Document Type

Article

Publication Title

American Philosophical Quarterly

Publication Date

7-1994

Keywords

Moral responsibility, determinism, scientific explanation, causation, compatibilism

Abstract

In order to show that persons can be morally accountable even though their choices are at least potentially explainable in a scientific way, the standard compatibilist position holds that causal determinism is compatible with some type of freedom or autonomy moral responsibility requires. This paper shows that even if causal determinism is indeed compatible with that sort of freedom, that cannot prove contemporary scientific explanations for choices are compatible with moral responsibility. In other words, this paper argues that much of the debate over free will, autonomy, and determinism cannot establish compatibilism. Recognition of this point leads us to seek a new approach to compatibilism

Comments

This is a preprint of an article first published in American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3, July 1999.

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