Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Nous

Publication Date

12-1985

Keywords

induction, deduction, inductive logic, deductive logic, applied logic

Abstract

Most authors seem to assume there are two types of argument, deductive ones and inductive ones. But there is wide disagreement about how those two are to be distinguished from one another, and about whether there are two kinds of logic, deductive and inductive, relevant to evaluating arguments of each type. In this paper, I argue that all attempts to distinguish a logic of inductive arguments from a logic of deductive ones fail. I argue that the distinction between induction and deduction is not a logical distinction, but is rather a pragmatic one, pertaining to how “tight” the argument needs to be in order to provide adequate support of its conclusion within the context in which the argument occurs. The concepts found in deductive logic can be legitimately applied to any and all arguments, but in many cases deductive validity is not required for an argument to fulfill its purpose in providing strong reasons to accept its conclusion. Deductively invalid arguments can still be “tight” enough to be valuable, depending on the context in which they occur.

Comments

This paper was ultimately published in Noûs,Vol. 19, No. 4 (Dec., 1985), pp. 571-578.

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