Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Grazer Philosophische Studien

Publication Date

10-2023

Keywords

epistemology, epistemic circularity, positive epistemic status

Abstract

While there has been a great deal of discussion of whether and when beliefs formed in an epistemically circular manner can be justified, there has been almost no discussion of exactly which beliefs are formed in a circular manner. These discussions have tended to focus on an extremely limited number of intuitively-identified paradigm examples concerning attempts to establish the reliability of a method of belief formation. Here, I seek to answer a prior analytical question about the nature of epistemic circularity by developing a criterion which sorts epistemically circular beliefs from non-epistemically circular beliefs.

Comments

This is an accepted manuscript of an article published in Grazer Philosophische Studien100 (2023): 336–353. https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000192.

DOI

10.1163/18756735-0000019

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