The Hawk-Dove game is a classical game-theoretical model of potentially aggressive animal conflicts. In this paper, we apply game theory to a population of foraging animals that may engage in stealing food from one another. We assume that the population is composed of two types of individuals, Hawks and Doves. Hawks try to escalate encounters into aggressive contests while Doves engage in non-aggressive displays between themselves or concede to aggressive Hawks. The fitness of each type depends upon various natural parameters, such as food density, the mean handling time of a food item, as well as the mean times of conflicts over the food. We find the Evolutionarily Stable States (ESSs) for all parameter combinations and show that there are two possible ESSs, pure Hawks, or a mixed population of Hawks and Doves. We demonstrate that for any set of parameter values there is exactly one ESS.



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