding, resources, and the number of personnel? It is believed that law enforcement agencies across the nation are attempting to become more active in terrorism preparedness. Can contingency theory help explain terrorism preparedness? Contingency theory has gained a great amount of support in explaining homeland security preparedness (Davis et al. 2004; Davis et al., 2006; Schafer, Burruss, & Giblin, 2009; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010). The current study looked to confirm past research on the relationship between risk and terrorism preparedness by looking at county and municipal agencies, while determining whether contingency theory (agency size, organizational structure, and contingency) played a vital role in explaining whether law enforcement agencies were prepared for the next terrorist attack. The next chapter will discuss the results of the current study.
CHAPTER V
RESULTS

Introduction

Following September 11th, researchers have attempted to understand terrorism preparedness among law enforcement agencies across the nation. Previous studies have confirmed that risk is associated with preparedness (Davis et al., 2004; Davis et al., 2006; Burruss, Giblin, & Schaefer, 2010; Giblin, Burruss, & Schafer, 2014), but has not examined how agency characteristics impact preparedness. The present study was designed to confirm and extend previous terrorism research by answering the following research questions: (1) Do municipal and county police agencies believe they have the necessary resources and training to prevent and or respond to the next terrorist attack?; (2) How does agency size, structure, funding, and perceived risk influence terrorism preparedness?

In this chapter, three different statistical analyses were used to test the relationship between preparedness, size, structure, funding, and perceived risk. First, descriptive statistics were run for all dependent and independent variables. Second, bivariate analysis was used to test the relationships between the dependent and independent variables. Ordinal Least Squares (OLS) regression analyses were used to evaluate the impact the independent variables had on preparedness. Multicollinearity diagnostics were employed to measure Variable Inflation Factor (VIF) and tolerance statistics to ensure that all the
assumptions of the regression analysis were met. At the end of this chapter, a summary of the statistical results were presented.

**Descriptive Statistics**

The dependent variable for this study was preparedness. Preparedness consisted of two summed indexes, resources ($\bar{x}=28.39$, $SD=5.45$) and training ($\bar{x}=3.85$, $SD=2.23$). The indexes consisted of multiple questions regarding resources of an agency as well as type of training and personnel staffed, (See Table 1).

The first index, resources, consisted of eight questions measured originally at the ordinal-interval level through a Likert scale ranging from 1= very poor to 5=very good regarding: budget to support emergency operations, communication with other agencies, emergency response plan, equipment, knowledge and expertise, large-scale incident preparedness, partnership with local responders, and training to respond to emergencies, were summed into an index. These factors were analyzed by conducting a factor analysis with Varimax rotation. The analysis yielded one factor which explained 54 percent of the variance (Eigenvalue = 4.35).

Table 1 presented the results of the descriptive statistics. Agencies felt they had a poor level of preparedness when dealing with a budget to support emergency operations ($\bar{x}=2.31$, $SD=0.99$). On average, law enforcement agencies felt they had a good communication with other agencies ($\bar{x}=4.33$, $SD=0.76$). Written emergency response plan had a mean value of 3.75 ($SD=0.99$). Of the surveyed agencies, on average, felt that their preparedness level was poor to fair in terms of having the proper equipment to respond to emergencies ($\bar{x}=2.96$, $SD=0.99$). Agencies’ knowledge and expertise about emergency response was fair with a mean value of 3.81 ($SD=0.87$). Law enforcement
agencies’ felt their level of preparedness of large-scale incidents were fair ($\bar{x}=3.19$, SD=0.97). Agencies also reported that they had a good level of preparedness in terms of a partnership with local responders ($\bar{x}=4.41$, SD=0.82). Agencies’ training preparedness level was fair with a mean value of 3.77 (SD=0.91).
Table 1

**Descriptive Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preparedness (Index)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>28.39</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>39.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget to support emergency operations</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to Communicate w/other agencies</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Written Emergency Response plan</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment to respond to emergencies</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge and Expertise about emergency response</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of preparedness for Large-Scale Incidents</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership W/local responders</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training to respond to emergencies</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training/Personnel (Index)</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in Field Training Exercises</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned individuals to address emergency preparedness</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Created an internal task force</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Created Specialized Units</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased number of staff dedicated to emergency preparedness</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in table-top training exercises</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trained personnel on emergency response</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified training opportunities</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheduled training for terrorism related incidents</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Complexity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Bureaus/Divisions (Horizontal)</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of rank levels (Vertical)</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formalization (Index)</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Population Ratio</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>6.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The second index of the preparedness variable was training/personnel. The category consisted of nine questions regarding: participation in field training exercises, individuals assigned to address emergency preparedness, created an internal task force, created specialized units, increased the number of personnel dedicated to emergency preparedness, table-top training, training opportunities, and scheduling training for terrorism related incidents. The questions were measured through yes (1) or no (0) responses. The variables were factor analyzed using factor analysis with Varimax rotation. The analysis initially yielded two factors. Once analyzing the factor loadings, three variables: created an internal task force, created specialized units, and increased number of personnel dedicated to emergency preparedness, were removed from the index for the multivariate analyses. The factor analysis was conducted again in which it produced one factor that explained 46 percent of the variance (Eigenvalue = 2.74).

The mean value for whether an agency participated in field training exercises was 0.64 (SD= 0.48). Individuals who were assigned to address emergency preparedness had a mean value of 0.47 (SD= 0.50). On average agencies did not create an internal task force (\(\bar{x}= 0.03, SD= 0.16\)). Many of the surveyed agencies did not create specialized units (\(\bar{x}= 0.11, SD=0.31\)). Law enforcement agencies, on average, did not increase the number of staff dedicated to emergency preparedness (\(\bar{x}=0.11, SD=0.31\)) (See Table 1). Agencies that participated in table-top training exercises had a mean value of 0.66 (SD=0.48). On average, agencies were more likely to train personnel on emergency response (\(\bar{x}=0.78, SD=0.42\)). Of the surveyed agencies just over half conveyed that they had identified training opportunities (\(\bar{x}=0.56, SD=0.50\)). Agencies who had scheduled training for terrorism related incidents had a mean value of 0.51 (SD=0.50).
For measuring the influence of terrorism preparedness, five independent variables were examined: structural complexity, formalization, police population ratio, risk, and funding. First, structural complexity was measured by the number of bureaus or divisions an agency had ($\bar{x}=1.11$, $SD=0.67$) along with the number of rank levels within the agency ($\bar{x}=3.88$, $SD=1.99$). Second, formalization was measured by whether an agency had policies on use of force ($\bar{x}=0.97$, $SD=0.17$), racial profiling ($\bar{x}=0.78$, $SD=0.42$), citizen complaints ($\bar{x}=0.87$, $SD=0.33$), and hostage situations ($\bar{x}=0.63$, $SD=0.49$). These variables were first analyzed using the factor analysis with Varimax rotation. The analysis produced one factor explaining 50 percent of the variance (Eigenvalue = 2.00). Next, a summed formalization index was created, with a mean value of 3.23 ($SD=1.02$). Across the surveyed agencies, on average the agencies had implemented the above policies. Next, police population ratio was measured by the number of full time sworn officers divided by the population times one thousand ($\bar{x}=1.25$, $SD=0.95$). Overall, police population ratio indicates that there is at least one full time officer per one thousand citizens served. Risk was measured by whether an agency perceived the likelihood of a terrorist threat occurring within their jurisdiction ($\bar{x}=0.14$, $SD=0.35$). Finally, funding was measured in US dollars but was coded to become a dichotomous variable and had a mean value of 0.11 ($SD=0.31$).

In response to the second research question, table 2 shows the frequencies for the resources variable. It was evident that of the responding agencies they felt most confident in their level of preparedness with their partnerships ($n=60$, 56.1%) and communication with other agencies ($n=53$, 49.1%) as many responded with 5-point ratings. This was consistent with the findings of Schaefer, Burruss, and Giblin (2009). On the other hand,
41.1 percent (n=44) of the agencies were not confident in their emergency operations budget. Agencies rated themselves as having a fair level of preparedness for large-scale incidents (n=46, 42.6%) along with having the necessary equipment to respond to emergencies (n=46, 42.6%). This was an improvement from Schaefer, Burruss, and Giblin’s (2009) finding of agencies ranking themselves less-than-adequate in terms of having the necessary equipment for emergency operations. Law enforcement agencies rated themselves as having a good level of knowledge and expertise about emergency response (n=51, 47.2%). This could be explained by the fact that many agencies felt that they have a good preparedness level when dealing with training to respond to emergencies (n=45, 42.1%). Forty-four agencies reported having a good level of preparedness in terms of having a written emergency response plan in place (41.1%).
Table 3 shows the percentages of agencies responding to questions within the training/personnel variable. Of the 110 agencies that responded to whether their agency had created specialized units, 98 agencies had not created specialized units at the time of the survey (89.1%). This lack of implementation could have been due to budget restraints as well as available personnel. As noted in table 3, many agencies stated that they did not have an adequate budget to support emergency operations. Of the reporting agencies, 97.2 percent of them did not form an internal task force (n=106). About half the agencies responding did assign individuals in their department to oversee and address emergency preparedness (n=58, 52.7%). However, there were 52 agencies that did allocate personnel

Table 2

Frequencies for Resources Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect of Response as…</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>(1) Very Poor</th>
<th>(2) Poor</th>
<th>(3) Fair</th>
<th>(4) Good</th>
<th>(5) Very Good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partnership with other local responders</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>(1) 1.9</td>
<td>(2) 0.9</td>
<td>(3) 7.5</td>
<td>(4) 33.6</td>
<td>(5) 56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to communicate with other agencies</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>(0) 0.0</td>
<td>(1) 1.9</td>
<td>(2) 12.0</td>
<td>(3) 37.0</td>
<td>(4) 49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Written Emergency Response Plan</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>(0) 0.0</td>
<td>(1) 15.0</td>
<td>(2) 19.6</td>
<td>(3) 41.1</td>
<td>(4) 24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training to Respond to Emergencies</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>(2) 1.9</td>
<td>(3) 4.7</td>
<td>(4) 29.9</td>
<td>(5) 42.1</td>
<td>(6) 21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Preparedness for Large-Scale Incidents</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>(0) 5.6</td>
<td>(1) 14.8</td>
<td>(2) 42.6</td>
<td>(3) 29.6</td>
<td>(4) 7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge and Expertise about Emergency Response</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>(0) 1.9</td>
<td>(1) 3.7</td>
<td>(2) 26.9</td>
<td>(3) 47.2</td>
<td>(4) 20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment to Respond to Emergencies</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>(0) 9.3</td>
<td>(1) 18.5</td>
<td>(2) 42.6</td>
<td>(3) 25.9</td>
<td>(4) 3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget to Support Emergency Operations</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>(0) 21.5</td>
<td>(1) 41.1</td>
<td>(2) 24.3</td>
<td>(3) 11.2</td>
<td>(4) 1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to address preparedness (47.3%). The data also showed that law enforcement agencies were not likely to increase the number of staff dedicated to emergency preparedness (n=98, 89.1%). It was found that 51.4 percent of agencies scheduled some type of training for terrorism related incidents (n=56) while 48.6 percent did not attempt to schedule training (n=53). In contrast to the lack of individuals assigned to address emergency response, an overwhelmingly majority of agencies had trained personnel in emergency response within their department (n=86, 78.2%). Fifty-six percent of the responding departments confirmed that they had identified training opportunities (n=61). When it came to training, 63.6 percent of agencies participated in field training exercises (n=70) while 66.1 percent participated in table-top exercises (n=72) respectfully.
Table 3

Frequencies for Training Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Since September 11th have you:</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Percentage of Agencies Answering...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Created specialized units</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>Yes 10.9 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No 89.1 (98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Created an internal task force</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>Yes 2.8 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No 97.2 (106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned individuals to address emergency preparedness</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>Yes 47.3 (52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No 52.7 (58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased number of staff dedicated to emergency preparedness</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>Yes 10.9 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No 89.1 (98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheduled training for terrorism related incidents</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>Yes 51.4 (56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No 48.6 (53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trained personnel on emergency response</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>Yes 78.2 (86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No 21.8 (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified training opportunities</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>Yes 56.0 (61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No 44.0 (48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in field training exercises</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>Yes 63.6 (70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No 36.4 (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in table-top exercises</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>Yes 66.1 (72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No 33.9 (37)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bivariate Analysis

Using correlations, a bivariate analysis was conducted to determine significant relationships among the variables. Of the independent variables, four variables had a significant association with the dependent variable, preparedness (training): formalization ($r = .370, p < .01$), number of rank levels ($r = .587, p < .01$), number of divisions/bureaus ($r = .419, p < .01$), and funding ($r = .337, p < .01$). There were four independent variables with a significant association with preparedness (resources): formalization ($r = .342, p < .01$), funding ($r = .356, p < .01$), number of rank levels ($r = .371, p < .01$), and number of divisions/bureaus ($r = .300, p < .01$) (See Table 4).
Table 4 also shows correlations among four independent variables. The Pearson correlation coefficient showed that number of divisions/bureaus and police population ratio had a significant but a negative weak relationship, \((r = -.209, p<.05)\). The number of divisions/bureaus was positively associated with formalization \((r = .368, p<.01)\). Risk was shown to have a weak but positive correlation with the number of divisions/bureaus, \((r = .201, p<.01)\). The number of rank levels was shown to have a positive, moderate relationship with the number of divisions/bureaus \((r = .566, p<.01)\). Risk was found to have a weak but positive relationship with the number of rank levels \((r = .214, p<.05)\). The number of rank levels was also found to have weak, significant relationships with formalization \((r = .282, p<.01)\) and funding \((r = .367, p<.01)\). Table 4 also indicated that funding had a positive yet weak relationship to the number of divisions \((r = .304, p<.01)\) and risk \((r = .225, p<.05)\).
Table 4

*Correlation Matrix for Variables*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Preparedness (Training)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.531**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.587**</td>
<td>.370**</td>
<td>.337**</td>
<td>.419**</td>
<td>.174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Preparedness (Resources)</td>
<td>.531**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.587**</td>
<td>.370**</td>
<td>.337**</td>
<td>.419**</td>
<td>.174</td>
<td>.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Number of Rank Levels</td>
<td>.587**</td>
<td>.371**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.342**</td>
<td>.283**</td>
<td>.367**</td>
<td>.300**</td>
<td>.214*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Formalization</td>
<td>.370**</td>
<td>.342**</td>
<td>.283**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>.304**</td>
<td>.225*</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Funding</td>
<td>.337**</td>
<td>.356**</td>
<td>.367**</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.304**</td>
<td>.225*</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Number of Divisions/Bureaus</td>
<td>.419**</td>
<td>.300**</td>
<td>.566**</td>
<td>.368**</td>
<td>.304**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.201*</td>
<td>.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Police Population Ratio</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>-.190</td>
<td>-.178</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>-.090</td>
<td>-.209*</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p<.01, *p<.05**
Multicollinearity Diagnostics

Before running the OLS regression analysis, frequencies and distributions were checked for all the variables. After checking the frequencies and distributions, the regression analysis was conducted. To answer research question two, two separate regression models had to be run due to the dependent variable consisting of two summed indexes. For each dependent variable multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and normal distribution were examined to ensure regression assumptions were met.

Multicollinearity occurs when variables are highly correlated with each other. This can cause the decrease of explanation of the independent and dependent variables by lowering the $R^2$. There are multiple ways to examine multicollinearity. One way to check this was by observing the correlation matrix on the regression output. If the bivariate correlation was too high, it would have been above 0.70. In terms of the current study none of the correlations reached 0.70. The highest correlation was .58. Another way to check for multicollinearity was to inspect the collinearity diagnostics that SPSS supplies on the regression output. Table 5 presents the results from the multicollinearity diagnostics.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Tolerance</th>
<th>VIF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>1.81</td>
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<tr>
<td>Formalization</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Population Ratio</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank Levels</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If multicollinearity existed, the tolerance would have approach zero. As can be seen in table 5, no multicollinearity exists. The last way to check for multicollinearity was by observing the VIF. If the VIF approached 2.0 or higher, there was a model problem and multicollinearity was present. The current study variables had a range of VIF from 1.08 to 1.81 as seen in table 5. This suggested that there was an absence of multicollinearity in the present variables.

Heteroscedasticity was tested by conducting the Time Honored Method of Inspection (THMI). The THMI was analyzed for a funneling effect on the scatter plot. The results showed that the width of the band was mostly uniform from end to end with no funneling effect detected. In order to test for autocorrelation, the Durbin-Watson statistic was conducted. When the Durbin-Watson statistic approaches 2.0 it generally indicates that the variable was independent. The Durbin-Watson associated with the current study was 1.75 and 1.96 respectively. This suggests that there was no autocorrelation. A Normal P-Plot was conducted to establish that the variables were normally distributed. The closer the plot was to the line, the better. The P-Plot for this study was very close to the line. This indicated that the variables were normally distributed. Cook’s D, DFFITS, and DFBETAS were checked to ensure they did not exceed one. There were no variables that did not exceed one. Therefore, it was determined that outliers were not a major problem in the regression analysis.

**Multivariate Analysis**

In the OLS Regression, a multivariate analysis, two models were included to test the statistical effect of funding, formalization, number of divisions, police population ratio, number of rank levels, and risk on preparedness (resources and training). In Model
I examined the effect of funding, divisions/bureaus, formalization, police population ratio, rank levels, and risk had on preparedness (training). In Model 2 the same variables were tested for their influence on preparedness (resources).

Table 6

Results of Training OLS Regression Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>.19</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.020*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.01</td>
<td>.926</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.11</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.000**</td>
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<td>Risk</td>
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<td>.02</td>
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Note. $R^2 = .40$, n = 91

**p < .01, *p < .05

Table 6 presented the results of the training OLS Regression analysis. Two variables were significant in predicting the dependent variable. The first variable that was a significant predictor was formalization ($\beta = .22$, p<.05). Essentially, agencies that had policies (formalization) implemented were more likely to believe that they would be prepared than agencies that did not have policies in place. The strongest predictor of training was number of rank levels ($\beta = .45$, p<.01). The more rank levels an agency had, the more likely an agency perceived that they would be prepared for a terrorist attack. Lastly, the model was found to be statistically significant and explained 40 percent of the variance ($R^2 = .40$, n=91) (See table 6).
Table 7

*Results of Resources OLS Regression Analysis*

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Note. $R^2 = .26$, n=91

**p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .10

Table 7 presents the Resources OLS Regression analysis. There was only one statistically significant predictor of preparedness. Funding ($\beta=.34$, $p< .01$) was found to be the strongest predictor. Law enforcement agencies that had funding for counterterrorism operations were more likely to have the necessary resources for terrorism preparedness. Risk ($\beta=-.19$, $p< .10$) was a marginally significant predictor of preparedness (resources). However, the model was found to be statistically significant as it explained 26 percent of the variance ($R^2=.26$, n=91) (See table 7).

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, several analyses were utilized in which they presented important predictors of the dependent variable, preparedness. First, the bivariate correlations found statistically significant relationships among the variables. Second, the assumption of the regression equation were tested and confirmed. The VIF and tolerance scores showed no multicollinearity issues. Finally, the OLS regression was used to establish the impact the independent variables had on preparedness. Formalization and the number of rank levels were found to have a positive effect on the preparedness (training). In the second model, funding was the only variable to have a positive effect on preparedness (resources). On the other hand, risk had a negative effect on preparedness (resources). In the next chapter,
the findings from the present study are discussed in greater detail along with implications and limitations of the study.
CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION

Introduction

Law enforcement agencies today play a vital role in terrorism prevention. There are many factors in understanding terrorism preparedness among law enforcement agencies. In past research, risk has been identified as the leading factor in driving terrorism preparedness (Davis et al. 2004; Davis, Mariano, Pace, Cotton, & Steinberg, 2006; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010; Giblin, Burruss, & Schafer, 2014). For example, Giblin, Burruss, and Schafer (2014) found that “agency leaders who perceive their risk to be higher…are more likely to take steps to enhance their preparedness” (p.46). On the other hand, institutional influences have also been found to play a role in terrorism prevention (Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010). Burruss, Giblin, and Schaefer (2010) found that the “influence of professional publications, associations, and peers [institutional pressures] were strongly related with greater levels of homeland security preparedness” (p.96). The contingency theory asserts that an organization adapts to their environment through organizational structure and contingencies in order to remain a high level of performance (Donaldson, 2007). The current thesis looked to assess the state of fit within law enforcement agencies and to identify any trends within the region surveyed.

Utilizing the contingency theory as a framework, the current study expanded on current research of terrorism preparedness by conducting an exploratory analysis to answer the following questions: (1) Do municipal and county police agencies believe
they have the necessary resources and training to prevent and or respond to the next terrorist attack? (2) How does agency size, structure, funding, and perceived risk influence terrorism preparedness? To answer these research questions, bivariate and Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analyses were employed. The statistical results and their implications are discussed below.

**Discussion**

This study confirmed and extended previous research on terrorism preparedness in law enforcement agencies. One major finding of the current study was that risk was a predictor of preparedness. Although risk was significant, it was a weak predictor of preparedness compared to previous studies. Another finding of the study was that contingency theory did assist in exploring terrorism preparedness, as organizational structure and contingencies drove preparedness.

According to Schafer, Burruss, and Giblin (2009), most law enforcement agencies were confident in their communication and partnership capacities. The current results confirm this finding. In other words, law enforcement agencies reported having a very good open line of communication and partnerships with outside agencies. In past terrorism literature, communication and cooperation with outside agencies was reported as a struggle or nonexistent. Downing (2009) claimed there were “turf battles and need for jurisdictional supremacy at all levels of the U.S. law enforcement community” (p.3). As Schafer, Burruss, and Giblin’s (2009) finding and the current study’s finding, communication and cooperation have greatly improved.

For an agency to have a good level of terrorism preparedness, one component is essential, equipment. According to Schafer, Burruss, and Giblin (2009), more than half of
the agencies surveyed responded with “less-than-adequate” equipment for emergency operations. The current thesis found that of the agencies surveyed, close to half communicated that they had a ‘fair’ level of preparedness in terms of equipment needed for emergency operations. This was an improvement from Schafer, Burruss, and Giblin’s (2009) findings.

Research in the past has identified risk as a predictive factor in determining terrorism preparedness among law enforcement agencies (Davis et al. 2004; Davis, Mariano, Pace, Cotton, & Steinberg, 2006; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010; Giblin, Burruss, & Schafer, 2014). The data from the current study suggested that risk had a negative effect on terrorism preparedness. However, in the current thesis, risk proved to be a marginally significant predictor of terrorism preparedness. One reason for this result may lie with pressures facing the agency. According to Haynes and Giblin (2014), all agencies face some type of pressure to address homeland security tasks. For example, law enforcement agencies face the pressure to take on homeland security obligations, but additional pressures (i.e., funding, organizational structure, etc.) may hinder them from addressing homeland security concerns in a timely manner. Another possible reason that risk was a weak predictor could have been due to the small sample size. Overall, the number of useable cases for this study was around 115. A larger sample may have produced more robust findings.

In the current study, funding was a predictor of resources. This finding was consistent with what one would expect, agencies were increasing their budget to increase the resources they can acquire. This confirms Davis et al.’s (2004) finding that funding is related to preparedness. According to Davis et al. (2004), when there is an increase of
external funding law enforcement agencies are more likely to increase their resources to focus on terrorism preparedness. On the other hand, Burruss et al. (2010) stated that agencies “did not appear to be adopting practices in response to the lure of external funding” (p.95). The current data suggested that law enforcement agencies were adopting practices in response to the amount of funding they receive for counterterrorism operations. The increase in funding could have been due to the amount of counterterrorism grants being issued to law enforcement agencies since September 11th. In 2011 alone, the DHS awarded over $2 billion in counterterrorism grants (Becker & Schulz, 2011). Overall, a law enforcement agency that received external funding for counterterrorism were more likely to focus on resources for terrorism preparedness than those who do not.

Contingency theory states that an organization adapts to its environment to accomplish a fit between structure and contingencies. For the purpose of this study, structure was measured by structural complexity (i.e., number of ranks and number of divisions/bureaus) and formalization (i.e., policies). Donaldson (2007) claimed that organizations strive to be fit so they can enjoy a high level of performance. In the current thesis, findings suggested that the variables formalization and number of rank levels had a positive effect on training. This means the more policies an agency implemented the more likely they focused on training opportunities for their personnel. Also, the more rank levels a law enforcement agency had, the more likely the agency provided counterterrorism training for their employees. As stated before, contingency theory hinges on the balance of organizational structure (i.e., formalization & diversification) and its contingencies (i.e., organizational size, diversification, risk, funding) in order for
an organization to retain a high performance (i.e., preparedness). The current findings suggested that contingency theory was a good framework for exploring terrorism preparedness. The data from the current study showed that the organizational structure component of contingency theory did drive training, which was a component of the dependent variable, preparedness. On the other side, risk and funding, contingency components of the theory, were shown to drive resources of the dependent variable. Therefore it could be concluded that contingency theory explained terrorism preparedness among law enforcement agencies, confirming past research (Davis et al., 2004, 2006; Schaefer, Burruss, & Giblin, 2009; Burruss et al., 2010).

Limitations

The study’s findings should be interpreted with the following limitations in mind. First, not all law enforcement agencies have a readily available email address for public consumption. This became a problem as the surveys were intended to be electronic. Of the original 902 agencies selected for the study, only 522 agencies had public email addresses. The remaining 380 agencies without an email address were mailed a paper copy of the survey.

Second, there were time constraints with this study. The survey was live only for a few months. It would have been ideal to have the survey live for at least 4 to 5 months before closing it for analysis. Third, there was a small return rate on the surveys. The researcher only had 115 usable cases for analysis out of the original 902 sample size. This gave the researcher a 12.74 percent return rate. Fourth, due to the small return rate and the lack of the bigger law enforcement agency respondents, generalizability cannot be
established. Finally, of the responding agencies, not all of the data received was complete. This was because agencies could to skip questions they did not want to answer.

Implications and Conclusion

Based on the findings of the current thesis a handful of implications can be drawn. First, law enforcement agencies felt they have a good level of terrorism preparedness given the resources they were able to acquire. Overall, this meant that agencies were able to obtain the necessary counterterrorism resources they needed to be prepared. Second, although agencies were locating resources, their organizations were not implementing a large number of training opportunities for their officers. Just over half of the agencies had scheduled training for terrorism related incidents. However, this finding shows that agencies were attempting to move in the direction of acquiring a higher level of terrorism preparedness. In answering the first research question, law enforcement agencies believe they have enough training and resources to respond and or prevent the next terrorist attack.

Next, based on the results of the current study, risk and funding drive whether an agency was able to obtain the necessary resources. Also, formalization and a portion of the structural complexity drives whether an agency attained counterterrorism training. Overall, contingency theory helped explain terrorism preparedness among law enforcement agencies. This finding confirmed previous studies stating that contingency theory assists in explaining homeland security preparedness (Davis et al. 2004, 2006; Schafer, Brruss, & Giblin, 2009; Brruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010). Finally, in answering the second research question, agency size did not influence terrorism
preparedness. However, perceived risk, funding and structure were found to have an influence on the level of preparedness.

The current study found that law enforcement agencies’ level of preparedness was driven by risk, funding, formalization, and the number of rank levels. However, agencies felt their level of preparedness with acquiring the necessary equipment needed for emergency operations was fair. It was concluded that law enforcement agencies believed they had the necessary resources and training to prevent and/or respond to a terrorist attack. The current results concluded that the theoretical framework helps explain terrorism preparedness. Future researchers should continue examining terrorism preparedness through the training and resources variables. More specifically, researchers should examine more specific influential factors that drive an agencies preparedness level through qualitative research that can capture a more in-depth explanation of an agency’s terrorism preparedness decisions.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX

LAW ENFORCEMENT PREPAREDNESS

SURVEY

Is it likely that you will have a terrorist attack within your jurisdiction in the next 5 years?
1   YES
2   NO

IF YES, which does your agency perceive as an immediate threat? (Circle all that apply)
1   CHEMICAL WARFARE
2   CYBER-TERRORISM
3   AGRO-TERRORISM (AGRICULTURE TERRORISM)
4   BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM
5   CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVES
6   RADIOLOGICAL THREATS
7   USE OF MILITARY WEAPONS

Since September 11th have you:
1   CREATED SPECIALIZED UNITS
2   CREATED AN INTERNAL TASK FORCE
3   ASSIGNED INDIVIDUALS TO ADDRESS EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
4   INCREASED NUMBER OF STAFF DEDICATED TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
5   SCHEDULED TRAINING FOR TERRORISM RELATED INCIDENTS
6   TRAINED PERSONNEL ON EMERGENCY RESPONSE
7   IDENTIFIED TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES
8   PARTICIPATED IN FIELD TRAINING EXERCISES
9   PARTICIPATED IN TABLE-TOP EXERCISES
10  NONE OF THE ABOVE

Please enter the number of officers in your agency trained in counterterrorism.

______________________ OFFICERS

Does your agency have an active cooperation with other agencies for the purpose of terrorism-related operations?
1   YES
2   NO
IF YES, what agencies do you actively cooperate with for the purpose of terrorism-related operations?
1. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS (FBI)
2. LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
3. FUSIONS CENTERS
4. FIRE SERVICES
5. STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
6. EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES (EMS)
7. OTHER STATE AGENCIES
8. OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES
9. DO NOT HAVE ACTIVE COOPERATION WITH OUTSIDE AGENCIES

Has your agency ever provided information to a fusion center?
1. YES
2. NO

Does your agency participate in the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)?
1. YES
2. NO

Does your agency have designated personnel to act as liaisons to other agencies on counterterrorism issues?
1. YES
2. NO

How much money did your agency receive for counterterrorism operations (i.e., training, equipment, personnel, etc.) last year?

$_____________________________

From your perspective of your agency, please rate your agency’s level of preparedness for the following critical incident responses: (Circle your answers)

**Partnership with other local responders:**

VERY POOR   POOR   FAIR   GOOD   VERY GOOD

**Ability to communication with other agencies:**

VERY POOR   POOR   FAIR   GOOD   VERY GOOD

**Written emergency response plan:**

VERY POOR   POOR   FAIR   GOOD   VERY GOOD
Training to respond to emergencies:

VERY POOR   POOR   FAIR   GOOD   VERY GOOD

Level of preparedness for large-scale incidents:

VERY POOR   POOR   FAIR   GOOD   VERY GOOD

Knowledge and expertise about emergency response:

VERY POOR   POOR   FAIR   GOOD   VERY GOOD

Equipment to respond to emergencies:

VERY POOR   POOR   FAIR   GOOD   VERY GOOD

Budget to support emergency operations:

VERY POOR   POOR   FAIR   GOOD   VERY GOOD
Your Agency

How many sworn/nonsworn officers does your agency employ?

Sworn Officers:
- FULL TIME
- PART TIME
- FULL TIME

Nonsworn Officers:
- PART TIME

How many rank levels (line officer, sergeant, lieutenant, etc.) does your agency have?

How many divisions/bureaus does your agency have?

Roughly, how many citizens does your agency serve?

Would you describe your jurisdiction as primarily:
1 RURAL
2 SUBURBAN
3 URBAN
4 OTHER
PLEASE EXPLAIN: ________________________________

Does your agency have a WRITTEN counterterrorism policy/plan?
1 YES
2 NO

Does your agency have formal policies on the following: (please circle your answer)
- USE OF FORCE
- RACIAL PROFILING
- CITIZENS COMPLIANCE
- HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

YES  NO
 YES  NO
 YES  NO
 YES  NO