Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Synthese

Publication Date

2026

Keywords

epistemology, reliabilism, induction, conditional reliability, dependent reliability

Abstract

I explore a problem for the standard process reliabilist analysis of proper inference in terms of conditional reliability. The difficulty involves Goodman’s new riddle of induction, which can be used to argue that inductive inferences are in fact conditionally unreliable, and hence that no inductive inference is capable of producing a justified belief given the conditional reliability analysis. Accepting this conclusion would commit reliabilism to an unattractive form of inductive skepticism. I then consider some ways a reliabilist could resolve this problem, finally proposing a new analysis incorporating inferential dispositions.

Funding Source

This article was published Open Access thanks to a transformative agreement between Milner Library and Springer Nature.

Comments

First published in Synthese (2026):https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-026-05614-w

DOI

10.1007/s11229-026-05614-w

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