Graduation Term

Summer 2026

Degree Name

Master of Science (MS)

Department

Department of Politics and Government

Committee Chair

Michael Hendricks

Committee Member

Noha Shawki

Abstract

This study addresses a critical gap in the resource curse literature by examining how strategic mineral wealth, central to the global clean energy transition, influences international arms transfers. While the relationship between oil rents, militarization, and conflict is well-established, the role of non-hydrocarbon resources and conflict-related variables remains underexplored. This paper posits that mineral rents provide governments with unearned, discretionary income, relaxing fiscal constraints and creating powerful incentives for both resource-rich states and major power suppliers to increase arms flows to secure political control, suppress internal dissent, and maintain access to valuable deposits. Using a country-year panel dataset spanning 1990-2023 and employing a fixed effects regression model, the analysis isolates within-country changes over time. The results provide robust empirical support for the hypothesis, demonstrating that a one percentage-point increase in mineral rents as a share of GDP corresponds to an approximate 33.4% increase in the value of reported firearms imports. These findings, which show a magnitude of effect comparable to oil rents, establish strategic minerals as a powerful and independent driver of militarization, fundamentally altering patterns of coercion and regional insecurity in the contemporary international system.

Access Type

Thesis-Open Access

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