Title

The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles

Author

Megan Kalafut, UndergraduateFollow

Files

Publication Date

4-2020

Document Type

Poster

Presentation Type

Individual

Degree Type

Undergraduate

Department

Philosophy

Mentor

David Sanson

Mentor Department

Philosophy

Abstract

The Identity of Indiscernibles is the principle that states, roughly, that if two things have all properties in common, then they are the same thing. It is an attractive principle because it gives us a criterion for identity and as such a criterion for counting. But, in “The Identity of Indiscernibles,” Max Black argues the principle is false because there could be two distinct but indiscernible spheres. In this poster, I explore the point and declare method of discerning, the implications of accepting the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is false, and the implications of accepting the point and declare method to support the Identity of Indiscernibles.

Recommended Citation

Kalafut, Megan, "The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles" (2020). Philosophy. 1.
https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/ursphi/1