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risk-based deposit insurance; bank moral hazard; deposit pricing; bank failures


Using the Russian banking system as a laboratory, we study the effect of a switch from fixed-rate deposit insurance to a risk-based system with premia tied to insured deposit rates offered by a bank. After the switch, increases in bank risk lead to reduced reliance on insured deposits, private banks without excessive capital stop raising insured deposit rates to fund loan growth, and the cost of insured deposits becomes a predictor of bank failures (beyond the CAMEL variables). Offering insured deposit rates notably above the market becomes a last resort to banks. The results suggest that risk-based deposit insurance schemes discouraging high insured deposit rates may help reduce bank moral hazard and improve financial stability.


This is the accepted version of the article that was published in Journal of Banking & Finance 138 (May 2022),

Available for download on Tuesday, September 16, 2025